Did Aristotle believe in an immortal soul?
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Does Aristotle have a clear stance on the question of the immortality of the soul?
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Does Aristotle have a clear stance on the question of the immortality of the soul?
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Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
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Does Aristotle have a clear stance on the question of the immortality of the soul?
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Does Aristotle have a clear stance on the question of the immortality of the soul?
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Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
â Conifold
2 hours ago
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Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
â Conifold
2 hours ago
Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
â Conifold
2 hours ago
Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
â Conifold
2 hours ago
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The human intellect / "intellective soul" is immortal
As St. Thomas Aquinas writes in Sententia De anima a. 14 co., Aristotle
proves in the De anima III, 4, 429b3 [that] intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ.
Aristotle:
á¼Âûû' ὠýÿῦàὠÃÂñý ÃÂù ýÿήÃÂá¿ ÃÂÃÂόôÃÂñ ýÿ÷ÃÂόý, ÿá½ÂàἧÃÂÃÂÿý ýÿõῠÃÂá½° á½ÂÃÂÿôõέÃÂÃÂõÃÂñ, á¼Âûûὰ úñὶ üᾶûûÿýàÃÂὸ üὲý óὰàñἰÃÂø÷ÃÂùúὸý ÿá½Âú á¼ÂýõàÃÂώüñÃÂÿÃÂ, ὠôὲ ÃÂÃÂÃÂùÃÂÃÂá½¹ÃÂ.
But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.
and Aristotle proves
that the intellect is something divine and everlasting
in De anima, III, 5, 430a22:
Aristotle:
ÃÂÃÂÃÂùÃÂøõὶàô' á¼ÂÃÂÃÂὶ üόýÿý ÃÂÿῦø' á½ ÃÂõàá¼ÂÃÂÃÂá½·, úñὶ ÃÂÿῦÃÂÿ üόýÿý á¼ÂøάýñÃÂÿý úñὶ á¼Âá¿Âôùÿý
Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.
J. A. Smith's translation:
When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal
One soul in man
Plato held that there are several souls in man:
- the intellective soul (intellect),
- nutritive soul, and
- sensitive soul,
cf. St. Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles II cap. 58
but Aristotle refutes this in De Anima I, 5, by a reducio ad absurdam:
ÃÂá½· ÿá½Âý ôή ÃÂÿÃÂõ ÃÂàýέÃÂõù ÃÂὴý ÃÂàÃÂήý, õἰ üõÃÂùÃÂÃÂá½´ ÃÂá½³ÃÂàúõýþ ÿὠóὰàôὴ ÃÂá½¹ óõ ÃÂῶüñàôÿúõῠóὰàÃÂÿá½ÂýñýÃÂίÿý üᾶûûÿý ἡ ÃÂàÃÂá½´ ÃÂὸ ÃÂῶüñ ÃÂàýέÃÂõùýàá¼ÂþõûøÿύÃÂ÷àóÿῦý ôùñÃÂýÃ栨ÂÃÂñù úñὶ ÃÂá½µÃÂõÃÂñù. õἰ ÿá½Âý á¼ÂÃÂõÃÂόý ÃÂù üίñý ñá½ÂÃÂὴý ÃÂÿùÃ栨Â, á¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ üάûùÃÂÃÂ' á¼Âý õἴ÷ ÃÂàÃÂá½µ. ôõήÃÂõù ôὲ ÃÂάûùý úá¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ ö÷ÃÂÃ栨Âý ÃÂá½¹ÃÂõÃÂÿý á¼Âý á¼¢ ÃÂÿûàüõÃÂá½³ÃÂ. õἰ üὲý óὰàá¼Âý, ôùὰ ÃÂá½· ÿá½Âú Ã栫ÂøέÃÂàúñὶ ἡ ÃÂàÃÂá½´ á¼Âýþ õἰ ôὲ üõÃÂùÃÂÃÂόý, ÃÂάûùý ὠûόóÿàö÷ÃÂá½µÃÂõù ÃÂá½· ÃÂὸ ÃÂàýέÃÂÿý á¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ, úñὶ ÿá½ÂÃÂàôὴ ÃÂÃÂόõùÃÂùý á¼ÂÃÂὶ ÃÂὸ á¼ÂÃÂõùÃÂÿý.
If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.
Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (â¦) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
â Conifold
2 hours ago
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I basically agree with Geremia's answer. Here is similar perspective.
According to Dominic J. O'Meara, who is writing about the philosophical influences Plotinus had to address claimed Aristotle did not believe in an immortal soul, but he did consider the intellect to be immortal (page 14):
One of Plotinus' first writings, Ennead IV. 7 [2], is devoted to
showing that the soul is immortal. Plato had argued for this in the
Phaedo and in the Phaedrus (245ce), Plato's claim that soul is an incorporeal, non-composite reality not suject to desctruction is
rejected by Aristotle. For Aristotle, soul, as the structure (or
'form') responsible for the various functions of a living body, cannot
escape death. Yet one living function, intellect, seems to be an
exception: in Aristotle's view thinking is not the function of a
particular bodily organ. Intellect thus seems to have a claim to
immortality (De anima, 2. 2. 413b24-7; 3. 4-5). However, Aristotle
is at his most obscure here and in any case the question of immortality
lies far from his primarily biological interests in the De anima.
This seems to agree with D. W. Hamlyn's translation of De anima (On the Soul) (page 168) although I don't know if I have the exact location O'Meara referenced.
For the present let it be enough to say only that the soul is the
source of the things above mentioned and is determined by them--by the
faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and movement. Whether
each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it
is such as to be distinct in definition only or also in place, are
questions to which it is not hard to find answers in some cases,
although others present difficulty.
And as for the intellect:
Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the
situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of
soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting from the
perishable.
Reference
O'Meara, D. J. (1995). Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Hamlyn, D. W. (1989). A New Aristotle Reader Edited by JL Ackrill Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987
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The human intellect / "intellective soul" is immortal
As St. Thomas Aquinas writes in Sententia De anima a. 14 co., Aristotle
proves in the De anima III, 4, 429b3 [that] intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ.
Aristotle:
á¼Âûû' ὠýÿῦàὠÃÂñý ÃÂù ýÿήÃÂá¿ ÃÂÃÂόôÃÂñ ýÿ÷ÃÂόý, ÿá½ÂàἧÃÂÃÂÿý ýÿõῠÃÂá½° á½ÂÃÂÿôõέÃÂÃÂõÃÂñ, á¼Âûûὰ úñὶ üᾶûûÿýàÃÂὸ üὲý óὰàñἰÃÂø÷ÃÂùúὸý ÿá½Âú á¼ÂýõàÃÂώüñÃÂÿÃÂ, ὠôὲ ÃÂÃÂÃÂùÃÂÃÂá½¹ÃÂ.
But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.
and Aristotle proves
that the intellect is something divine and everlasting
in De anima, III, 5, 430a22:
Aristotle:
ÃÂÃÂÃÂùÃÂøõὶàô' á¼ÂÃÂÃÂὶ üόýÿý ÃÂÿῦø' á½ ÃÂõàá¼ÂÃÂÃÂá½·, úñὶ ÃÂÿῦÃÂÿ üόýÿý á¼ÂøάýñÃÂÿý úñὶ á¼Âá¿Âôùÿý
Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.
J. A. Smith's translation:
When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal
One soul in man
Plato held that there are several souls in man:
- the intellective soul (intellect),
- nutritive soul, and
- sensitive soul,
cf. St. Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles II cap. 58
but Aristotle refutes this in De Anima I, 5, by a reducio ad absurdam:
ÃÂá½· ÿá½Âý ôή ÃÂÿÃÂõ ÃÂàýέÃÂõù ÃÂὴý ÃÂàÃÂήý, õἰ üõÃÂùÃÂÃÂá½´ ÃÂá½³ÃÂàúõýþ ÿὠóὰàôὴ ÃÂá½¹ óõ ÃÂῶüñàôÿúõῠóὰàÃÂÿá½ÂýñýÃÂίÿý üᾶûûÿý ἡ ÃÂàÃÂá½´ ÃÂὸ ÃÂῶüñ ÃÂàýέÃÂõùýàá¼ÂþõûøÿύÃÂ÷àóÿῦý ôùñÃÂýÃ栨ÂÃÂñù úñὶ ÃÂá½µÃÂõÃÂñù. õἰ ÿá½Âý á¼ÂÃÂõÃÂόý ÃÂù üίñý ñá½ÂÃÂὴý ÃÂÿùÃ栨Â, á¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ üάûùÃÂÃÂ' á¼Âý õἴ÷ ÃÂàÃÂá½µ. ôõήÃÂõù ôὲ ÃÂάûùý úá¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ ö÷ÃÂÃ栨Âý ÃÂá½¹ÃÂõÃÂÿý á¼Âý á¼¢ ÃÂÿûàüõÃÂá½³ÃÂ. õἰ üὲý óὰàá¼Âý, ôùὰ ÃÂá½· ÿá½Âú Ã栫ÂøέÃÂàúñὶ ἡ ÃÂàÃÂá½´ á¼Âýþ õἰ ôὲ üõÃÂùÃÂÃÂόý, ÃÂάûùý ὠûόóÿàö÷ÃÂá½µÃÂõù ÃÂá½· ÃÂὸ ÃÂàýέÃÂÿý á¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ, úñὶ ÿá½ÂÃÂàôὴ ÃÂÃÂόõùÃÂùý á¼ÂÃÂὶ ÃÂὸ á¼ÂÃÂõùÃÂÿý.
If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.
Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (â¦) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
â Conifold
2 hours ago
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up vote
2
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The human intellect / "intellective soul" is immortal
As St. Thomas Aquinas writes in Sententia De anima a. 14 co., Aristotle
proves in the De anima III, 4, 429b3 [that] intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ.
Aristotle:
á¼Âûû' ὠýÿῦàὠÃÂñý ÃÂù ýÿήÃÂá¿ ÃÂÃÂόôÃÂñ ýÿ÷ÃÂόý, ÿá½ÂàἧÃÂÃÂÿý ýÿõῠÃÂá½° á½ÂÃÂÿôõέÃÂÃÂõÃÂñ, á¼Âûûὰ úñὶ üᾶûûÿýàÃÂὸ üὲý óὰàñἰÃÂø÷ÃÂùúὸý ÿá½Âú á¼ÂýõàÃÂώüñÃÂÿÃÂ, ὠôὲ ÃÂÃÂÃÂùÃÂÃÂá½¹ÃÂ.
But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.
and Aristotle proves
that the intellect is something divine and everlasting
in De anima, III, 5, 430a22:
Aristotle:
ÃÂÃÂÃÂùÃÂøõὶàô' á¼ÂÃÂÃÂὶ üόýÿý ÃÂÿῦø' á½ ÃÂõàá¼ÂÃÂÃÂá½·, úñὶ ÃÂÿῦÃÂÿ üόýÿý á¼ÂøάýñÃÂÿý úñὶ á¼Âá¿Âôùÿý
Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.
J. A. Smith's translation:
When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal
One soul in man
Plato held that there are several souls in man:
- the intellective soul (intellect),
- nutritive soul, and
- sensitive soul,
cf. St. Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles II cap. 58
but Aristotle refutes this in De Anima I, 5, by a reducio ad absurdam:
ÃÂá½· ÿá½Âý ôή ÃÂÿÃÂõ ÃÂàýέÃÂõù ÃÂὴý ÃÂàÃÂήý, õἰ üõÃÂùÃÂÃÂá½´ ÃÂá½³ÃÂàúõýþ ÿὠóὰàôὴ ÃÂá½¹ óõ ÃÂῶüñàôÿúõῠóὰàÃÂÿá½ÂýñýÃÂίÿý üᾶûûÿý ἡ ÃÂàÃÂá½´ ÃÂὸ ÃÂῶüñ ÃÂàýέÃÂõùýàá¼ÂþõûøÿύÃÂ÷àóÿῦý ôùñÃÂýÃ栨ÂÃÂñù úñὶ ÃÂá½µÃÂõÃÂñù. õἰ ÿá½Âý á¼ÂÃÂõÃÂόý ÃÂù üίñý ñá½ÂÃÂὴý ÃÂÿùÃ栨Â, á¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ üάûùÃÂÃÂ' á¼Âý õἴ÷ ÃÂàÃÂá½µ. ôõήÃÂõù ôὲ ÃÂάûùý úá¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ ö÷ÃÂÃ栨Âý ÃÂá½¹ÃÂõÃÂÿý á¼Âý á¼¢ ÃÂÿûàüõÃÂá½³ÃÂ. õἰ üὲý óὰàá¼Âý, ôùὰ ÃÂá½· ÿá½Âú Ã栫ÂøέÃÂàúñὶ ἡ ÃÂàÃÂá½´ á¼Âýþ õἰ ôὲ üõÃÂùÃÂÃÂόý, ÃÂάûùý ὠûόóÿàö÷ÃÂá½µÃÂõù ÃÂá½· ÃÂὸ ÃÂàýέÃÂÿý á¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ, úñὶ ÿá½ÂÃÂàôὴ ÃÂÃÂόõùÃÂùý á¼ÂÃÂὶ ÃÂὸ á¼ÂÃÂõùÃÂÿý.
If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.
Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (â¦) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
â Conifold
2 hours ago
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up vote
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The human intellect / "intellective soul" is immortal
As St. Thomas Aquinas writes in Sententia De anima a. 14 co., Aristotle
proves in the De anima III, 4, 429b3 [that] intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ.
Aristotle:
á¼Âûû' ὠýÿῦàὠÃÂñý ÃÂù ýÿήÃÂá¿ ÃÂÃÂόôÃÂñ ýÿ÷ÃÂόý, ÿá½ÂàἧÃÂÃÂÿý ýÿõῠÃÂá½° á½ÂÃÂÿôõέÃÂÃÂõÃÂñ, á¼Âûûὰ úñὶ üᾶûûÿýàÃÂὸ üὲý óὰàñἰÃÂø÷ÃÂùúὸý ÿá½Âú á¼ÂýõàÃÂώüñÃÂÿÃÂ, ὠôὲ ÃÂÃÂÃÂùÃÂÃÂá½¹ÃÂ.
But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.
and Aristotle proves
that the intellect is something divine and everlasting
in De anima, III, 5, 430a22:
Aristotle:
ÃÂÃÂÃÂùÃÂøõὶàô' á¼ÂÃÂÃÂὶ üόýÿý ÃÂÿῦø' á½ ÃÂõàá¼ÂÃÂÃÂá½·, úñὶ ÃÂÿῦÃÂÿ üόýÿý á¼ÂøάýñÃÂÿý úñὶ á¼Âá¿Âôùÿý
Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.
J. A. Smith's translation:
When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal
One soul in man
Plato held that there are several souls in man:
- the intellective soul (intellect),
- nutritive soul, and
- sensitive soul,
cf. St. Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles II cap. 58
but Aristotle refutes this in De Anima I, 5, by a reducio ad absurdam:
ÃÂá½· ÿá½Âý ôή ÃÂÿÃÂõ ÃÂàýέÃÂõù ÃÂὴý ÃÂàÃÂήý, õἰ üõÃÂùÃÂÃÂá½´ ÃÂá½³ÃÂàúõýþ ÿὠóὰàôὴ ÃÂá½¹ óõ ÃÂῶüñàôÿúõῠóὰàÃÂÿá½ÂýñýÃÂίÿý üᾶûûÿý ἡ ÃÂàÃÂá½´ ÃÂὸ ÃÂῶüñ ÃÂàýέÃÂõùýàá¼ÂþõûøÿύÃÂ÷àóÿῦý ôùñÃÂýÃ栨ÂÃÂñù úñὶ ÃÂá½µÃÂõÃÂñù. õἰ ÿá½Âý á¼ÂÃÂõÃÂόý ÃÂù üίñý ñá½ÂÃÂὴý ÃÂÿùÃ栨Â, á¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ üάûùÃÂÃÂ' á¼Âý õἴ÷ ÃÂàÃÂá½µ. ôõήÃÂõù ôὲ ÃÂάûùý úá¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ ö÷ÃÂÃ栨Âý ÃÂá½¹ÃÂõÃÂÿý á¼Âý á¼¢ ÃÂÿûàüõÃÂá½³ÃÂ. õἰ üὲý óὰàá¼Âý, ôùὰ ÃÂá½· ÿá½Âú Ã栫ÂøέÃÂàúñὶ ἡ ÃÂàÃÂá½´ á¼Âýþ õἰ ôὲ üõÃÂùÃÂÃÂόý, ÃÂάûùý ὠûόóÿàö÷ÃÂá½µÃÂõù ÃÂá½· ÃÂὸ ÃÂàýέÃÂÿý á¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ, úñὶ ÿá½ÂÃÂàôὴ ÃÂÃÂόõùÃÂùý á¼ÂÃÂὶ ÃÂὸ á¼ÂÃÂõùÃÂÿý.
If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.
The human intellect / "intellective soul" is immortal
As St. Thomas Aquinas writes in Sententia De anima a. 14 co., Aristotle
proves in the De anima III, 4, 429b3 [that] intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ.
Aristotle:
á¼Âûû' ὠýÿῦàὠÃÂñý ÃÂù ýÿήÃÂá¿ ÃÂÃÂόôÃÂñ ýÿ÷ÃÂόý, ÿá½ÂàἧÃÂÃÂÿý ýÿõῠÃÂá½° á½ÂÃÂÿôõέÃÂÃÂõÃÂñ, á¼Âûûὰ úñὶ üᾶûûÿýàÃÂὸ üὲý óὰàñἰÃÂø÷ÃÂùúὸý ÿá½Âú á¼ÂýõàÃÂώüñÃÂÿÃÂ, ὠôὲ ÃÂÃÂÃÂùÃÂÃÂá½¹ÃÂ.
But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.
and Aristotle proves
that the intellect is something divine and everlasting
in De anima, III, 5, 430a22:
Aristotle:
ÃÂÃÂÃÂùÃÂøõὶàô' á¼ÂÃÂÃÂὶ üόýÿý ÃÂÿῦø' á½ ÃÂõàá¼ÂÃÂÃÂá½·, úñὶ ÃÂÿῦÃÂÿ üόýÿý á¼ÂøάýñÃÂÿý úñὶ á¼Âá¿Âôùÿý
Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.
J. A. Smith's translation:
When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal
One soul in man
Plato held that there are several souls in man:
- the intellective soul (intellect),
- nutritive soul, and
- sensitive soul,
cf. St. Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles II cap. 58
but Aristotle refutes this in De Anima I, 5, by a reducio ad absurdam:
ÃÂá½· ÿá½Âý ôή ÃÂÿÃÂõ ÃÂàýέÃÂõù ÃÂὴý ÃÂàÃÂήý, õἰ üõÃÂùÃÂÃÂá½´ ÃÂá½³ÃÂàúõýþ ÿὠóὰàôὴ ÃÂá½¹ óõ ÃÂῶüñàôÿúõῠóὰàÃÂÿá½ÂýñýÃÂίÿý üᾶûûÿý ἡ ÃÂàÃÂá½´ ÃÂὸ ÃÂῶüñ ÃÂàýέÃÂõùýàá¼ÂþõûøÿύÃÂ÷àóÿῦý ôùñÃÂýÃ栨ÂÃÂñù úñὶ ÃÂá½µÃÂõÃÂñù. õἰ ÿá½Âý á¼ÂÃÂõÃÂόý ÃÂù üίñý ñá½ÂÃÂὴý ÃÂÿùÃ栨Â, á¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ üάûùÃÂÃÂ' á¼Âý õἴ÷ ÃÂàÃÂá½µ. ôõήÃÂõù ôὲ ÃÂάûùý úá¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ ö÷ÃÂÃ栨Âý ÃÂá½¹ÃÂõÃÂÿý á¼Âý á¼¢ ÃÂÿûàüõÃÂá½³ÃÂ. õἰ üὲý óὰàá¼Âý, ôùὰ ÃÂá½· ÿá½Âú Ã栫ÂøέÃÂàúñὶ ἡ ÃÂàÃÂá½´ á¼Âýþ õἰ ôὲ üõÃÂùÃÂÃÂόý, ÃÂάûùý ὠûόóÿàö÷ÃÂá½µÃÂõù ÃÂá½· ÃÂὸ ÃÂàýέÃÂÿý á¼ÂúÃ栨Âýÿ, úñὶ ÿá½ÂÃÂàôὴ ÃÂÃÂόõùÃÂùý á¼ÂÃÂὶ ÃÂὸ á¼ÂÃÂõùÃÂÿý.
If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.
edited 2 hours ago
answered 2 hours ago
Geremia
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Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (â¦) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
â Conifold
2 hours ago
add a comment |Â
Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (â¦) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
â Conifold
2 hours ago
Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (â¦) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
â Conifold
2 hours ago
Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (â¦) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
â Conifold
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I basically agree with Geremia's answer. Here is similar perspective.
According to Dominic J. O'Meara, who is writing about the philosophical influences Plotinus had to address claimed Aristotle did not believe in an immortal soul, but he did consider the intellect to be immortal (page 14):
One of Plotinus' first writings, Ennead IV. 7 [2], is devoted to
showing that the soul is immortal. Plato had argued for this in the
Phaedo and in the Phaedrus (245ce), Plato's claim that soul is an incorporeal, non-composite reality not suject to desctruction is
rejected by Aristotle. For Aristotle, soul, as the structure (or
'form') responsible for the various functions of a living body, cannot
escape death. Yet one living function, intellect, seems to be an
exception: in Aristotle's view thinking is not the function of a
particular bodily organ. Intellect thus seems to have a claim to
immortality (De anima, 2. 2. 413b24-7; 3. 4-5). However, Aristotle
is at his most obscure here and in any case the question of immortality
lies far from his primarily biological interests in the De anima.
This seems to agree with D. W. Hamlyn's translation of De anima (On the Soul) (page 168) although I don't know if I have the exact location O'Meara referenced.
For the present let it be enough to say only that the soul is the
source of the things above mentioned and is determined by them--by the
faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and movement. Whether
each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it
is such as to be distinct in definition only or also in place, are
questions to which it is not hard to find answers in some cases,
although others present difficulty.
And as for the intellect:
Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the
situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of
soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting from the
perishable.
Reference
O'Meara, D. J. (1995). Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Hamlyn, D. W. (1989). A New Aristotle Reader Edited by JL Ackrill Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987
add a comment |Â
up vote
1
down vote
I basically agree with Geremia's answer. Here is similar perspective.
According to Dominic J. O'Meara, who is writing about the philosophical influences Plotinus had to address claimed Aristotle did not believe in an immortal soul, but he did consider the intellect to be immortal (page 14):
One of Plotinus' first writings, Ennead IV. 7 [2], is devoted to
showing that the soul is immortal. Plato had argued for this in the
Phaedo and in the Phaedrus (245ce), Plato's claim that soul is an incorporeal, non-composite reality not suject to desctruction is
rejected by Aristotle. For Aristotle, soul, as the structure (or
'form') responsible for the various functions of a living body, cannot
escape death. Yet one living function, intellect, seems to be an
exception: in Aristotle's view thinking is not the function of a
particular bodily organ. Intellect thus seems to have a claim to
immortality (De anima, 2. 2. 413b24-7; 3. 4-5). However, Aristotle
is at his most obscure here and in any case the question of immortality
lies far from his primarily biological interests in the De anima.
This seems to agree with D. W. Hamlyn's translation of De anima (On the Soul) (page 168) although I don't know if I have the exact location O'Meara referenced.
For the present let it be enough to say only that the soul is the
source of the things above mentioned and is determined by them--by the
faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and movement. Whether
each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it
is such as to be distinct in definition only or also in place, are
questions to which it is not hard to find answers in some cases,
although others present difficulty.
And as for the intellect:
Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the
situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of
soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting from the
perishable.
Reference
O'Meara, D. J. (1995). Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Hamlyn, D. W. (1989). A New Aristotle Reader Edited by JL Ackrill Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987
add a comment |Â
up vote
1
down vote
up vote
1
down vote
I basically agree with Geremia's answer. Here is similar perspective.
According to Dominic J. O'Meara, who is writing about the philosophical influences Plotinus had to address claimed Aristotle did not believe in an immortal soul, but he did consider the intellect to be immortal (page 14):
One of Plotinus' first writings, Ennead IV. 7 [2], is devoted to
showing that the soul is immortal. Plato had argued for this in the
Phaedo and in the Phaedrus (245ce), Plato's claim that soul is an incorporeal, non-composite reality not suject to desctruction is
rejected by Aristotle. For Aristotle, soul, as the structure (or
'form') responsible for the various functions of a living body, cannot
escape death. Yet one living function, intellect, seems to be an
exception: in Aristotle's view thinking is not the function of a
particular bodily organ. Intellect thus seems to have a claim to
immortality (De anima, 2. 2. 413b24-7; 3. 4-5). However, Aristotle
is at his most obscure here and in any case the question of immortality
lies far from his primarily biological interests in the De anima.
This seems to agree with D. W. Hamlyn's translation of De anima (On the Soul) (page 168) although I don't know if I have the exact location O'Meara referenced.
For the present let it be enough to say only that the soul is the
source of the things above mentioned and is determined by them--by the
faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and movement. Whether
each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it
is such as to be distinct in definition only or also in place, are
questions to which it is not hard to find answers in some cases,
although others present difficulty.
And as for the intellect:
Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the
situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of
soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting from the
perishable.
Reference
O'Meara, D. J. (1995). Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Hamlyn, D. W. (1989). A New Aristotle Reader Edited by JL Ackrill Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987
I basically agree with Geremia's answer. Here is similar perspective.
According to Dominic J. O'Meara, who is writing about the philosophical influences Plotinus had to address claimed Aristotle did not believe in an immortal soul, but he did consider the intellect to be immortal (page 14):
One of Plotinus' first writings, Ennead IV. 7 [2], is devoted to
showing that the soul is immortal. Plato had argued for this in the
Phaedo and in the Phaedrus (245ce), Plato's claim that soul is an incorporeal, non-composite reality not suject to desctruction is
rejected by Aristotle. For Aristotle, soul, as the structure (or
'form') responsible for the various functions of a living body, cannot
escape death. Yet one living function, intellect, seems to be an
exception: in Aristotle's view thinking is not the function of a
particular bodily organ. Intellect thus seems to have a claim to
immortality (De anima, 2. 2. 413b24-7; 3. 4-5). However, Aristotle
is at his most obscure here and in any case the question of immortality
lies far from his primarily biological interests in the De anima.
This seems to agree with D. W. Hamlyn's translation of De anima (On the Soul) (page 168) although I don't know if I have the exact location O'Meara referenced.
For the present let it be enough to say only that the soul is the
source of the things above mentioned and is determined by them--by the
faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and movement. Whether
each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it
is such as to be distinct in definition only or also in place, are
questions to which it is not hard to find answers in some cases,
although others present difficulty.
And as for the intellect:
Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the
situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of
soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting from the
perishable.
Reference
O'Meara, D. J. (1995). Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Hamlyn, D. W. (1989). A New Aristotle Reader Edited by JL Ackrill Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987
answered 30 mins ago
Frank Hubeny
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3,4202834
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Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
â Conifold
2 hours ago