Did Aristotle believe in an immortal soul?

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Does Aristotle have a clear stance on the question of the immortality of the soul?










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  • Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
    – Conifold
    2 hours ago














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Does Aristotle have a clear stance on the question of the immortality of the soul?










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  • Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
    – Conifold
    2 hours ago












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Does Aristotle have a clear stance on the question of the immortality of the soul?










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  • Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
    – Conifold
    2 hours ago
















  • Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
    – Conifold
    2 hours ago















Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
– Conifold
2 hours ago




Please do more research before posting here, or at least google. Wikipedia has an article concerning Aristotle's On the Soul, which reads:"Aristotle also argues that the mind (only the agent intellect) is immaterial, able to exist without the body, and immortal".
– Conifold
2 hours ago










2 Answers
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The human intellect / "intellective soul" is immortal



As St. Thomas Aquinas writes in Sententia De anima a. 14 co., Aristotle




proves in the De anima III, 4, 429b3 [that] intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ.




Aristotle:




ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός.



But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.




and Aristotle proves




that the intellect is something divine and everlasting




in De anima, III, 5, 430a22:



Aristotle:




χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον



Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.



J. A. Smith's translation:
When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal




One soul in man



Plato held that there are several souls in man:



  1. the intellective soul (intellect),

  2. nutritive soul, and

  3. sensitive soul,

cf. St. Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles II cap. 58



but Aristotle refutes this in De Anima I, 5, by a reducio ad absurdam:




τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη ψυχή. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κἀκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἓν ἢ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν; εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.



If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.







share|improve this answer






















  • Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (…) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
    – Conifold
    2 hours ago


















up vote
1
down vote













I basically agree with Geremia's answer. Here is similar perspective.



According to Dominic J. O'Meara, who is writing about the philosophical influences Plotinus had to address claimed Aristotle did not believe in an immortal soul, but he did consider the intellect to be immortal (page 14):




One of Plotinus' first writings, Ennead IV. 7 [2], is devoted to
showing that the soul is immortal. Plato had argued for this in the
Phaedo and in the Phaedrus (245ce), Plato's claim that soul is an incorporeal, non-composite reality not suject to desctruction is
rejected by Aristotle. For Aristotle, soul, as the structure (or
'form') responsible for the various functions of a living body, cannot
escape death. Yet one living function, intellect, seems to be an
exception: in Aristotle's view thinking is not the function of a
particular bodily organ. Intellect thus seems to have a claim to
immortality (De anima, 2. 2. 413b24-7; 3. 4-5). However, Aristotle
is at his most obscure here and in any case the question of immortality
lies far from his primarily biological interests in the De anima.




This seems to agree with D. W. Hamlyn's translation of De anima (On the Soul) (page 168) although I don't know if I have the exact location O'Meara referenced.




For the present let it be enough to say only that the soul is the
source of the things above mentioned and is determined by them--by the
faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and movement. Whether
each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it
is such as to be distinct in definition only or also in place, are
questions to which it is not hard to find answers in some cases,
although others present difficulty.




And as for the intellect:




Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the
situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of
soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting from the
perishable.





Reference



O'Meara, D. J. (1995). Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads. Oxford University Press on Demand.



Hamlyn, D. W. (1989). A New Aristotle Reader Edited by JL Ackrill Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987






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    The human intellect / "intellective soul" is immortal



    As St. Thomas Aquinas writes in Sententia De anima a. 14 co., Aristotle




    proves in the De anima III, 4, 429b3 [that] intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ.




    Aristotle:




    ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός.



    But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.




    and Aristotle proves




    that the intellect is something divine and everlasting




    in De anima, III, 5, 430a22:



    Aristotle:




    χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον



    Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.



    J. A. Smith's translation:
    When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal




    One soul in man



    Plato held that there are several souls in man:



    1. the intellective soul (intellect),

    2. nutritive soul, and

    3. sensitive soul,

    cf. St. Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles II cap. 58



    but Aristotle refutes this in De Anima I, 5, by a reducio ad absurdam:




    τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη ψυχή. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κἀκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἓν ἢ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν; εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.



    If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.







    share|improve this answer






















    • Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (…) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
      – Conifold
      2 hours ago















    up vote
    2
    down vote













    The human intellect / "intellective soul" is immortal



    As St. Thomas Aquinas writes in Sententia De anima a. 14 co., Aristotle




    proves in the De anima III, 4, 429b3 [that] intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ.




    Aristotle:




    ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός.



    But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.




    and Aristotle proves




    that the intellect is something divine and everlasting




    in De anima, III, 5, 430a22:



    Aristotle:




    χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον



    Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.



    J. A. Smith's translation:
    When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal




    One soul in man



    Plato held that there are several souls in man:



    1. the intellective soul (intellect),

    2. nutritive soul, and

    3. sensitive soul,

    cf. St. Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles II cap. 58



    but Aristotle refutes this in De Anima I, 5, by a reducio ad absurdam:




    τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη ψυχή. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κἀκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἓν ἢ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν; εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.



    If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.







    share|improve this answer






















    • Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (…) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
      – Conifold
      2 hours ago













    up vote
    2
    down vote










    up vote
    2
    down vote









    The human intellect / "intellective soul" is immortal



    As St. Thomas Aquinas writes in Sententia De anima a. 14 co., Aristotle




    proves in the De anima III, 4, 429b3 [that] intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ.




    Aristotle:




    ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός.



    But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.




    and Aristotle proves




    that the intellect is something divine and everlasting




    in De anima, III, 5, 430a22:



    Aristotle:




    χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον



    Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.



    J. A. Smith's translation:
    When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal




    One soul in man



    Plato held that there are several souls in man:



    1. the intellective soul (intellect),

    2. nutritive soul, and

    3. sensitive soul,

    cf. St. Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles II cap. 58



    but Aristotle refutes this in De Anima I, 5, by a reducio ad absurdam:




    τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη ψυχή. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κἀκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἓν ἢ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν; εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.



    If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.







    share|improve this answer














    The human intellect / "intellective soul" is immortal



    As St. Thomas Aquinas writes in Sententia De anima a. 14 co., Aristotle




    proves in the De anima III, 4, 429b3 [that] intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ.




    Aristotle:




    ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός.



    But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.




    and Aristotle proves




    that the intellect is something divine and everlasting




    in De anima, III, 5, 430a22:



    Aristotle:




    χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον



    Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.



    J. A. Smith's translation:
    When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal




    One soul in man



    Plato held that there are several souls in man:



    1. the intellective soul (intellect),

    2. nutritive soul, and

    3. sensitive soul,

    cf. St. Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles II cap. 58



    but Aristotle refutes this in De Anima I, 5, by a reducio ad absurdam:




    τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη ψυχή. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κἀκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἓν ἢ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν; εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.



    If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.








    share|improve this answer














    share|improve this answer



    share|improve this answer








    edited 2 hours ago

























    answered 2 hours ago









    Geremia

    3,7341125




    3,7341125











    • Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (…) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
      – Conifold
      2 hours ago

















    • Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (…) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
      – Conifold
      2 hours ago
















    Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (…) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
    – Conifold
    2 hours ago





    Interpretations of DA III,5 are controversial, and Aquinas is certainly not an impartial interpreter. Extracting a major category like agent intellect from a single obscure passage is entirely the handiwork of medieval commentators. According to others, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (…) and without this nothing thinks" refers to the divine intellect of Metaphysics XII, 7, and not to the "immortal soul". See Intellection and divine causation in Aristotle by Côté
    – Conifold
    2 hours ago











    up vote
    1
    down vote













    I basically agree with Geremia's answer. Here is similar perspective.



    According to Dominic J. O'Meara, who is writing about the philosophical influences Plotinus had to address claimed Aristotle did not believe in an immortal soul, but he did consider the intellect to be immortal (page 14):




    One of Plotinus' first writings, Ennead IV. 7 [2], is devoted to
    showing that the soul is immortal. Plato had argued for this in the
    Phaedo and in the Phaedrus (245ce), Plato's claim that soul is an incorporeal, non-composite reality not suject to desctruction is
    rejected by Aristotle. For Aristotle, soul, as the structure (or
    'form') responsible for the various functions of a living body, cannot
    escape death. Yet one living function, intellect, seems to be an
    exception: in Aristotle's view thinking is not the function of a
    particular bodily organ. Intellect thus seems to have a claim to
    immortality (De anima, 2. 2. 413b24-7; 3. 4-5). However, Aristotle
    is at his most obscure here and in any case the question of immortality
    lies far from his primarily biological interests in the De anima.




    This seems to agree with D. W. Hamlyn's translation of De anima (On the Soul) (page 168) although I don't know if I have the exact location O'Meara referenced.




    For the present let it be enough to say only that the soul is the
    source of the things above mentioned and is determined by them--by the
    faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and movement. Whether
    each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it
    is such as to be distinct in definition only or also in place, are
    questions to which it is not hard to find answers in some cases,
    although others present difficulty.




    And as for the intellect:




    Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the
    situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of
    soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting from the
    perishable.





    Reference



    O'Meara, D. J. (1995). Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads. Oxford University Press on Demand.



    Hamlyn, D. W. (1989). A New Aristotle Reader Edited by JL Ackrill Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987






    share|improve this answer
























      up vote
      1
      down vote













      I basically agree with Geremia's answer. Here is similar perspective.



      According to Dominic J. O'Meara, who is writing about the philosophical influences Plotinus had to address claimed Aristotle did not believe in an immortal soul, but he did consider the intellect to be immortal (page 14):




      One of Plotinus' first writings, Ennead IV. 7 [2], is devoted to
      showing that the soul is immortal. Plato had argued for this in the
      Phaedo and in the Phaedrus (245ce), Plato's claim that soul is an incorporeal, non-composite reality not suject to desctruction is
      rejected by Aristotle. For Aristotle, soul, as the structure (or
      'form') responsible for the various functions of a living body, cannot
      escape death. Yet one living function, intellect, seems to be an
      exception: in Aristotle's view thinking is not the function of a
      particular bodily organ. Intellect thus seems to have a claim to
      immortality (De anima, 2. 2. 413b24-7; 3. 4-5). However, Aristotle
      is at his most obscure here and in any case the question of immortality
      lies far from his primarily biological interests in the De anima.




      This seems to agree with D. W. Hamlyn's translation of De anima (On the Soul) (page 168) although I don't know if I have the exact location O'Meara referenced.




      For the present let it be enough to say only that the soul is the
      source of the things above mentioned and is determined by them--by the
      faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and movement. Whether
      each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it
      is such as to be distinct in definition only or also in place, are
      questions to which it is not hard to find answers in some cases,
      although others present difficulty.




      And as for the intellect:




      Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the
      situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of
      soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting from the
      perishable.





      Reference



      O'Meara, D. J. (1995). Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads. Oxford University Press on Demand.



      Hamlyn, D. W. (1989). A New Aristotle Reader Edited by JL Ackrill Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987






      share|improve this answer






















        up vote
        1
        down vote










        up vote
        1
        down vote









        I basically agree with Geremia's answer. Here is similar perspective.



        According to Dominic J. O'Meara, who is writing about the philosophical influences Plotinus had to address claimed Aristotle did not believe in an immortal soul, but he did consider the intellect to be immortal (page 14):




        One of Plotinus' first writings, Ennead IV. 7 [2], is devoted to
        showing that the soul is immortal. Plato had argued for this in the
        Phaedo and in the Phaedrus (245ce), Plato's claim that soul is an incorporeal, non-composite reality not suject to desctruction is
        rejected by Aristotle. For Aristotle, soul, as the structure (or
        'form') responsible for the various functions of a living body, cannot
        escape death. Yet one living function, intellect, seems to be an
        exception: in Aristotle's view thinking is not the function of a
        particular bodily organ. Intellect thus seems to have a claim to
        immortality (De anima, 2. 2. 413b24-7; 3. 4-5). However, Aristotle
        is at his most obscure here and in any case the question of immortality
        lies far from his primarily biological interests in the De anima.




        This seems to agree with D. W. Hamlyn's translation of De anima (On the Soul) (page 168) although I don't know if I have the exact location O'Meara referenced.




        For the present let it be enough to say only that the soul is the
        source of the things above mentioned and is determined by them--by the
        faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and movement. Whether
        each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it
        is such as to be distinct in definition only or also in place, are
        questions to which it is not hard to find answers in some cases,
        although others present difficulty.




        And as for the intellect:




        Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the
        situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of
        soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting from the
        perishable.





        Reference



        O'Meara, D. J. (1995). Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads. Oxford University Press on Demand.



        Hamlyn, D. W. (1989). A New Aristotle Reader Edited by JL Ackrill Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987






        share|improve this answer












        I basically agree with Geremia's answer. Here is similar perspective.



        According to Dominic J. O'Meara, who is writing about the philosophical influences Plotinus had to address claimed Aristotle did not believe in an immortal soul, but he did consider the intellect to be immortal (page 14):




        One of Plotinus' first writings, Ennead IV. 7 [2], is devoted to
        showing that the soul is immortal. Plato had argued for this in the
        Phaedo and in the Phaedrus (245ce), Plato's claim that soul is an incorporeal, non-composite reality not suject to desctruction is
        rejected by Aristotle. For Aristotle, soul, as the structure (or
        'form') responsible for the various functions of a living body, cannot
        escape death. Yet one living function, intellect, seems to be an
        exception: in Aristotle's view thinking is not the function of a
        particular bodily organ. Intellect thus seems to have a claim to
        immortality (De anima, 2. 2. 413b24-7; 3. 4-5). However, Aristotle
        is at his most obscure here and in any case the question of immortality
        lies far from his primarily biological interests in the De anima.




        This seems to agree with D. W. Hamlyn's translation of De anima (On the Soul) (page 168) although I don't know if I have the exact location O'Meara referenced.




        For the present let it be enough to say only that the soul is the
        source of the things above mentioned and is determined by them--by the
        faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and movement. Whether
        each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it
        is such as to be distinct in definition only or also in place, are
        questions to which it is not hard to find answers in some cases,
        although others present difficulty.




        And as for the intellect:




        Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the
        situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of
        soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting from the
        perishable.





        Reference



        O'Meara, D. J. (1995). Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads. Oxford University Press on Demand.



        Hamlyn, D. W. (1989). A New Aristotle Reader Edited by JL Ackrill Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987







        share|improve this answer












        share|improve this answer



        share|improve this answer










        answered 30 mins ago









        Frank Hubeny

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