Why can we not use the group $Z_p^*$ for cryptography?

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Sorry if this is a noob question, but for instance in ECDSA, we start by considering the field $mathbb F_p$, whose the elements also form a group under multiplication. Why don't we just use this group instead of the one that is generated by the solutions of an elliptic curve equation lying in this field? I.E. choose an element lying in this field $g$ and choose a random number $n$ as a private key, and let $g^n$ be the public key. Is is just because of the reduction in key size? It seems like a high price to pay for the additional structure imposed by the curve equation.










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  • Are you specifically asking about DSA vs ECDSA?
    – mikeazo
    3 hours ago










  • Rather about ElGamal v.s. ECDSA, I think
    – Erik
    2 hours ago










  • I was almost sure we already had a question like "why use ECDSA instead of plain DSA?" lying around, but it looks like we don't. The closest thing I could find was this, which is not quite it.
    – Ilmari Karonen
    2 hours ago











  • ...although we do also have this general question with some pretty nice answers.
    – Ilmari Karonen
    2 hours ago














up vote
2
down vote

favorite












Sorry if this is a noob question, but for instance in ECDSA, we start by considering the field $mathbb F_p$, whose the elements also form a group under multiplication. Why don't we just use this group instead of the one that is generated by the solutions of an elliptic curve equation lying in this field? I.E. choose an element lying in this field $g$ and choose a random number $n$ as a private key, and let $g^n$ be the public key. Is is just because of the reduction in key size? It seems like a high price to pay for the additional structure imposed by the curve equation.










share|improve this question









New contributor




Erik is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.



















  • Are you specifically asking about DSA vs ECDSA?
    – mikeazo
    3 hours ago










  • Rather about ElGamal v.s. ECDSA, I think
    – Erik
    2 hours ago










  • I was almost sure we already had a question like "why use ECDSA instead of plain DSA?" lying around, but it looks like we don't. The closest thing I could find was this, which is not quite it.
    – Ilmari Karonen
    2 hours ago











  • ...although we do also have this general question with some pretty nice answers.
    – Ilmari Karonen
    2 hours ago












up vote
2
down vote

favorite









up vote
2
down vote

favorite











Sorry if this is a noob question, but for instance in ECDSA, we start by considering the field $mathbb F_p$, whose the elements also form a group under multiplication. Why don't we just use this group instead of the one that is generated by the solutions of an elliptic curve equation lying in this field? I.E. choose an element lying in this field $g$ and choose a random number $n$ as a private key, and let $g^n$ be the public key. Is is just because of the reduction in key size? It seems like a high price to pay for the additional structure imposed by the curve equation.










share|improve this question









New contributor




Erik is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.











Sorry if this is a noob question, but for instance in ECDSA, we start by considering the field $mathbb F_p$, whose the elements also form a group under multiplication. Why don't we just use this group instead of the one that is generated by the solutions of an elliptic curve equation lying in this field? I.E. choose an element lying in this field $g$ and choose a random number $n$ as a private key, and let $g^n$ be the public key. Is is just because of the reduction in key size? It seems like a high price to pay for the additional structure imposed by the curve equation.







rsa dsa






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Erik is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.











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Check out our Code of Conduct.









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edited 50 mins ago





















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Erik is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.






Erik is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.











  • Are you specifically asking about DSA vs ECDSA?
    – mikeazo
    3 hours ago










  • Rather about ElGamal v.s. ECDSA, I think
    – Erik
    2 hours ago










  • I was almost sure we already had a question like "why use ECDSA instead of plain DSA?" lying around, but it looks like we don't. The closest thing I could find was this, which is not quite it.
    – Ilmari Karonen
    2 hours ago











  • ...although we do also have this general question with some pretty nice answers.
    – Ilmari Karonen
    2 hours ago
















  • Are you specifically asking about DSA vs ECDSA?
    – mikeazo
    3 hours ago










  • Rather about ElGamal v.s. ECDSA, I think
    – Erik
    2 hours ago










  • I was almost sure we already had a question like "why use ECDSA instead of plain DSA?" lying around, but it looks like we don't. The closest thing I could find was this, which is not quite it.
    – Ilmari Karonen
    2 hours ago











  • ...although we do also have this general question with some pretty nice answers.
    – Ilmari Karonen
    2 hours ago















Are you specifically asking about DSA vs ECDSA?
– mikeazo
3 hours ago




Are you specifically asking about DSA vs ECDSA?
– mikeazo
3 hours ago












Rather about ElGamal v.s. ECDSA, I think
– Erik
2 hours ago




Rather about ElGamal v.s. ECDSA, I think
– Erik
2 hours ago












I was almost sure we already had a question like "why use ECDSA instead of plain DSA?" lying around, but it looks like we don't. The closest thing I could find was this, which is not quite it.
– Ilmari Karonen
2 hours ago





I was almost sure we already had a question like "why use ECDSA instead of plain DSA?" lying around, but it looks like we don't. The closest thing I could find was this, which is not quite it.
– Ilmari Karonen
2 hours ago













...although we do also have this general question with some pretty nice answers.
– Ilmari Karonen
2 hours ago




...although we do also have this general question with some pretty nice answers.
– Ilmari Karonen
2 hours ago










1 Answer
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You can use the multiplicative group $mathbbZ_p^*$, provided you use a key long enough to be secure.



Diffie-Hellman key exchange, DSA and the ElGamal cryptosystem were originally defined based on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) over finite fields.



The challenge is that since then several methods have been found to reduce the complexity of the DLP (e.g. number field sieve, Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, Pollard's Rho algorithm). Consequently for these algorithms to be secure today it is necessary to use long (>3072 bits) prime fields. Additionally, since the scaling of hardness is sub-exponential in p, doubling the hardness of the problem requires that p is increased by much more than 2 (so secure key lengths will grow near-exponentially over time).



The advantage of using cryptography over elliptic curve groups is that you end up with smaller key lengths and ciphertexts for equivalent hardness (e.g. 256-bit ECC versus 3072 bit) and it scales better (so doubling the complexity means adding a single bit instead of adding many bits).






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  • @fgrieu, thanks... I assumed the multiplicative group but good to be explicit.
    – jadb
    1 hour ago










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1 Answer
1






active

oldest

votes








1 Answer
1






active

oldest

votes









active

oldest

votes






active

oldest

votes








up vote
5
down vote













You can use the multiplicative group $mathbbZ_p^*$, provided you use a key long enough to be secure.



Diffie-Hellman key exchange, DSA and the ElGamal cryptosystem were originally defined based on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) over finite fields.



The challenge is that since then several methods have been found to reduce the complexity of the DLP (e.g. number field sieve, Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, Pollard's Rho algorithm). Consequently for these algorithms to be secure today it is necessary to use long (>3072 bits) prime fields. Additionally, since the scaling of hardness is sub-exponential in p, doubling the hardness of the problem requires that p is increased by much more than 2 (so secure key lengths will grow near-exponentially over time).



The advantage of using cryptography over elliptic curve groups is that you end up with smaller key lengths and ciphertexts for equivalent hardness (e.g. 256-bit ECC versus 3072 bit) and it scales better (so doubling the complexity means adding a single bit instead of adding many bits).






share|improve this answer






















  • @fgrieu, thanks... I assumed the multiplicative group but good to be explicit.
    – jadb
    1 hour ago














up vote
5
down vote













You can use the multiplicative group $mathbbZ_p^*$, provided you use a key long enough to be secure.



Diffie-Hellman key exchange, DSA and the ElGamal cryptosystem were originally defined based on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) over finite fields.



The challenge is that since then several methods have been found to reduce the complexity of the DLP (e.g. number field sieve, Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, Pollard's Rho algorithm). Consequently for these algorithms to be secure today it is necessary to use long (>3072 bits) prime fields. Additionally, since the scaling of hardness is sub-exponential in p, doubling the hardness of the problem requires that p is increased by much more than 2 (so secure key lengths will grow near-exponentially over time).



The advantage of using cryptography over elliptic curve groups is that you end up with smaller key lengths and ciphertexts for equivalent hardness (e.g. 256-bit ECC versus 3072 bit) and it scales better (so doubling the complexity means adding a single bit instead of adding many bits).






share|improve this answer






















  • @fgrieu, thanks... I assumed the multiplicative group but good to be explicit.
    – jadb
    1 hour ago












up vote
5
down vote










up vote
5
down vote









You can use the multiplicative group $mathbbZ_p^*$, provided you use a key long enough to be secure.



Diffie-Hellman key exchange, DSA and the ElGamal cryptosystem were originally defined based on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) over finite fields.



The challenge is that since then several methods have been found to reduce the complexity of the DLP (e.g. number field sieve, Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, Pollard's Rho algorithm). Consequently for these algorithms to be secure today it is necessary to use long (>3072 bits) prime fields. Additionally, since the scaling of hardness is sub-exponential in p, doubling the hardness of the problem requires that p is increased by much more than 2 (so secure key lengths will grow near-exponentially over time).



The advantage of using cryptography over elliptic curve groups is that you end up with smaller key lengths and ciphertexts for equivalent hardness (e.g. 256-bit ECC versus 3072 bit) and it scales better (so doubling the complexity means adding a single bit instead of adding many bits).






share|improve this answer














You can use the multiplicative group $mathbbZ_p^*$, provided you use a key long enough to be secure.



Diffie-Hellman key exchange, DSA and the ElGamal cryptosystem were originally defined based on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) over finite fields.



The challenge is that since then several methods have been found to reduce the complexity of the DLP (e.g. number field sieve, Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, Pollard's Rho algorithm). Consequently for these algorithms to be secure today it is necessary to use long (>3072 bits) prime fields. Additionally, since the scaling of hardness is sub-exponential in p, doubling the hardness of the problem requires that p is increased by much more than 2 (so secure key lengths will grow near-exponentially over time).



The advantage of using cryptography over elliptic curve groups is that you end up with smaller key lengths and ciphertexts for equivalent hardness (e.g. 256-bit ECC versus 3072 bit) and it scales better (so doubling the complexity means adding a single bit instead of adding many bits).







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edited 11 mins ago









Ella Rose

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answered 2 hours ago









jadb

3507




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  • @fgrieu, thanks... I assumed the multiplicative group but good to be explicit.
    – jadb
    1 hour ago
















  • @fgrieu, thanks... I assumed the multiplicative group but good to be explicit.
    – jadb
    1 hour ago















@fgrieu, thanks... I assumed the multiplicative group but good to be explicit.
– jadb
1 hour ago




@fgrieu, thanks... I assumed the multiplicative group but good to be explicit.
– jadb
1 hour ago










Erik is a new contributor. Be nice, and check out our Code of Conduct.









 

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