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Why did the Confederacy think they could win the American Civil War?
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The early Confederacy (The 7 founding states) attacked Fort Sumter in April 1861, starting the American Civil War. The Confederacy knew this would lead to war with the Union, yet they seemed to be confident in their odds of succeeding.
Shortly after the start of war, 4 other States joined the Confederacy. They also must have thought that this was a war they would win.
I know the Confederacy expected at least to some degree an involvement of Europe that did not come (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotton_diplomacy), but there must have been better plans than that. Unlike the Confederacy, the Union had a large industrialized and urbanized area (the Northeast), and more advanced commercial, transportation and financial systems than the rural South. Additionally, the Union states had a manpower advantage of 5 to 2 at the start of the war.
What documented evidence exists which indicates the political, industrial, infrastructure, economical, military, and/or other significant factors considered favorable to the Confederacy as reasons for having confidence in a victory over the Union?
united-states american-civil-war confederacy
edited 8 hours ago
Kerry L
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asked 14 hours ago
Robert Tausig
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The early Confederacy (The 7 founding states) attacked Fort Sumter in April 1861, starting the American Civil War. The Confederacy knew this would lead to war with the Union, yet they seemed to be confident in their odds of succeeding.
Shortly after the start of war, 4 other States joined the Confederacy. They also must have thought that this was a war they would win.
I know the Confederacy expected at least to some degree an involvement of Europe that did not come (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotton_diplomacy), but there must have been better plans than that. Unlike the Confederacy, the Union had a large industrialized and urbanized area (the Northeast), and more advanced commercial, transportation and financial systems than the rural South. Additionally, the Union states had a manpower advantage of 5 to 2 at the start of the war.
What documented evidence exists which indicates the political, industrial, infrastructure, economical, military, and/or other significant factors considered favorable to the Confederacy as reasons for having confidence in a victory over the Union?
united-states american-civil-war confederacy
edited 8 hours ago
Kerry L
1,455431
asked 14 hours ago
Robert Tausig
312
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Robert Tausig is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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3
It would also be valid to ask why the Confederacy thought the war could be won. (that's not a hypothetical). Or what contemporaries thought of the chances. (I researched this a few years ago, and was kind of interested in what other nations thought - England backed the Confederacy, and nearly had to pay reparations. ) Or, you could try worldbuilding. In either case, welcome to the site; hope you find good stuff.
– Mark C. Wallace♦
12 hours ago
From memory, without sources, Southern leadership was better, but the South was committed to the cause in a way the North could not imagine. The conflict had been brewing since before the country was founded, and the South felt it was clear that the North wanted to obliterate the Southern way of life. Few thought the North would bleed for black lives (the North was no less racist). Perhaps someone can expand and source?
– Mark C. Wallace♦
7 hours ago
Perhaps they thought that Lincoln and other Northern politicians (and the people) would be unwilling to accept the slaughter of 2/3 of a million men as the price for keeping the South?
– jamesqf
5 hours ago
Possible duplicate What reasons did the Confederacy have for believing they would have a quick victory?
– Lars Bosteen
4 hours ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
5
down vote
favorite
up vote
5
down vote
favorite
The early Confederacy (The 7 founding states) attacked Fort Sumter in April 1861, starting the American Civil War. The Confederacy knew this would lead to war with the Union, yet they seemed to be confident in their odds of succeeding.
Shortly after the start of war, 4 other States joined the Confederacy. They also must have thought that this was a war they would win.
I know the Confederacy expected at least to some degree an involvement of Europe that did not come (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotton_diplomacy), but there must have been better plans than that. Unlike the Confederacy, the Union had a large industrialized and urbanized area (the Northeast), and more advanced commercial, transportation and financial systems than the rural South. Additionally, the Union states had a manpower advantage of 5 to 2 at the start of the war.
What documented evidence exists which indicates the political, industrial, infrastructure, economical, military, and/or other significant factors considered favorable to the Confederacy as reasons for having confidence in a victory over the Union?
united-states american-civil-war confederacy
edited 8 hours ago
Kerry L
1,455431
asked 14 hours ago
Robert Tausig
312
New contributor
Robert Tausig is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
The early Confederacy (The 7 founding states) attacked Fort Sumter in April 1861, starting the American Civil War. The Confederacy knew this would lead to war with the Union, yet they seemed to be confident in their odds of succeeding.
Shortly after the start of war, 4 other States joined the Confederacy. They also must have thought that this was a war they would win.
I know the Confederacy expected at least to some degree an involvement of Europe that did not come (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotton_diplomacy), but there must have been better plans than that. Unlike the Confederacy, the Union had a large industrialized and urbanized area (the Northeast), and more advanced commercial, transportation and financial systems than the rural South. Additionally, the Union states had a manpower advantage of 5 to 2 at the start of the war.
What documented evidence exists which indicates the political, industrial, infrastructure, economical, military, and/or other significant factors considered favorable to the Confederacy as reasons for having confidence in a victory over the Union?
united-states american-civil-war confederacy
united-states american-civil-war confederacy
edited 8 hours ago
Kerry L
1,455431
asked 14 hours ago
Robert Tausig
312
New contributor
Robert Tausig is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
edited 8 hours ago
Kerry L
1,455431
asked 14 hours ago
Robert Tausig
312
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Robert Tausig is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
edited 8 hours ago
Kerry L
1,455431
edited 8 hours ago
Kerry L
1,455431
edited 8 hours ago
Kerry L
1,455431
1,455431
asked 14 hours ago
Robert Tausig
312
New contributor
Robert Tausig is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
asked 14 hours ago
Robert Tausig
312
asked 14 hours ago
Robert Tausig
312
312
New contributor
Robert Tausig is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
New contributor
Robert Tausig is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
Robert Tausig is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
3
It would also be valid to ask why the Confederacy thought the war could be won. (that's not a hypothetical). Or what contemporaries thought of the chances. (I researched this a few years ago, and was kind of interested in what other nations thought - England backed the Confederacy, and nearly had to pay reparations. ) Or, you could try worldbuilding. In either case, welcome to the site; hope you find good stuff.
– Mark C. Wallace♦
12 hours ago
From memory, without sources, Southern leadership was better, but the South was committed to the cause in a way the North could not imagine. The conflict had been brewing since before the country was founded, and the South felt it was clear that the North wanted to obliterate the Southern way of life. Few thought the North would bleed for black lives (the North was no less racist). Perhaps someone can expand and source?
– Mark C. Wallace♦
7 hours ago
Perhaps they thought that Lincoln and other Northern politicians (and the people) would be unwilling to accept the slaughter of 2/3 of a million men as the price for keeping the South?
– jamesqf
5 hours ago
Possible duplicate What reasons did the Confederacy have for believing they would have a quick victory?
– Lars Bosteen
4 hours ago
add a comment |Â
3
It would also be valid to ask why the Confederacy thought the war could be won. (that's not a hypothetical). Or what contemporaries thought of the chances. (I researched this a few years ago, and was kind of interested in what other nations thought - England backed the Confederacy, and nearly had to pay reparations. ) Or, you could try worldbuilding. In either case, welcome to the site; hope you find good stuff.
– Mark C. Wallace♦
12 hours ago
From memory, without sources, Southern leadership was better, but the South was committed to the cause in a way the North could not imagine. The conflict had been brewing since before the country was founded, and the South felt it was clear that the North wanted to obliterate the Southern way of life. Few thought the North would bleed for black lives (the North was no less racist). Perhaps someone can expand and source?
– Mark C. Wallace♦
7 hours ago
Perhaps they thought that Lincoln and other Northern politicians (and the people) would be unwilling to accept the slaughter of 2/3 of a million men as the price for keeping the South?
– jamesqf
5 hours ago
Possible duplicate What reasons did the Confederacy have for believing they would have a quick victory?
– Lars Bosteen
4 hours ago
3
3
It would also be valid to ask why the Confederacy thought the war could be won. (that's not a hypothetical). Or what contemporaries thought of the chances. (I researched this a few years ago, and was kind of interested in what other nations thought - England backed the Confederacy, and nearly had to pay reparations. ) Or, you could try worldbuilding. In either case, welcome to the site; hope you find good stuff.
– Mark C. Wallace♦
12 hours ago
It would also be valid to ask why the Confederacy thought the war could be won. (that's not a hypothetical). Or what contemporaries thought of the chances. (I researched this a few years ago, and was kind of interested in what other nations thought - England backed the Confederacy, and nearly had to pay reparations. ) Or, you could try worldbuilding. In either case, welcome to the site; hope you find good stuff.
– Mark C. Wallace♦
12 hours ago
From memory, without sources, Southern leadership was better, but the South was committed to the cause in a way the North could not imagine. The conflict had been brewing since before the country was founded, and the South felt it was clear that the North wanted to obliterate the Southern way of life. Few thought the North would bleed for black lives (the North was no less racist). Perhaps someone can expand and source?
– Mark C. Wallace♦
7 hours ago
From memory, without sources, Southern leadership was better, but the South was committed to the cause in a way the North could not imagine. The conflict had been brewing since before the country was founded, and the South felt it was clear that the North wanted to obliterate the Southern way of life. Few thought the North would bleed for black lives (the North was no less racist). Perhaps someone can expand and source?
– Mark C. Wallace♦
7 hours ago
Perhaps they thought that Lincoln and other Northern politicians (and the people) would be unwilling to accept the slaughter of 2/3 of a million men as the price for keeping the South?
– jamesqf
5 hours ago
Perhaps they thought that Lincoln and other Northern politicians (and the people) would be unwilling to accept the slaughter of 2/3 of a million men as the price for keeping the South?
– jamesqf
5 hours ago
Possible duplicate What reasons did the Confederacy have for believing they would have a quick victory?
– Lars Bosteen
4 hours ago
Possible duplicate What reasons did the Confederacy have for believing they would have a quick victory?
– Lars Bosteen
4 hours ago
add a comment |Â
3 Answers
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The vast wealth of the Southern plantations was intrinsically tied up with their ability to generate a fabulous annual income, at low risk. Once the Union blockade was established by autumn 1861 those income streams shrank, the associated risk rose, and the value of those plantations, dropped to a tiny fraction of the ante bellum value.
For a perpetual annuity, a reasonable ante bellum approximation, PV = D / r. With D dropping by 80+% and r increasing by a factor of 2 or 3, those fabulous plantations were suddenly worth less than 10% of their 1860 value; and even at that price there were no buyers available. Not only was direct income of the CSA hit by the blockade, but its fabulous pre-war wealth and the associated borrowing capability instantly vanished. In just a span of months the CSA went from being fabulously wealthy to destitute and bankrupt.
The expectation also existed that Britain and France would intervene to protect their growing textile industries. However with greatly shrunken supply, those mills were able to maintain profitably due to greatly increased prices, as well (ironically) for the immediately increased demand for cotton military uniforms required by both sides.
Finally, the South was unaware of the repugnance with which its slave-holding economy was regarded in Europe. This ensured that Britain and France would only enter the war to jump on an already victorious bandwagon, and not to decide the fray.
The only way in which this triple whammy could possibly have been avoided would have been to enter the war with an already extant navy capable of keeping at least a few of he South's major ports open against a blockade. In practical terms this likely meant a need for several years of pre-war independence. This was never going to happen under a Republican president, so it would have been necessary to secede under Buchanan and immediately begin a naval construction program, while he remained President.
answered 5 hours ago
Pieter Geerkens
34.9k597166
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up vote
3
down vote
Militarily, the south did not need to win the war by invading and defeating the north. Their belief was that they just had to hold on to what they had, hence their defensive strategy. Allied with this was their belief in
the power of “King Cotton†and its allure to the European powers.
Davis and his advisors regarded the fiber’s pull as so strong that
they could almost assume British and French recognition.
Source: Donald Stoker, The Grand Design Strategy and the US Civil War
Diplomacy and economic pressure were to play decisive roles in the southern strategy:
The chance that the Confederacy had, leaders in Richmond believed,
rested in the power of cotton to compel European statesmen and finan-
ciers to side with their cause. The key commodity of the
nineteenth-century Atlantic economy, Southern cotton fueled the
textile industries of Europe and sustained an estimated twenty percent
of the British population.3 With this trump card in their hand,
Confederate leaders were convinced that they could dictate Civil War
diplomacy. Cotton, Southern statesmen held, could be a bargaining chip
employed to induce British recognition of the Confederacy. With this
accomplished, the commodity could reassume its traditional role as a
source of foreign exchange that would provide the Confederacy with the
credit needed to obtain war supplies abroad.
Source: Jay Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era 1837–1873
The south had great confidence in its economy, in part because of “decades of expanding productionâ€Â. More recently, the Panic of 1857 had meant
the South, profiting from the steady exportation of the staple,
largely escaped the financial crisis that enveloped the North.
Southerners saw their avoidance of the panic as a triumph of an
economy that was based on agriculture and trade rather than on finance
and speculation. As DeBow’s Review, the voice of the commercial South,
declared in 1857, ‘‘the wealth of the South is permanent and real,
that of the North fugitive and fictitious.’’
Source: Sexton
Confederate President Jefferson Davis believed that once recognition had been achieved,
economic and military support would follow, thus guaranteeing
Confederate independence. Moreover, Davis believed that British
recognition alone would discourage the North from prosecuting the war,
and that the Union would withdraw from the fight from a fear of
British intervention.
Source: Stoker
The southern strategy was at times not without realistic hope for
The Palmerston cabinet twice considered intervening in the Civil War,
most likely by joining France in extending an offer of mediation to
the warring sides. Though not an outright recognition of the
Confederacy’s independence, mediation was a policy favorable to the
South as it would seek peace—which, given the success of Confederate
armies at the time, would almost certainly result in the separation of
the North and South.
Source: Sexton
No less a statesman than William Gladstone, in a speech in October 1862, went so far as to say:
There is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South
have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have
made what is more than either—they have made a nation.
Source: Sexton
Ultimately, though, southern hopes were sunk by, among other things, the British middle and working classes’ intense dislike of slavery, and the Emancipation proclamation (1st Jan 1863) was perhaps the final nail in the coffin of southern hopes for British and French intervention.
answered 2 hours ago
Lars Bosteen
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The majority of the economic and political elite of the Southern States were aware of the existential threat to their economy and culture—chiefly as these were the direct result of malapportionment so as to continue latifundia slavery.
Existential threats are necessarily those which threaten the existence of an agent. The results of a lost war were identical with the results of not fighting. The elite of the South did not need to inquire into the likely chances of their success.
There are reasons for the average member of the elite to believe in the possibility of success based on the popular imagination surrounding very unlikely military causes such as the Dutch Republic, The American Republic and the French Republic and Empire. It does need to be remembered that politicians and even generals are poor analysts of the likelihood of martial success.
Finally the 19th century thought of elites were infected with thoughts of Elan and right making might.
answered 5 hours ago
Samuel Russell
8,85932971
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3 Answers
3
active
oldest
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3 Answers
3
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
up vote
3
down vote
The vast wealth of the Southern plantations was intrinsically tied up with their ability to generate a fabulous annual income, at low risk. Once the Union blockade was established by autumn 1861 those income streams shrank, the associated risk rose, and the value of those plantations, dropped to a tiny fraction of the ante bellum value.
For a perpetual annuity, a reasonable ante bellum approximation, PV = D / r. With D dropping by 80+% and r increasing by a factor of 2 or 3, those fabulous plantations were suddenly worth less than 10% of their 1860 value; and even at that price there were no buyers available. Not only was direct income of the CSA hit by the blockade, but its fabulous pre-war wealth and the associated borrowing capability instantly vanished. In just a span of months the CSA went from being fabulously wealthy to destitute and bankrupt.
The expectation also existed that Britain and France would intervene to protect their growing textile industries. However with greatly shrunken supply, those mills were able to maintain profitably due to greatly increased prices, as well (ironically) for the immediately increased demand for cotton military uniforms required by both sides.
Finally, the South was unaware of the repugnance with which its slave-holding economy was regarded in Europe. This ensured that Britain and France would only enter the war to jump on an already victorious bandwagon, and not to decide the fray.
The only way in which this triple whammy could possibly have been avoided would have been to enter the war with an already extant navy capable of keeping at least a few of he South's major ports open against a blockade. In practical terms this likely meant a need for several years of pre-war independence. This was never going to happen under a Republican president, so it would have been necessary to secede under Buchanan and immediately begin a naval construction program, while he remained President.
answered 5 hours ago
Pieter Geerkens
34.9k597166
add a comment |Â
up vote
3
down vote
The vast wealth of the Southern plantations was intrinsically tied up with their ability to generate a fabulous annual income, at low risk. Once the Union blockade was established by autumn 1861 those income streams shrank, the associated risk rose, and the value of those plantations, dropped to a tiny fraction of the ante bellum value.
For a perpetual annuity, a reasonable ante bellum approximation, PV = D / r. With D dropping by 80+% and r increasing by a factor of 2 or 3, those fabulous plantations were suddenly worth less than 10% of their 1860 value; and even at that price there were no buyers available. Not only was direct income of the CSA hit by the blockade, but its fabulous pre-war wealth and the associated borrowing capability instantly vanished. In just a span of months the CSA went from being fabulously wealthy to destitute and bankrupt.
The expectation also existed that Britain and France would intervene to protect their growing textile industries. However with greatly shrunken supply, those mills were able to maintain profitably due to greatly increased prices, as well (ironically) for the immediately increased demand for cotton military uniforms required by both sides.
Finally, the South was unaware of the repugnance with which its slave-holding economy was regarded in Europe. This ensured that Britain and France would only enter the war to jump on an already victorious bandwagon, and not to decide the fray.
The only way in which this triple whammy could possibly have been avoided would have been to enter the war with an already extant navy capable of keeping at least a few of he South's major ports open against a blockade. In practical terms this likely meant a need for several years of pre-war independence. This was never going to happen under a Republican president, so it would have been necessary to secede under Buchanan and immediately begin a naval construction program, while he remained President.
answered 5 hours ago
Pieter Geerkens
34.9k597166
add a comment |Â
up vote
3
down vote
up vote
3
down vote
The vast wealth of the Southern plantations was intrinsically tied up with their ability to generate a fabulous annual income, at low risk. Once the Union blockade was established by autumn 1861 those income streams shrank, the associated risk rose, and the value of those plantations, dropped to a tiny fraction of the ante bellum value.
For a perpetual annuity, a reasonable ante bellum approximation, PV = D / r. With D dropping by 80+% and r increasing by a factor of 2 or 3, those fabulous plantations were suddenly worth less than 10% of their 1860 value; and even at that price there were no buyers available. Not only was direct income of the CSA hit by the blockade, but its fabulous pre-war wealth and the associated borrowing capability instantly vanished. In just a span of months the CSA went from being fabulously wealthy to destitute and bankrupt.
The expectation also existed that Britain and France would intervene to protect their growing textile industries. However with greatly shrunken supply, those mills were able to maintain profitably due to greatly increased prices, as well (ironically) for the immediately increased demand for cotton military uniforms required by both sides.
Finally, the South was unaware of the repugnance with which its slave-holding economy was regarded in Europe. This ensured that Britain and France would only enter the war to jump on an already victorious bandwagon, and not to decide the fray.
The only way in which this triple whammy could possibly have been avoided would have been to enter the war with an already extant navy capable of keeping at least a few of he South's major ports open against a blockade. In practical terms this likely meant a need for several years of pre-war independence. This was never going to happen under a Republican president, so it would have been necessary to secede under Buchanan and immediately begin a naval construction program, while he remained President.
answered 5 hours ago
Pieter Geerkens
34.9k597166
The vast wealth of the Southern plantations was intrinsically tied up with their ability to generate a fabulous annual income, at low risk. Once the Union blockade was established by autumn 1861 those income streams shrank, the associated risk rose, and the value of those plantations, dropped to a tiny fraction of the ante bellum value.
For a perpetual annuity, a reasonable ante bellum approximation, PV = D / r. With D dropping by 80+% and r increasing by a factor of 2 or 3, those fabulous plantations were suddenly worth less than 10% of their 1860 value; and even at that price there were no buyers available. Not only was direct income of the CSA hit by the blockade, but its fabulous pre-war wealth and the associated borrowing capability instantly vanished. In just a span of months the CSA went from being fabulously wealthy to destitute and bankrupt.
The expectation also existed that Britain and France would intervene to protect their growing textile industries. However with greatly shrunken supply, those mills were able to maintain profitably due to greatly increased prices, as well (ironically) for the immediately increased demand for cotton military uniforms required by both sides.
Finally, the South was unaware of the repugnance with which its slave-holding economy was regarded in Europe. This ensured that Britain and France would only enter the war to jump on an already victorious bandwagon, and not to decide the fray.
The only way in which this triple whammy could possibly have been avoided would have been to enter the war with an already extant navy capable of keeping at least a few of he South's major ports open against a blockade. In practical terms this likely meant a need for several years of pre-war independence. This was never going to happen under a Republican president, so it would have been necessary to secede under Buchanan and immediately begin a naval construction program, while he remained President.
answered 5 hours ago
Pieter Geerkens
34.9k597166
answered 5 hours ago
Pieter Geerkens
34.9k597166
answered 5 hours ago
Pieter Geerkens
34.9k597166
answered 5 hours ago
Pieter Geerkens
34.9k597166
34.9k597166
add a comment |Â
add a comment |Â
up vote
3
down vote
Militarily, the south did not need to win the war by invading and defeating the north. Their belief was that they just had to hold on to what they had, hence their defensive strategy. Allied with this was their belief in
the power of “King Cotton†and its allure to the European powers.
Davis and his advisors regarded the fiber’s pull as so strong that
they could almost assume British and French recognition.
Source: Donald Stoker, The Grand Design Strategy and the US Civil War
Diplomacy and economic pressure were to play decisive roles in the southern strategy:
The chance that the Confederacy had, leaders in Richmond believed,
rested in the power of cotton to compel European statesmen and finan-
ciers to side with their cause. The key commodity of the
nineteenth-century Atlantic economy, Southern cotton fueled the
textile industries of Europe and sustained an estimated twenty percent
of the British population.3 With this trump card in their hand,
Confederate leaders were convinced that they could dictate Civil War
diplomacy. Cotton, Southern statesmen held, could be a bargaining chip
employed to induce British recognition of the Confederacy. With this
accomplished, the commodity could reassume its traditional role as a
source of foreign exchange that would provide the Confederacy with the
credit needed to obtain war supplies abroad.
Source: Jay Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era 1837–1873
The south had great confidence in its economy, in part because of “decades of expanding productionâ€Â. More recently, the Panic of 1857 had meant
the South, profiting from the steady exportation of the staple,
largely escaped the financial crisis that enveloped the North.
Southerners saw their avoidance of the panic as a triumph of an
economy that was based on agriculture and trade rather than on finance
and speculation. As DeBow’s Review, the voice of the commercial South,
declared in 1857, ‘‘the wealth of the South is permanent and real,
that of the North fugitive and fictitious.’’
Source: Sexton
Confederate President Jefferson Davis believed that once recognition had been achieved,
economic and military support would follow, thus guaranteeing
Confederate independence. Moreover, Davis believed that British
recognition alone would discourage the North from prosecuting the war,
and that the Union would withdraw from the fight from a fear of
British intervention.
Source: Stoker
The southern strategy was at times not without realistic hope for
The Palmerston cabinet twice considered intervening in the Civil War,
most likely by joining France in extending an offer of mediation to
the warring sides. Though not an outright recognition of the
Confederacy’s independence, mediation was a policy favorable to the
South as it would seek peace—which, given the success of Confederate
armies at the time, would almost certainly result in the separation of
the North and South.
Source: Sexton
No less a statesman than William Gladstone, in a speech in October 1862, went so far as to say:
There is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South
have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have
made what is more than either—they have made a nation.
Source: Sexton
Ultimately, though, southern hopes were sunk by, among other things, the British middle and working classes’ intense dislike of slavery, and the Emancipation proclamation (1st Jan 1863) was perhaps the final nail in the coffin of southern hopes for British and French intervention.
answered 2 hours ago
Lars Bosteen
31k7153214
add a comment |Â
up vote
3
down vote
Militarily, the south did not need to win the war by invading and defeating the north. Their belief was that they just had to hold on to what they had, hence their defensive strategy. Allied with this was their belief in
the power of “King Cotton†and its allure to the European powers.
Davis and his advisors regarded the fiber’s pull as so strong that
they could almost assume British and French recognition.
Source: Donald Stoker, The Grand Design Strategy and the US Civil War
Diplomacy and economic pressure were to play decisive roles in the southern strategy:
The chance that the Confederacy had, leaders in Richmond believed,
rested in the power of cotton to compel European statesmen and finan-
ciers to side with their cause. The key commodity of the
nineteenth-century Atlantic economy, Southern cotton fueled the
textile industries of Europe and sustained an estimated twenty percent
of the British population.3 With this trump card in their hand,
Confederate leaders were convinced that they could dictate Civil War
diplomacy. Cotton, Southern statesmen held, could be a bargaining chip
employed to induce British recognition of the Confederacy. With this
accomplished, the commodity could reassume its traditional role as a
source of foreign exchange that would provide the Confederacy with the
credit needed to obtain war supplies abroad.
Source: Jay Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era 1837–1873
The south had great confidence in its economy, in part because of “decades of expanding productionâ€Â. More recently, the Panic of 1857 had meant
the South, profiting from the steady exportation of the staple,
largely escaped the financial crisis that enveloped the North.
Southerners saw their avoidance of the panic as a triumph of an
economy that was based on agriculture and trade rather than on finance
and speculation. As DeBow’s Review, the voice of the commercial South,
declared in 1857, ‘‘the wealth of the South is permanent and real,
that of the North fugitive and fictitious.’’
Source: Sexton
Confederate President Jefferson Davis believed that once recognition had been achieved,
economic and military support would follow, thus guaranteeing
Confederate independence. Moreover, Davis believed that British
recognition alone would discourage the North from prosecuting the war,
and that the Union would withdraw from the fight from a fear of
British intervention.
Source: Stoker
The southern strategy was at times not without realistic hope for
The Palmerston cabinet twice considered intervening in the Civil War,
most likely by joining France in extending an offer of mediation to
the warring sides. Though not an outright recognition of the
Confederacy’s independence, mediation was a policy favorable to the
South as it would seek peace—which, given the success of Confederate
armies at the time, would almost certainly result in the separation of
the North and South.
Source: Sexton
No less a statesman than William Gladstone, in a speech in October 1862, went so far as to say:
There is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South
have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have
made what is more than either—they have made a nation.
Source: Sexton
Ultimately, though, southern hopes were sunk by, among other things, the British middle and working classes’ intense dislike of slavery, and the Emancipation proclamation (1st Jan 1863) was perhaps the final nail in the coffin of southern hopes for British and French intervention.
answered 2 hours ago
Lars Bosteen
31k7153214
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up vote
3
down vote
up vote
3
down vote
Militarily, the south did not need to win the war by invading and defeating the north. Their belief was that they just had to hold on to what they had, hence their defensive strategy. Allied with this was their belief in
the power of “King Cotton†and its allure to the European powers.
Davis and his advisors regarded the fiber’s pull as so strong that
they could almost assume British and French recognition.
Source: Donald Stoker, The Grand Design Strategy and the US Civil War
Diplomacy and economic pressure were to play decisive roles in the southern strategy:
The chance that the Confederacy had, leaders in Richmond believed,
rested in the power of cotton to compel European statesmen and finan-
ciers to side with their cause. The key commodity of the
nineteenth-century Atlantic economy, Southern cotton fueled the
textile industries of Europe and sustained an estimated twenty percent
of the British population.3 With this trump card in their hand,
Confederate leaders were convinced that they could dictate Civil War
diplomacy. Cotton, Southern statesmen held, could be a bargaining chip
employed to induce British recognition of the Confederacy. With this
accomplished, the commodity could reassume its traditional role as a
source of foreign exchange that would provide the Confederacy with the
credit needed to obtain war supplies abroad.
Source: Jay Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era 1837–1873
The south had great confidence in its economy, in part because of “decades of expanding productionâ€Â. More recently, the Panic of 1857 had meant
the South, profiting from the steady exportation of the staple,
largely escaped the financial crisis that enveloped the North.
Southerners saw their avoidance of the panic as a triumph of an
economy that was based on agriculture and trade rather than on finance
and speculation. As DeBow’s Review, the voice of the commercial South,
declared in 1857, ‘‘the wealth of the South is permanent and real,
that of the North fugitive and fictitious.’’
Source: Sexton
Confederate President Jefferson Davis believed that once recognition had been achieved,
economic and military support would follow, thus guaranteeing
Confederate independence. Moreover, Davis believed that British
recognition alone would discourage the North from prosecuting the war,
and that the Union would withdraw from the fight from a fear of
British intervention.
Source: Stoker
The southern strategy was at times not without realistic hope for
The Palmerston cabinet twice considered intervening in the Civil War,
most likely by joining France in extending an offer of mediation to
the warring sides. Though not an outright recognition of the
Confederacy’s independence, mediation was a policy favorable to the
South as it would seek peace—which, given the success of Confederate
armies at the time, would almost certainly result in the separation of
the North and South.
Source: Sexton
No less a statesman than William Gladstone, in a speech in October 1862, went so far as to say:
There is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South
have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have
made what is more than either—they have made a nation.
Source: Sexton
Ultimately, though, southern hopes were sunk by, among other things, the British middle and working classes’ intense dislike of slavery, and the Emancipation proclamation (1st Jan 1863) was perhaps the final nail in the coffin of southern hopes for British and French intervention.
answered 2 hours ago
Lars Bosteen
31k7153214
Militarily, the south did not need to win the war by invading and defeating the north. Their belief was that they just had to hold on to what they had, hence their defensive strategy. Allied with this was their belief in
the power of “King Cotton†and its allure to the European powers.
Davis and his advisors regarded the fiber’s pull as so strong that
they could almost assume British and French recognition.
Source: Donald Stoker, The Grand Design Strategy and the US Civil War
Diplomacy and economic pressure were to play decisive roles in the southern strategy:
The chance that the Confederacy had, leaders in Richmond believed,
rested in the power of cotton to compel European statesmen and finan-
ciers to side with their cause. The key commodity of the
nineteenth-century Atlantic economy, Southern cotton fueled the
textile industries of Europe and sustained an estimated twenty percent
of the British population.3 With this trump card in their hand,
Confederate leaders were convinced that they could dictate Civil War
diplomacy. Cotton, Southern statesmen held, could be a bargaining chip
employed to induce British recognition of the Confederacy. With this
accomplished, the commodity could reassume its traditional role as a
source of foreign exchange that would provide the Confederacy with the
credit needed to obtain war supplies abroad.
Source: Jay Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era 1837–1873
The south had great confidence in its economy, in part because of “decades of expanding productionâ€Â. More recently, the Panic of 1857 had meant
the South, profiting from the steady exportation of the staple,
largely escaped the financial crisis that enveloped the North.
Southerners saw their avoidance of the panic as a triumph of an
economy that was based on agriculture and trade rather than on finance
and speculation. As DeBow’s Review, the voice of the commercial South,
declared in 1857, ‘‘the wealth of the South is permanent and real,
that of the North fugitive and fictitious.’’
Source: Sexton
Confederate President Jefferson Davis believed that once recognition had been achieved,
economic and military support would follow, thus guaranteeing
Confederate independence. Moreover, Davis believed that British
recognition alone would discourage the North from prosecuting the war,
and that the Union would withdraw from the fight from a fear of
British intervention.
Source: Stoker
The southern strategy was at times not without realistic hope for
The Palmerston cabinet twice considered intervening in the Civil War,
most likely by joining France in extending an offer of mediation to
the warring sides. Though not an outright recognition of the
Confederacy’s independence, mediation was a policy favorable to the
South as it would seek peace—which, given the success of Confederate
armies at the time, would almost certainly result in the separation of
the North and South.
Source: Sexton
No less a statesman than William Gladstone, in a speech in October 1862, went so far as to say:
There is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South
have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have
made what is more than either—they have made a nation.
Source: Sexton
Ultimately, though, southern hopes were sunk by, among other things, the British middle and working classes’ intense dislike of slavery, and the Emancipation proclamation (1st Jan 1863) was perhaps the final nail in the coffin of southern hopes for British and French intervention.
answered 2 hours ago
Lars Bosteen
31k7153214
answered 2 hours ago
Lars Bosteen
31k7153214
answered 2 hours ago
Lars Bosteen
31k7153214
answered 2 hours ago
Lars Bosteen
31k7153214
31k7153214
add a comment |Â
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
The majority of the economic and political elite of the Southern States were aware of the existential threat to their economy and culture—chiefly as these were the direct result of malapportionment so as to continue latifundia slavery.
Existential threats are necessarily those which threaten the existence of an agent. The results of a lost war were identical with the results of not fighting. The elite of the South did not need to inquire into the likely chances of their success.
There are reasons for the average member of the elite to believe in the possibility of success based on the popular imagination surrounding very unlikely military causes such as the Dutch Republic, The American Republic and the French Republic and Empire. It does need to be remembered that politicians and even generals are poor analysts of the likelihood of martial success.
Finally the 19th century thought of elites were infected with thoughts of Elan and right making might.
answered 5 hours ago
Samuel Russell
8,85932971
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
The majority of the economic and political elite of the Southern States were aware of the existential threat to their economy and culture—chiefly as these were the direct result of malapportionment so as to continue latifundia slavery.
Existential threats are necessarily those which threaten the existence of an agent. The results of a lost war were identical with the results of not fighting. The elite of the South did not need to inquire into the likely chances of their success.
There are reasons for the average member of the elite to believe in the possibility of success based on the popular imagination surrounding very unlikely military causes such as the Dutch Republic, The American Republic and the French Republic and Empire. It does need to be remembered that politicians and even generals are poor analysts of the likelihood of martial success.
Finally the 19th century thought of elites were infected with thoughts of Elan and right making might.
answered 5 hours ago
Samuel Russell
8,85932971
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
up vote
2
down vote
The majority of the economic and political elite of the Southern States were aware of the existential threat to their economy and culture—chiefly as these were the direct result of malapportionment so as to continue latifundia slavery.
Existential threats are necessarily those which threaten the existence of an agent. The results of a lost war were identical with the results of not fighting. The elite of the South did not need to inquire into the likely chances of their success.
There are reasons for the average member of the elite to believe in the possibility of success based on the popular imagination surrounding very unlikely military causes such as the Dutch Republic, The American Republic and the French Republic and Empire. It does need to be remembered that politicians and even generals are poor analysts of the likelihood of martial success.
Finally the 19th century thought of elites were infected with thoughts of Elan and right making might.
answered 5 hours ago
Samuel Russell
8,85932971
The majority of the economic and political elite of the Southern States were aware of the existential threat to their economy and culture—chiefly as these were the direct result of malapportionment so as to continue latifundia slavery.
Existential threats are necessarily those which threaten the existence of an agent. The results of a lost war were identical with the results of not fighting. The elite of the South did not need to inquire into the likely chances of their success.
There are reasons for the average member of the elite to believe in the possibility of success based on the popular imagination surrounding very unlikely military causes such as the Dutch Republic, The American Republic and the French Republic and Empire. It does need to be remembered that politicians and even generals are poor analysts of the likelihood of martial success.
Finally the 19th century thought of elites were infected with thoughts of Elan and right making might.
answered 5 hours ago
Samuel Russell
8,85932971
answered 5 hours ago
Samuel Russell
8,85932971
answered 5 hours ago
Samuel Russell
8,85932971
answered 5 hours ago
Samuel Russell
8,85932971
8,85932971
add a comment |Â
add a comment |Â
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3
It would also be valid to ask why the Confederacy thought the war could be won. (that's not a hypothetical). Or what contemporaries thought of the chances. (I researched this a few years ago, and was kind of interested in what other nations thought - England backed the Confederacy, and nearly had to pay reparations. ) Or, you could try worldbuilding. In either case, welcome to the site; hope you find good stuff.
– Mark C. Wallace♦
12 hours ago
From memory, without sources, Southern leadership was better, but the South was committed to the cause in a way the North could not imagine. The conflict had been brewing since before the country was founded, and the South felt it was clear that the North wanted to obliterate the Southern way of life. Few thought the North would bleed for black lives (the North was no less racist). Perhaps someone can expand and source?
– Mark C. Wallace♦
7 hours ago
Perhaps they thought that Lincoln and other Northern politicians (and the people) would be unwilling to accept the slaughter of 2/3 of a million men as the price for keeping the South?
– jamesqf
5 hours ago
Possible duplicate What reasons did the Confederacy have for believing they would have a quick victory?
– Lars Bosteen
4 hours ago