Are propositions of logic for the tractarian Wittgenstein “sinnlos satze”?

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For the tractarian Wittgenstein propositions of logic did not have a meaning because logic was only an instrument.



Given that he divided meaningless propositions into unsinnig satze (nonsense) and sinnlos satze (meaningless), which category do the propositions of logic belong to?



Is it legitimate to say that propositions of logic are sinnlos, whereas propositions of metaphysics are unsinnig?










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  • I made some edits to hopefully clarify the question. I am curious about this as well now that you've raised the question. +1
    – Frank Hubeny
    4 hours ago














up vote
1
down vote

favorite












For the tractarian Wittgenstein propositions of logic did not have a meaning because logic was only an instrument.



Given that he divided meaningless propositions into unsinnig satze (nonsense) and sinnlos satze (meaningless), which category do the propositions of logic belong to?



Is it legitimate to say that propositions of logic are sinnlos, whereas propositions of metaphysics are unsinnig?










share|improve this question























  • I made some edits to hopefully clarify the question. I am curious about this as well now that you've raised the question. +1
    – Frank Hubeny
    4 hours ago












up vote
1
down vote

favorite









up vote
1
down vote

favorite











For the tractarian Wittgenstein propositions of logic did not have a meaning because logic was only an instrument.



Given that he divided meaningless propositions into unsinnig satze (nonsense) and sinnlos satze (meaningless), which category do the propositions of logic belong to?



Is it legitimate to say that propositions of logic are sinnlos, whereas propositions of metaphysics are unsinnig?










share|improve this question















For the tractarian Wittgenstein propositions of logic did not have a meaning because logic was only an instrument.



Given that he divided meaningless propositions into unsinnig satze (nonsense) and sinnlos satze (meaningless), which category do the propositions of logic belong to?



Is it legitimate to say that propositions of logic are sinnlos, whereas propositions of metaphysics are unsinnig?







philosophy-of-language wittgenstein






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edited 3 hours ago









Eliran H

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asked 4 hours ago









franz1

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  • I made some edits to hopefully clarify the question. I am curious about this as well now that you've raised the question. +1
    – Frank Hubeny
    4 hours ago
















  • I made some edits to hopefully clarify the question. I am curious about this as well now that you've raised the question. +1
    – Frank Hubeny
    4 hours ago















I made some edits to hopefully clarify the question. I am curious about this as well now that you've raised the question. +1
– Frank Hubeny
4 hours ago




I made some edits to hopefully clarify the question. I am curious about this as well now that you've raised the question. +1
– Frank Hubeny
4 hours ago










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For the early Wittgenstein, logical propositions (tautologies/contradictions) are senseless, but not nonsense. He says this explicitly in the Tractatus:




4.461 Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.
A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition.
Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.
(Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)
(For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.)



4.4611 Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism, much as ‘0’ is part of the symbolism of arithmetic.







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    For the early Wittgenstein, logical propositions (tautologies/contradictions) are senseless, but not nonsense. He says this explicitly in the Tractatus:




    4.461 Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.
    A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition.
    Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.
    (Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)
    (For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.)



    4.4611 Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism, much as ‘0’ is part of the symbolism of arithmetic.







    share|improve this answer
























      up vote
      2
      down vote













      For the early Wittgenstein, logical propositions (tautologies/contradictions) are senseless, but not nonsense. He says this explicitly in the Tractatus:




      4.461 Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.
      A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition.
      Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.
      (Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)
      (For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.)



      4.4611 Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism, much as ‘0’ is part of the symbolism of arithmetic.







      share|improve this answer






















        up vote
        2
        down vote










        up vote
        2
        down vote









        For the early Wittgenstein, logical propositions (tautologies/contradictions) are senseless, but not nonsense. He says this explicitly in the Tractatus:




        4.461 Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.
        A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition.
        Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.
        (Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)
        (For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.)



        4.4611 Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism, much as ‘0’ is part of the symbolism of arithmetic.







        share|improve this answer












        For the early Wittgenstein, logical propositions (tautologies/contradictions) are senseless, but not nonsense. He says this explicitly in the Tractatus:




        4.461 Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.
        A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition.
        Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.
        (Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)
        (For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.)



        4.4611 Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism, much as ‘0’ is part of the symbolism of arithmetic.








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        answered 2 hours ago









        Eliran H

        3,66121031




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