What are the main errors of Bertrand Russell's *A History of Western Philosophy*?
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This discussion of A History of Western Philosophy complains about its errors and omissions, but doesn't give examples of the former. A previous question asked "how inaccurate" Russell's book was, and the answers indicated the primary areas where it errs are in early Greek and Mediaeval philosophy. But what are the main specific errors, on these topics or any others? For instance, did he exaggerate the extent to which Mediaeval theodicies were panglossian? (That's just an example I invented to illustrate why this question isn't a duplicate.)
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This discussion of A History of Western Philosophy complains about its errors and omissions, but doesn't give examples of the former. A previous question asked "how inaccurate" Russell's book was, and the answers indicated the primary areas where it errs are in early Greek and Mediaeval philosophy. But what are the main specific errors, on these topics or any others? For instance, did he exaggerate the extent to which Mediaeval theodicies were panglossian? (That's just an example I invented to illustrate why this question isn't a duplicate.)
history-of-philosophy bertrand-russell
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up vote
2
down vote
favorite
up vote
2
down vote
favorite
This discussion of A History of Western Philosophy complains about its errors and omissions, but doesn't give examples of the former. A previous question asked "how inaccurate" Russell's book was, and the answers indicated the primary areas where it errs are in early Greek and Mediaeval philosophy. But what are the main specific errors, on these topics or any others? For instance, did he exaggerate the extent to which Mediaeval theodicies were panglossian? (That's just an example I invented to illustrate why this question isn't a duplicate.)
history-of-philosophy bertrand-russell
This discussion of A History of Western Philosophy complains about its errors and omissions, but doesn't give examples of the former. A previous question asked "how inaccurate" Russell's book was, and the answers indicated the primary areas where it errs are in early Greek and Mediaeval philosophy. But what are the main specific errors, on these topics or any others? For instance, did he exaggerate the extent to which Mediaeval theodicies were panglossian? (That's just an example I invented to illustrate why this question isn't a duplicate.)
history-of-philosophy bertrand-russell
history-of-philosophy bertrand-russell
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J.G.
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I can offer one example, which I take from Isaiah Berlin concerning Russell's treatment of Kant's doctrine of space and time. This treatment, Berlin suggests, profoundly miscontrues the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason:
Kant is treated in greater detail [than Hume], and once more Russell follows
his preferred and somewhat Napoleonic method of concentrating
his fire against the position on which he regards the enemy as
strongest, leaving the rest to collapse and vanish of itself. In this
case the doctrines of space and time are selected as the principal
target, and after complaining that Kant gives no adequate explanation to account for the particular order or characteristics in time and
space of particular material objects (which Kant might have regarded as a metaphysical, i.e., in some sense illegitimate question),
Russell seems to assume that in Kant's system space and time must
either be subjective, i.e., in some sense be empirically given, or, if
not, that they must in some sense derive from, or belong to, Things
in Themselves. This does not so much refute as ignore the central
doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which material
objects (in Space and Time) are neither Things in Themselves (which
according to Russell in the end would amount to a metaphysical
transcendentalism of a neo-Platonist type), nor yet a set of (or
logical constructions out of) sense-data, at any rate not in the
ordinary phenomenalist sense. (Isaiah Berlin, 'A History of Western Philosophy
by Bertrand Russell', Mind, Vol. 56, No. 222 (Apr., 1947), pp. 151-166 : 163.)
'Sense-data' is not the best term, reflecting as it does theories of perception prevalent at the time of writing (1947) rather than the intellectual world of the Critique. But if we replace it with 'sensory perceptions', Berlin does appear to convict Russell of a significant misunderstanding of Kant.
1
+1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
â J.G.
1 hour ago
Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
â Geoffrey Thomas
1 hour ago
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1 Answer
1
active
oldest
votes
1 Answer
1
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
up vote
2
down vote
I can offer one example, which I take from Isaiah Berlin concerning Russell's treatment of Kant's doctrine of space and time. This treatment, Berlin suggests, profoundly miscontrues the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason:
Kant is treated in greater detail [than Hume], and once more Russell follows
his preferred and somewhat Napoleonic method of concentrating
his fire against the position on which he regards the enemy as
strongest, leaving the rest to collapse and vanish of itself. In this
case the doctrines of space and time are selected as the principal
target, and after complaining that Kant gives no adequate explanation to account for the particular order or characteristics in time and
space of particular material objects (which Kant might have regarded as a metaphysical, i.e., in some sense illegitimate question),
Russell seems to assume that in Kant's system space and time must
either be subjective, i.e., in some sense be empirically given, or, if
not, that they must in some sense derive from, or belong to, Things
in Themselves. This does not so much refute as ignore the central
doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which material
objects (in Space and Time) are neither Things in Themselves (which
according to Russell in the end would amount to a metaphysical
transcendentalism of a neo-Platonist type), nor yet a set of (or
logical constructions out of) sense-data, at any rate not in the
ordinary phenomenalist sense. (Isaiah Berlin, 'A History of Western Philosophy
by Bertrand Russell', Mind, Vol. 56, No. 222 (Apr., 1947), pp. 151-166 : 163.)
'Sense-data' is not the best term, reflecting as it does theories of perception prevalent at the time of writing (1947) rather than the intellectual world of the Critique. But if we replace it with 'sensory perceptions', Berlin does appear to convict Russell of a significant misunderstanding of Kant.
1
+1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
â J.G.
1 hour ago
Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
â Geoffrey Thomas
1 hour ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
I can offer one example, which I take from Isaiah Berlin concerning Russell's treatment of Kant's doctrine of space and time. This treatment, Berlin suggests, profoundly miscontrues the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason:
Kant is treated in greater detail [than Hume], and once more Russell follows
his preferred and somewhat Napoleonic method of concentrating
his fire against the position on which he regards the enemy as
strongest, leaving the rest to collapse and vanish of itself. In this
case the doctrines of space and time are selected as the principal
target, and after complaining that Kant gives no adequate explanation to account for the particular order or characteristics in time and
space of particular material objects (which Kant might have regarded as a metaphysical, i.e., in some sense illegitimate question),
Russell seems to assume that in Kant's system space and time must
either be subjective, i.e., in some sense be empirically given, or, if
not, that they must in some sense derive from, or belong to, Things
in Themselves. This does not so much refute as ignore the central
doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which material
objects (in Space and Time) are neither Things in Themselves (which
according to Russell in the end would amount to a metaphysical
transcendentalism of a neo-Platonist type), nor yet a set of (or
logical constructions out of) sense-data, at any rate not in the
ordinary phenomenalist sense. (Isaiah Berlin, 'A History of Western Philosophy
by Bertrand Russell', Mind, Vol. 56, No. 222 (Apr., 1947), pp. 151-166 : 163.)
'Sense-data' is not the best term, reflecting as it does theories of perception prevalent at the time of writing (1947) rather than the intellectual world of the Critique. But if we replace it with 'sensory perceptions', Berlin does appear to convict Russell of a significant misunderstanding of Kant.
1
+1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
â J.G.
1 hour ago
Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
â Geoffrey Thomas
1 hour ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
up vote
2
down vote
I can offer one example, which I take from Isaiah Berlin concerning Russell's treatment of Kant's doctrine of space and time. This treatment, Berlin suggests, profoundly miscontrues the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason:
Kant is treated in greater detail [than Hume], and once more Russell follows
his preferred and somewhat Napoleonic method of concentrating
his fire against the position on which he regards the enemy as
strongest, leaving the rest to collapse and vanish of itself. In this
case the doctrines of space and time are selected as the principal
target, and after complaining that Kant gives no adequate explanation to account for the particular order or characteristics in time and
space of particular material objects (which Kant might have regarded as a metaphysical, i.e., in some sense illegitimate question),
Russell seems to assume that in Kant's system space and time must
either be subjective, i.e., in some sense be empirically given, or, if
not, that they must in some sense derive from, or belong to, Things
in Themselves. This does not so much refute as ignore the central
doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which material
objects (in Space and Time) are neither Things in Themselves (which
according to Russell in the end would amount to a metaphysical
transcendentalism of a neo-Platonist type), nor yet a set of (or
logical constructions out of) sense-data, at any rate not in the
ordinary phenomenalist sense. (Isaiah Berlin, 'A History of Western Philosophy
by Bertrand Russell', Mind, Vol. 56, No. 222 (Apr., 1947), pp. 151-166 : 163.)
'Sense-data' is not the best term, reflecting as it does theories of perception prevalent at the time of writing (1947) rather than the intellectual world of the Critique. But if we replace it with 'sensory perceptions', Berlin does appear to convict Russell of a significant misunderstanding of Kant.
I can offer one example, which I take from Isaiah Berlin concerning Russell's treatment of Kant's doctrine of space and time. This treatment, Berlin suggests, profoundly miscontrues the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason:
Kant is treated in greater detail [than Hume], and once more Russell follows
his preferred and somewhat Napoleonic method of concentrating
his fire against the position on which he regards the enemy as
strongest, leaving the rest to collapse and vanish of itself. In this
case the doctrines of space and time are selected as the principal
target, and after complaining that Kant gives no adequate explanation to account for the particular order or characteristics in time and
space of particular material objects (which Kant might have regarded as a metaphysical, i.e., in some sense illegitimate question),
Russell seems to assume that in Kant's system space and time must
either be subjective, i.e., in some sense be empirically given, or, if
not, that they must in some sense derive from, or belong to, Things
in Themselves. This does not so much refute as ignore the central
doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which material
objects (in Space and Time) are neither Things in Themselves (which
according to Russell in the end would amount to a metaphysical
transcendentalism of a neo-Platonist type), nor yet a set of (or
logical constructions out of) sense-data, at any rate not in the
ordinary phenomenalist sense. (Isaiah Berlin, 'A History of Western Philosophy
by Bertrand Russell', Mind, Vol. 56, No. 222 (Apr., 1947), pp. 151-166 : 163.)
'Sense-data' is not the best term, reflecting as it does theories of perception prevalent at the time of writing (1947) rather than the intellectual world of the Critique. But if we replace it with 'sensory perceptions', Berlin does appear to convict Russell of a significant misunderstanding of Kant.
edited 1 hour ago
answered 2 hours ago
Geoffrey Thomas
17.8k21470
17.8k21470
1
+1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
â J.G.
1 hour ago
Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
â Geoffrey Thomas
1 hour ago
add a comment |Â
1
+1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
â J.G.
1 hour ago
Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
â Geoffrey Thomas
1 hour ago
1
1
+1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
â J.G.
1 hour ago
+1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
â J.G.
1 hour ago
Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
â Geoffrey Thomas
1 hour ago
Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
â Geoffrey Thomas
1 hour ago
add a comment |Â
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