Why is belief necessary for justified true belief?

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In justified true belief it is said that for a person to know a fact it must be true, she must believe in it and she must be justified in believing it.



My question is: Is belief necessary? Why is the following not enough:



  1. The fact is true.

  2. She has justifiable reasons to conclude it is true.









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  • 1




    This is an interesting question; but why would anyone not believe something they have reason to believe is true, unless it is something that conflicts with their ideals? I personally find some things extremely difficult to believe for that reason, even with adequate evidence to the contrary. And I don't think that my reaction to, say, unpleasant truths, is all that uncommon. So there are things I rationally believe to be true, which my conscience or subconscious mind rejects.
    – Bread
    4 hours ago











  • I made an additional edit which you may roll back or continue editing. Good question to ask why all three of these are needed. +1
    – Frank Hubeny
    2 hours ago










  • On your proposal we'd have to say that creationists know that the evolution theory is true. That is not a common use of "know". There are theories of knowledge that discard belief as a condition, especially in artificial intelligence contexts, but they put in place more than 1 and 2, see Do machine learning algorithms have knowledge?
    – Conifold
    26 mins ago














up vote
4
down vote

favorite












In justified true belief it is said that for a person to know a fact it must be true, she must believe in it and she must be justified in believing it.



My question is: Is belief necessary? Why is the following not enough:



  1. The fact is true.

  2. She has justifiable reasons to conclude it is true.









share|improve this question









New contributor




george is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.















  • 1




    This is an interesting question; but why would anyone not believe something they have reason to believe is true, unless it is something that conflicts with their ideals? I personally find some things extremely difficult to believe for that reason, even with adequate evidence to the contrary. And I don't think that my reaction to, say, unpleasant truths, is all that uncommon. So there are things I rationally believe to be true, which my conscience or subconscious mind rejects.
    – Bread
    4 hours ago











  • I made an additional edit which you may roll back or continue editing. Good question to ask why all three of these are needed. +1
    – Frank Hubeny
    2 hours ago










  • On your proposal we'd have to say that creationists know that the evolution theory is true. That is not a common use of "know". There are theories of knowledge that discard belief as a condition, especially in artificial intelligence contexts, but they put in place more than 1 and 2, see Do machine learning algorithms have knowledge?
    – Conifold
    26 mins ago












up vote
4
down vote

favorite









up vote
4
down vote

favorite











In justified true belief it is said that for a person to know a fact it must be true, she must believe in it and she must be justified in believing it.



My question is: Is belief necessary? Why is the following not enough:



  1. The fact is true.

  2. She has justifiable reasons to conclude it is true.









share|improve this question









New contributor




george is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.











In justified true belief it is said that for a person to know a fact it must be true, she must believe in it and she must be justified in believing it.



My question is: Is belief necessary? Why is the following not enough:



  1. The fact is true.

  2. She has justifiable reasons to conclude it is true.






knowledge truth belief






share|improve this question









New contributor




george is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.











share|improve this question









New contributor




george is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.









share|improve this question




share|improve this question








edited 2 hours ago









Frank Hubeny

3,6852836




3,6852836






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asked 4 hours ago









george

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211




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george is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.






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  • 1




    This is an interesting question; but why would anyone not believe something they have reason to believe is true, unless it is something that conflicts with their ideals? I personally find some things extremely difficult to believe for that reason, even with adequate evidence to the contrary. And I don't think that my reaction to, say, unpleasant truths, is all that uncommon. So there are things I rationally believe to be true, which my conscience or subconscious mind rejects.
    – Bread
    4 hours ago











  • I made an additional edit which you may roll back or continue editing. Good question to ask why all three of these are needed. +1
    – Frank Hubeny
    2 hours ago










  • On your proposal we'd have to say that creationists know that the evolution theory is true. That is not a common use of "know". There are theories of knowledge that discard belief as a condition, especially in artificial intelligence contexts, but they put in place more than 1 and 2, see Do machine learning algorithms have knowledge?
    – Conifold
    26 mins ago












  • 1




    This is an interesting question; but why would anyone not believe something they have reason to believe is true, unless it is something that conflicts with their ideals? I personally find some things extremely difficult to believe for that reason, even with adequate evidence to the contrary. And I don't think that my reaction to, say, unpleasant truths, is all that uncommon. So there are things I rationally believe to be true, which my conscience or subconscious mind rejects.
    – Bread
    4 hours ago











  • I made an additional edit which you may roll back or continue editing. Good question to ask why all three of these are needed. +1
    – Frank Hubeny
    2 hours ago










  • On your proposal we'd have to say that creationists know that the evolution theory is true. That is not a common use of "know". There are theories of knowledge that discard belief as a condition, especially in artificial intelligence contexts, but they put in place more than 1 and 2, see Do machine learning algorithms have knowledge?
    – Conifold
    26 mins ago







1




1




This is an interesting question; but why would anyone not believe something they have reason to believe is true, unless it is something that conflicts with their ideals? I personally find some things extremely difficult to believe for that reason, even with adequate evidence to the contrary. And I don't think that my reaction to, say, unpleasant truths, is all that uncommon. So there are things I rationally believe to be true, which my conscience or subconscious mind rejects.
– Bread
4 hours ago





This is an interesting question; but why would anyone not believe something they have reason to believe is true, unless it is something that conflicts with their ideals? I personally find some things extremely difficult to believe for that reason, even with adequate evidence to the contrary. And I don't think that my reaction to, say, unpleasant truths, is all that uncommon. So there are things I rationally believe to be true, which my conscience or subconscious mind rejects.
– Bread
4 hours ago













I made an additional edit which you may roll back or continue editing. Good question to ask why all three of these are needed. +1
– Frank Hubeny
2 hours ago




I made an additional edit which you may roll back or continue editing. Good question to ask why all three of these are needed. +1
– Frank Hubeny
2 hours ago












On your proposal we'd have to say that creationists know that the evolution theory is true. That is not a common use of "know". There are theories of knowledge that discard belief as a condition, especially in artificial intelligence contexts, but they put in place more than 1 and 2, see Do machine learning algorithms have knowledge?
– Conifold
26 mins ago




On your proposal we'd have to say that creationists know that the evolution theory is true. That is not a common use of "know". There are theories of knowledge that discard belief as a condition, especially in artificial intelligence contexts, but they put in place more than 1 and 2, see Do machine learning algorithms have knowledge?
– Conifold
26 mins ago










2 Answers
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Your (1) and (2) are not enough. Here is an example: suppose I have excellent reasons to believe that the earth is round (I've seen photos, listened to lectures, etc.), and that it is in fact true that the earth is round, but nevertheless I do not believe it (because I'm irrational). Clearly this is not a case of knowledge.



There is a recent view, however, Knowledge First, that holds that knowledge cannot be analyzed in terms of belief (indeed, that it cannot be analyzed at all). But even on this view belief is a necessary condition for knowledge simply because knowledge entails belief.






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    up vote
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    down vote













    According to Eric Schwitzgebel,




    Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. To believe something, in this sense, needn't involve actively reflecting on it: Of the vast number of things ordinary adults believe, only a few can be at the fore of the mind at any single time. Nor does the term “belief”, in standard philosophical usage, imply any uncertainty or any extended reflection about the matter in question (as it sometimes does in ordinary English usage). Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane: that we have heads, that it's the 21st century, that a coffee mug is on the desk. Forming beliefs is thus one of the most basic and important features of the mind, and the concept of belief plays a crucial role in both philosophy of mind and epistemology.




    From this perspective the "belief" part of "justified true belief" is what is characterized as "true" and "justified" since we may have beliefs that are neither true nor justified.



    It is not something that we, in addition, have to believe in. We already believe the fact but our belief might be incorrect. Now the question is whether that fact, that belief, actually is true and justified.




    Reference



    Schwitzgebel, Eric, "Belief", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/belief/.






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      2 Answers
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      2 Answers
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      up vote
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      Your (1) and (2) are not enough. Here is an example: suppose I have excellent reasons to believe that the earth is round (I've seen photos, listened to lectures, etc.), and that it is in fact true that the earth is round, but nevertheless I do not believe it (because I'm irrational). Clearly this is not a case of knowledge.



      There is a recent view, however, Knowledge First, that holds that knowledge cannot be analyzed in terms of belief (indeed, that it cannot be analyzed at all). But even on this view belief is a necessary condition for knowledge simply because knowledge entails belief.






      share|improve this answer
























        up vote
        1
        down vote













        Your (1) and (2) are not enough. Here is an example: suppose I have excellent reasons to believe that the earth is round (I've seen photos, listened to lectures, etc.), and that it is in fact true that the earth is round, but nevertheless I do not believe it (because I'm irrational). Clearly this is not a case of knowledge.



        There is a recent view, however, Knowledge First, that holds that knowledge cannot be analyzed in terms of belief (indeed, that it cannot be analyzed at all). But even on this view belief is a necessary condition for knowledge simply because knowledge entails belief.






        share|improve this answer






















          up vote
          1
          down vote










          up vote
          1
          down vote









          Your (1) and (2) are not enough. Here is an example: suppose I have excellent reasons to believe that the earth is round (I've seen photos, listened to lectures, etc.), and that it is in fact true that the earth is round, but nevertheless I do not believe it (because I'm irrational). Clearly this is not a case of knowledge.



          There is a recent view, however, Knowledge First, that holds that knowledge cannot be analyzed in terms of belief (indeed, that it cannot be analyzed at all). But even on this view belief is a necessary condition for knowledge simply because knowledge entails belief.






          share|improve this answer












          Your (1) and (2) are not enough. Here is an example: suppose I have excellent reasons to believe that the earth is round (I've seen photos, listened to lectures, etc.), and that it is in fact true that the earth is round, but nevertheless I do not believe it (because I'm irrational). Clearly this is not a case of knowledge.



          There is a recent view, however, Knowledge First, that holds that knowledge cannot be analyzed in terms of belief (indeed, that it cannot be analyzed at all). But even on this view belief is a necessary condition for knowledge simply because knowledge entails belief.







          share|improve this answer












          share|improve this answer



          share|improve this answer










          answered 4 hours ago









          Eliran H

          3,67121031




          3,67121031




















              up vote
              0
              down vote













              According to Eric Schwitzgebel,




              Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. To believe something, in this sense, needn't involve actively reflecting on it: Of the vast number of things ordinary adults believe, only a few can be at the fore of the mind at any single time. Nor does the term “belief”, in standard philosophical usage, imply any uncertainty or any extended reflection about the matter in question (as it sometimes does in ordinary English usage). Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane: that we have heads, that it's the 21st century, that a coffee mug is on the desk. Forming beliefs is thus one of the most basic and important features of the mind, and the concept of belief plays a crucial role in both philosophy of mind and epistemology.




              From this perspective the "belief" part of "justified true belief" is what is characterized as "true" and "justified" since we may have beliefs that are neither true nor justified.



              It is not something that we, in addition, have to believe in. We already believe the fact but our belief might be incorrect. Now the question is whether that fact, that belief, actually is true and justified.




              Reference



              Schwitzgebel, Eric, "Belief", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/belief/.






              share|improve this answer


























                up vote
                0
                down vote













                According to Eric Schwitzgebel,




                Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. To believe something, in this sense, needn't involve actively reflecting on it: Of the vast number of things ordinary adults believe, only a few can be at the fore of the mind at any single time. Nor does the term “belief”, in standard philosophical usage, imply any uncertainty or any extended reflection about the matter in question (as it sometimes does in ordinary English usage). Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane: that we have heads, that it's the 21st century, that a coffee mug is on the desk. Forming beliefs is thus one of the most basic and important features of the mind, and the concept of belief plays a crucial role in both philosophy of mind and epistemology.




                From this perspective the "belief" part of "justified true belief" is what is characterized as "true" and "justified" since we may have beliefs that are neither true nor justified.



                It is not something that we, in addition, have to believe in. We already believe the fact but our belief might be incorrect. Now the question is whether that fact, that belief, actually is true and justified.




                Reference



                Schwitzgebel, Eric, "Belief", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/belief/.






                share|improve this answer
























                  up vote
                  0
                  down vote










                  up vote
                  0
                  down vote









                  According to Eric Schwitzgebel,




                  Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. To believe something, in this sense, needn't involve actively reflecting on it: Of the vast number of things ordinary adults believe, only a few can be at the fore of the mind at any single time. Nor does the term “belief”, in standard philosophical usage, imply any uncertainty or any extended reflection about the matter in question (as it sometimes does in ordinary English usage). Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane: that we have heads, that it's the 21st century, that a coffee mug is on the desk. Forming beliefs is thus one of the most basic and important features of the mind, and the concept of belief plays a crucial role in both philosophy of mind and epistemology.




                  From this perspective the "belief" part of "justified true belief" is what is characterized as "true" and "justified" since we may have beliefs that are neither true nor justified.



                  It is not something that we, in addition, have to believe in. We already believe the fact but our belief might be incorrect. Now the question is whether that fact, that belief, actually is true and justified.




                  Reference



                  Schwitzgebel, Eric, "Belief", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/belief/.






                  share|improve this answer














                  According to Eric Schwitzgebel,




                  Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. To believe something, in this sense, needn't involve actively reflecting on it: Of the vast number of things ordinary adults believe, only a few can be at the fore of the mind at any single time. Nor does the term “belief”, in standard philosophical usage, imply any uncertainty or any extended reflection about the matter in question (as it sometimes does in ordinary English usage). Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane: that we have heads, that it's the 21st century, that a coffee mug is on the desk. Forming beliefs is thus one of the most basic and important features of the mind, and the concept of belief plays a crucial role in both philosophy of mind and epistemology.




                  From this perspective the "belief" part of "justified true belief" is what is characterized as "true" and "justified" since we may have beliefs that are neither true nor justified.



                  It is not something that we, in addition, have to believe in. We already believe the fact but our belief might be incorrect. Now the question is whether that fact, that belief, actually is true and justified.




                  Reference



                  Schwitzgebel, Eric, "Belief", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/belief/.







                  share|improve this answer














                  share|improve this answer



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                  answered 21 mins ago









                  Frank Hubeny

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