What are the main errors of Bertrand Russell's *A History of Western Philosophy*?

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This discussion of A History of Western Philosophy complains about its errors and omissions, but doesn't give examples of the former. A previous question asked "how inaccurate" Russell's book was, and the answers indicated the primary areas where it errs are in early Greek and Mediaeval philosophy. But what are the main specific errors, on these topics or any others? For instance, did he exaggerate the extent to which Mediaeval theodicies were panglossian? (That's just an example I invented to illustrate why this question isn't a duplicate.)










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    This discussion of A History of Western Philosophy complains about its errors and omissions, but doesn't give examples of the former. A previous question asked "how inaccurate" Russell's book was, and the answers indicated the primary areas where it errs are in early Greek and Mediaeval philosophy. But what are the main specific errors, on these topics or any others? For instance, did he exaggerate the extent to which Mediaeval theodicies were panglossian? (That's just an example I invented to illustrate why this question isn't a duplicate.)










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      up vote
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      down vote

      favorite
      1






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      This discussion of A History of Western Philosophy complains about its errors and omissions, but doesn't give examples of the former. A previous question asked "how inaccurate" Russell's book was, and the answers indicated the primary areas where it errs are in early Greek and Mediaeval philosophy. But what are the main specific errors, on these topics or any others? For instance, did he exaggerate the extent to which Mediaeval theodicies were panglossian? (That's just an example I invented to illustrate why this question isn't a duplicate.)










      share|improve this question













      This discussion of A History of Western Philosophy complains about its errors and omissions, but doesn't give examples of the former. A previous question asked "how inaccurate" Russell's book was, and the answers indicated the primary areas where it errs are in early Greek and Mediaeval philosophy. But what are the main specific errors, on these topics or any others? For instance, did he exaggerate the extent to which Mediaeval theodicies were panglossian? (That's just an example I invented to illustrate why this question isn't a duplicate.)







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      J.G.

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          I can offer one example, which I take from Isaiah Berlin concerning Russell's treatment of Kant's doctrine of space and time. This treatment, Berlin suggests, profoundly miscontrues the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason:




          Kant is treated in greater detail [than Hume], and once more Russell follows
          his preferred and somewhat Napoleonic method of concentrating
          his fire against the position on which he regards the enemy as
          strongest, leaving the rest to collapse and vanish of itself. In this
          case the doctrines of space and time are selected as the principal
          target, and after complaining that Kant gives no adequate explanation to account for the particular order or characteristics in time and
          space of particular material objects (which Kant might have regarded as a metaphysical, i.e., in some sense illegitimate question),
          Russell seems to assume that in Kant's system space and time must
          either be subjective, i.e., in some sense be empirically given, or, if
          not, that they must in some sense derive from, or belong to, Things
          in Themselves. This does not so much refute as ignore the central
          doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which material
          objects (in Space and Time) are neither Things in Themselves (which
          according to Russell in the end would amount to a metaphysical
          transcendentalism of a neo-Platonist type), nor yet a set of (or
          logical constructions out of) sense-data, at any rate not in the
          ordinary phenomenalist sense. (Isaiah Berlin, 'A History of Western Philosophy
          by Bertrand Russell', Mind, Vol. 56, No. 222 (Apr., 1947), pp. 151-166 : 163.)




          'Sense-data' is not the best term, reflecting as it does theories of perception prevalent at the time of writing (1947) rather than the intellectual world of the Critique. But if we replace it with 'sensory perceptions', Berlin does appear to convict Russell of a significant misunderstanding of Kant.






          share|improve this answer


















          • 1




            +1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
            – J.G.
            1 hour ago











          • Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
            – Geoffrey Thomas
            1 hour ago










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          I can offer one example, which I take from Isaiah Berlin concerning Russell's treatment of Kant's doctrine of space and time. This treatment, Berlin suggests, profoundly miscontrues the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason:




          Kant is treated in greater detail [than Hume], and once more Russell follows
          his preferred and somewhat Napoleonic method of concentrating
          his fire against the position on which he regards the enemy as
          strongest, leaving the rest to collapse and vanish of itself. In this
          case the doctrines of space and time are selected as the principal
          target, and after complaining that Kant gives no adequate explanation to account for the particular order or characteristics in time and
          space of particular material objects (which Kant might have regarded as a metaphysical, i.e., in some sense illegitimate question),
          Russell seems to assume that in Kant's system space and time must
          either be subjective, i.e., in some sense be empirically given, or, if
          not, that they must in some sense derive from, or belong to, Things
          in Themselves. This does not so much refute as ignore the central
          doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which material
          objects (in Space and Time) are neither Things in Themselves (which
          according to Russell in the end would amount to a metaphysical
          transcendentalism of a neo-Platonist type), nor yet a set of (or
          logical constructions out of) sense-data, at any rate not in the
          ordinary phenomenalist sense. (Isaiah Berlin, 'A History of Western Philosophy
          by Bertrand Russell', Mind, Vol. 56, No. 222 (Apr., 1947), pp. 151-166 : 163.)




          'Sense-data' is not the best term, reflecting as it does theories of perception prevalent at the time of writing (1947) rather than the intellectual world of the Critique. But if we replace it with 'sensory perceptions', Berlin does appear to convict Russell of a significant misunderstanding of Kant.






          share|improve this answer


















          • 1




            +1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
            – J.G.
            1 hour ago











          • Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
            – Geoffrey Thomas
            1 hour ago














          up vote
          2
          down vote













          I can offer one example, which I take from Isaiah Berlin concerning Russell's treatment of Kant's doctrine of space and time. This treatment, Berlin suggests, profoundly miscontrues the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason:




          Kant is treated in greater detail [than Hume], and once more Russell follows
          his preferred and somewhat Napoleonic method of concentrating
          his fire against the position on which he regards the enemy as
          strongest, leaving the rest to collapse and vanish of itself. In this
          case the doctrines of space and time are selected as the principal
          target, and after complaining that Kant gives no adequate explanation to account for the particular order or characteristics in time and
          space of particular material objects (which Kant might have regarded as a metaphysical, i.e., in some sense illegitimate question),
          Russell seems to assume that in Kant's system space and time must
          either be subjective, i.e., in some sense be empirically given, or, if
          not, that they must in some sense derive from, or belong to, Things
          in Themselves. This does not so much refute as ignore the central
          doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which material
          objects (in Space and Time) are neither Things in Themselves (which
          according to Russell in the end would amount to a metaphysical
          transcendentalism of a neo-Platonist type), nor yet a set of (or
          logical constructions out of) sense-data, at any rate not in the
          ordinary phenomenalist sense. (Isaiah Berlin, 'A History of Western Philosophy
          by Bertrand Russell', Mind, Vol. 56, No. 222 (Apr., 1947), pp. 151-166 : 163.)




          'Sense-data' is not the best term, reflecting as it does theories of perception prevalent at the time of writing (1947) rather than the intellectual world of the Critique. But if we replace it with 'sensory perceptions', Berlin does appear to convict Russell of a significant misunderstanding of Kant.






          share|improve this answer


















          • 1




            +1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
            – J.G.
            1 hour ago











          • Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
            – Geoffrey Thomas
            1 hour ago












          up vote
          2
          down vote










          up vote
          2
          down vote









          I can offer one example, which I take from Isaiah Berlin concerning Russell's treatment of Kant's doctrine of space and time. This treatment, Berlin suggests, profoundly miscontrues the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason:




          Kant is treated in greater detail [than Hume], and once more Russell follows
          his preferred and somewhat Napoleonic method of concentrating
          his fire against the position on which he regards the enemy as
          strongest, leaving the rest to collapse and vanish of itself. In this
          case the doctrines of space and time are selected as the principal
          target, and after complaining that Kant gives no adequate explanation to account for the particular order or characteristics in time and
          space of particular material objects (which Kant might have regarded as a metaphysical, i.e., in some sense illegitimate question),
          Russell seems to assume that in Kant's system space and time must
          either be subjective, i.e., in some sense be empirically given, or, if
          not, that they must in some sense derive from, or belong to, Things
          in Themselves. This does not so much refute as ignore the central
          doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which material
          objects (in Space and Time) are neither Things in Themselves (which
          according to Russell in the end would amount to a metaphysical
          transcendentalism of a neo-Platonist type), nor yet a set of (or
          logical constructions out of) sense-data, at any rate not in the
          ordinary phenomenalist sense. (Isaiah Berlin, 'A History of Western Philosophy
          by Bertrand Russell', Mind, Vol. 56, No. 222 (Apr., 1947), pp. 151-166 : 163.)




          'Sense-data' is not the best term, reflecting as it does theories of perception prevalent at the time of writing (1947) rather than the intellectual world of the Critique. But if we replace it with 'sensory perceptions', Berlin does appear to convict Russell of a significant misunderstanding of Kant.






          share|improve this answer














          I can offer one example, which I take from Isaiah Berlin concerning Russell's treatment of Kant's doctrine of space and time. This treatment, Berlin suggests, profoundly miscontrues the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason:




          Kant is treated in greater detail [than Hume], and once more Russell follows
          his preferred and somewhat Napoleonic method of concentrating
          his fire against the position on which he regards the enemy as
          strongest, leaving the rest to collapse and vanish of itself. In this
          case the doctrines of space and time are selected as the principal
          target, and after complaining that Kant gives no adequate explanation to account for the particular order or characteristics in time and
          space of particular material objects (which Kant might have regarded as a metaphysical, i.e., in some sense illegitimate question),
          Russell seems to assume that in Kant's system space and time must
          either be subjective, i.e., in some sense be empirically given, or, if
          not, that they must in some sense derive from, or belong to, Things
          in Themselves. This does not so much refute as ignore the central
          doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which material
          objects (in Space and Time) are neither Things in Themselves (which
          according to Russell in the end would amount to a metaphysical
          transcendentalism of a neo-Platonist type), nor yet a set of (or
          logical constructions out of) sense-data, at any rate not in the
          ordinary phenomenalist sense. (Isaiah Berlin, 'A History of Western Philosophy
          by Bertrand Russell', Mind, Vol. 56, No. 222 (Apr., 1947), pp. 151-166 : 163.)




          'Sense-data' is not the best term, reflecting as it does theories of perception prevalent at the time of writing (1947) rather than the intellectual world of the Critique. But if we replace it with 'sensory perceptions', Berlin does appear to convict Russell of a significant misunderstanding of Kant.







          share|improve this answer














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          share|improve this answer








          edited 1 hour ago

























          answered 2 hours ago









          Geoffrey Thomas

          17.8k21470




          17.8k21470







          • 1




            +1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
            – J.G.
            1 hour ago











          • Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
            – Geoffrey Thomas
            1 hour ago












          • 1




            +1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
            – J.G.
            1 hour ago











          • Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
            – Geoffrey Thomas
            1 hour ago







          1




          1




          +1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
          – J.G.
          1 hour ago





          +1. I won't select the answer just yet in case it discourages more examples from other people, but I'll read Berlin's full review in case there are more examples.
          – J.G.
          1 hour ago













          Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
          – Geoffrey Thomas
          1 hour ago




          Fine by me, just the right thing to do. Best - Geoffrey
          – Geoffrey Thomas
          1 hour ago

















           

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