Mixing
Set-Theoretic Omniscience and Set Definition
Clash Royale CLAN TAG#URR8PPP
up vote
4
down vote
favorite
It occurred to me the other day that a set can, in some sense, know more than I do. This is because a set does not contain duplicate objects, and yet if the same object is defined in two different ways it may be very difficult for me to realize that they are the same (it could even be NP-hard). That's what I'm calling "Omniscience."
I realize that there is no paradox here, and I'm not trying to create one. I'm just interested in various philosophies of set theory, in constructivism, alternate axioms, and related issues so I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it.
Another thing about sets is that two sets defined differently may be equal in extensionality, but completely different as far as how I actually go about determining their membership. In fact there may be theorems from Complexity Theory about how hard it is for me to identify two sets as the same. Is there any approach to math which takes this into account, perhaps treating sets as processes rather than totalities?
logic set-theory axioms
asked 4 hours ago
DPatt
334
add a comment |Â
up vote
4
down vote
favorite
It occurred to me the other day that a set can, in some sense, know more than I do. This is because a set does not contain duplicate objects, and yet if the same object is defined in two different ways it may be very difficult for me to realize that they are the same (it could even be NP-hard). That's what I'm calling "Omniscience."
I realize that there is no paradox here, and I'm not trying to create one. I'm just interested in various philosophies of set theory, in constructivism, alternate axioms, and related issues so I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it.
Another thing about sets is that two sets defined differently may be equal in extensionality, but completely different as far as how I actually go about determining their membership. In fact there may be theorems from Complexity Theory about how hard it is for me to identify two sets as the same. Is there any approach to math which takes this into account, perhaps treating sets as processes rather than totalities?
logic set-theory axioms
asked 4 hours ago
DPatt
334
add a comment |Â
up vote
4
down vote
favorite
up vote
4
down vote
favorite
It occurred to me the other day that a set can, in some sense, know more than I do. This is because a set does not contain duplicate objects, and yet if the same object is defined in two different ways it may be very difficult for me to realize that they are the same (it could even be NP-hard). That's what I'm calling "Omniscience."
I realize that there is no paradox here, and I'm not trying to create one. I'm just interested in various philosophies of set theory, in constructivism, alternate axioms, and related issues so I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it.
Another thing about sets is that two sets defined differently may be equal in extensionality, but completely different as far as how I actually go about determining their membership. In fact there may be theorems from Complexity Theory about how hard it is for me to identify two sets as the same. Is there any approach to math which takes this into account, perhaps treating sets as processes rather than totalities?
logic set-theory axioms
asked 4 hours ago
DPatt
334
It occurred to me the other day that a set can, in some sense, know more than I do. This is because a set does not contain duplicate objects, and yet if the same object is defined in two different ways it may be very difficult for me to realize that they are the same (it could even be NP-hard). That's what I'm calling "Omniscience."
I realize that there is no paradox here, and I'm not trying to create one. I'm just interested in various philosophies of set theory, in constructivism, alternate axioms, and related issues so I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it.
Another thing about sets is that two sets defined differently may be equal in extensionality, but completely different as far as how I actually go about determining their membership. In fact there may be theorems from Complexity Theory about how hard it is for me to identify two sets as the same. Is there any approach to math which takes this into account, perhaps treating sets as processes rather than totalities?
logic set-theory axioms
logic set-theory axioms
asked 4 hours ago
DPatt
334
asked 4 hours ago
DPatt
334
asked 4 hours ago
DPatt
334
asked 4 hours ago
DPatt
334
asked 4 hours ago
DPatt
334
334
add a comment |Â
add a comment |Â
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
up vote
5
down vote
accepted
The distinction you're seeing is a very real one, and is treated seriously in both philosophical and mathematical logic; the prevalance of the extensional approach should be taken as a sign of its strength rather than the weakness/uninterestingness of intensional approaches.
You're getting at precisely the extensionality versus intensionality issue. The extensional perspective (as per the axiom) says that a set is determined entirely by its elements; the intensional view, by contrast, says that there is additional relevant data, and usually this data is taken to be some meaning or process assigned to the set.
It's important to note that this issue persists outside set theory. For a natural language example, "morningstar" and "eveningstar" are extensionally equivalent but are a priori different notions; so we can imagine an "intensional" universe of names sitting above an "extensional" universe of referents. This is a huge motivation in philosophical logic, and in particular modal logic; see e.g. here. It's also a natural aspect of intuitionism, or any philosophy of mathematics which views the mathematical universe as a "product of the mind" (or similar).
To be a bit more specific:
Your particular focus on how hard it is to "know" that two things are equal takes us to a very precise notion on logic, namely provable equality (or more generally "provable ---ness"). This is generally a hugely important idea, even when we're only interested in a semantic and extensional picture of things. I think the place this is most obvious is in Henkin's proof of the completeness theorem. Given a consistent theory $Gamma$, Henkin (after perhaps modifying $Gamma$ in a technical way) looks at the structure $mathcalT(Gamma)$ assigned to $Gamma$ as follows:
Elements of $mathcalT(Gamma)$ are equivalence classes of terms in the language of $Gamma$, with the equivalence relation being "$Gamma$-provable equality."
The language of $Gamma$ is then interpreted on this set of equivalence classes by saying that relations hold precisely when they provably hold: e.g. if $U$ is a unary relation symbol in the language of $Gamma$ and $t$ is a term in the language of $Gamma$, then $U$ holds of the equivalence class of $t$ in $mathcalT(Gamma)$ iff $Gamma$ proves $U(t)$.
So the objects of $mathcalT(Gamma)$ are "really" just names for objects. Note that this is all taking place inside classical logic: the intensional perspective is useful even within extensional mathematics.
Conversely, one could always argue that "intensionality is extensionality in disguise" - whenever we move from an "extensional world of objects" to an "intensional world of objects-via-definitions," what we've really done is move to an "extensional world of definitions" - our new objects are definitions, and they're treated extensionally! This is of similar spirit to how many-valued logic can be situated inside first-order logic, or how classical logic can be embedded into intuitionistic logic, or ... Basically each perspective is so broad that it can simulate the other. This is a good thing for each (in my opinion).
- Another example of this phenomenon is the idea of "provable totality" in proof theory. Roughly speaking, a function is provably total relative to a given theory if it has some definition which the theory proves defines a total function: that is, the theory should prove $forall xexists !yvarphi(x,y)$. The actual notions of provable totality considered arise by restricting attention to definitions of certain forms, e.g. via Turing machines, and understanding what functions a theory proves are total (in a given sense) gives us lots of information about the theory as a whole. This is closely connected with a similar but more technical notion in proof theory: proof-theoretic ordinals.
answered 4 hours ago
Noah Schweber
113k9143267
Oh yeah, I forgot to add in the OP that the equality of two sets may even be independent... which is the strangest case of all. What is "provable totality" in proof theory?
– DPatt
4 hours ago
@DPatt I've added a bit. Does that help?
– Noah Schweber
4 hours ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
-1
down vote
It occurred to me the other day that a set can, in some sense, know more than I do. This is because a set does not contain duplicate objects...
Duplicate elements are only an issue in set-builder notation, e.g. $X=0, 1, 1$
Translating this set-builder notation into the language of standard set theory, we would have:
$forall a: [ain X iff a=0 lor a=1 lor a=1]$
Dropping the second disjunction, it would then be trivial to prove that:
$forall a: [ain X iff a=0 lor a=1]$
Translating this back to set-builder notation, we would have:
$X=0, 1$
answered 24 mins ago
Dan Christensen
8,08911732
1
This doesn't have anything to do with the actual question. The OP is asking how the difficulty of telling whether two definitions refer to the same object plays (or doesn't play) a role in set theory, not why sets don't have duplicate elements - "I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it."
– Noah Schweber
14 mins ago
add a comment |Â
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
up vote
5
down vote
accepted
The distinction you're seeing is a very real one, and is treated seriously in both philosophical and mathematical logic; the prevalance of the extensional approach should be taken as a sign of its strength rather than the weakness/uninterestingness of intensional approaches.
You're getting at precisely the extensionality versus intensionality issue. The extensional perspective (as per the axiom) says that a set is determined entirely by its elements; the intensional view, by contrast, says that there is additional relevant data, and usually this data is taken to be some meaning or process assigned to the set.
It's important to note that this issue persists outside set theory. For a natural language example, "morningstar" and "eveningstar" are extensionally equivalent but are a priori different notions; so we can imagine an "intensional" universe of names sitting above an "extensional" universe of referents. This is a huge motivation in philosophical logic, and in particular modal logic; see e.g. here. It's also a natural aspect of intuitionism, or any philosophy of mathematics which views the mathematical universe as a "product of the mind" (or similar).
To be a bit more specific:
Your particular focus on how hard it is to "know" that two things are equal takes us to a very precise notion on logic, namely provable equality (or more generally "provable ---ness"). This is generally a hugely important idea, even when we're only interested in a semantic and extensional picture of things. I think the place this is most obvious is in Henkin's proof of the completeness theorem. Given a consistent theory $Gamma$, Henkin (after perhaps modifying $Gamma$ in a technical way) looks at the structure $mathcalT(Gamma)$ assigned to $Gamma$ as follows:
Elements of $mathcalT(Gamma)$ are equivalence classes of terms in the language of $Gamma$, with the equivalence relation being "$Gamma$-provable equality."
The language of $Gamma$ is then interpreted on this set of equivalence classes by saying that relations hold precisely when they provably hold: e.g. if $U$ is a unary relation symbol in the language of $Gamma$ and $t$ is a term in the language of $Gamma$, then $U$ holds of the equivalence class of $t$ in $mathcalT(Gamma)$ iff $Gamma$ proves $U(t)$.
So the objects of $mathcalT(Gamma)$ are "really" just names for objects. Note that this is all taking place inside classical logic: the intensional perspective is useful even within extensional mathematics.
Conversely, one could always argue that "intensionality is extensionality in disguise" - whenever we move from an "extensional world of objects" to an "intensional world of objects-via-definitions," what we've really done is move to an "extensional world of definitions" - our new objects are definitions, and they're treated extensionally! This is of similar spirit to how many-valued logic can be situated inside first-order logic, or how classical logic can be embedded into intuitionistic logic, or ... Basically each perspective is so broad that it can simulate the other. This is a good thing for each (in my opinion).
- Another example of this phenomenon is the idea of "provable totality" in proof theory. Roughly speaking, a function is provably total relative to a given theory if it has some definition which the theory proves defines a total function: that is, the theory should prove $forall xexists !yvarphi(x,y)$. The actual notions of provable totality considered arise by restricting attention to definitions of certain forms, e.g. via Turing machines, and understanding what functions a theory proves are total (in a given sense) gives us lots of information about the theory as a whole. This is closely connected with a similar but more technical notion in proof theory: proof-theoretic ordinals.
answered 4 hours ago
Noah Schweber
113k9143267
Oh yeah, I forgot to add in the OP that the equality of two sets may even be independent... which is the strangest case of all. What is "provable totality" in proof theory?
– DPatt
4 hours ago
@DPatt I've added a bit. Does that help?
– Noah Schweber
4 hours ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
5
down vote
accepted
The distinction you're seeing is a very real one, and is treated seriously in both philosophical and mathematical logic; the prevalance of the extensional approach should be taken as a sign of its strength rather than the weakness/uninterestingness of intensional approaches.
You're getting at precisely the extensionality versus intensionality issue. The extensional perspective (as per the axiom) says that a set is determined entirely by its elements; the intensional view, by contrast, says that there is additional relevant data, and usually this data is taken to be some meaning or process assigned to the set.
It's important to note that this issue persists outside set theory. For a natural language example, "morningstar" and "eveningstar" are extensionally equivalent but are a priori different notions; so we can imagine an "intensional" universe of names sitting above an "extensional" universe of referents. This is a huge motivation in philosophical logic, and in particular modal logic; see e.g. here. It's also a natural aspect of intuitionism, or any philosophy of mathematics which views the mathematical universe as a "product of the mind" (or similar).
To be a bit more specific:
Your particular focus on how hard it is to "know" that two things are equal takes us to a very precise notion on logic, namely provable equality (or more generally "provable ---ness"). This is generally a hugely important idea, even when we're only interested in a semantic and extensional picture of things. I think the place this is most obvious is in Henkin's proof of the completeness theorem. Given a consistent theory $Gamma$, Henkin (after perhaps modifying $Gamma$ in a technical way) looks at the structure $mathcalT(Gamma)$ assigned to $Gamma$ as follows:
Elements of $mathcalT(Gamma)$ are equivalence classes of terms in the language of $Gamma$, with the equivalence relation being "$Gamma$-provable equality."
The language of $Gamma$ is then interpreted on this set of equivalence classes by saying that relations hold precisely when they provably hold: e.g. if $U$ is a unary relation symbol in the language of $Gamma$ and $t$ is a term in the language of $Gamma$, then $U$ holds of the equivalence class of $t$ in $mathcalT(Gamma)$ iff $Gamma$ proves $U(t)$.
So the objects of $mathcalT(Gamma)$ are "really" just names for objects. Note that this is all taking place inside classical logic: the intensional perspective is useful even within extensional mathematics.
Conversely, one could always argue that "intensionality is extensionality in disguise" - whenever we move from an "extensional world of objects" to an "intensional world of objects-via-definitions," what we've really done is move to an "extensional world of definitions" - our new objects are definitions, and they're treated extensionally! This is of similar spirit to how many-valued logic can be situated inside first-order logic, or how classical logic can be embedded into intuitionistic logic, or ... Basically each perspective is so broad that it can simulate the other. This is a good thing for each (in my opinion).
- Another example of this phenomenon is the idea of "provable totality" in proof theory. Roughly speaking, a function is provably total relative to a given theory if it has some definition which the theory proves defines a total function: that is, the theory should prove $forall xexists !yvarphi(x,y)$. The actual notions of provable totality considered arise by restricting attention to definitions of certain forms, e.g. via Turing machines, and understanding what functions a theory proves are total (in a given sense) gives us lots of information about the theory as a whole. This is closely connected with a similar but more technical notion in proof theory: proof-theoretic ordinals.
answered 4 hours ago
Noah Schweber
113k9143267
Oh yeah, I forgot to add in the OP that the equality of two sets may even be independent... which is the strangest case of all. What is "provable totality" in proof theory?
– DPatt
4 hours ago
@DPatt I've added a bit. Does that help?
– Noah Schweber
4 hours ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
5
down vote
accepted
up vote
5
down vote
accepted
The distinction you're seeing is a very real one, and is treated seriously in both philosophical and mathematical logic; the prevalance of the extensional approach should be taken as a sign of its strength rather than the weakness/uninterestingness of intensional approaches.
You're getting at precisely the extensionality versus intensionality issue. The extensional perspective (as per the axiom) says that a set is determined entirely by its elements; the intensional view, by contrast, says that there is additional relevant data, and usually this data is taken to be some meaning or process assigned to the set.
It's important to note that this issue persists outside set theory. For a natural language example, "morningstar" and "eveningstar" are extensionally equivalent but are a priori different notions; so we can imagine an "intensional" universe of names sitting above an "extensional" universe of referents. This is a huge motivation in philosophical logic, and in particular modal logic; see e.g. here. It's also a natural aspect of intuitionism, or any philosophy of mathematics which views the mathematical universe as a "product of the mind" (or similar).
To be a bit more specific:
Your particular focus on how hard it is to "know" that two things are equal takes us to a very precise notion on logic, namely provable equality (or more generally "provable ---ness"). This is generally a hugely important idea, even when we're only interested in a semantic and extensional picture of things. I think the place this is most obvious is in Henkin's proof of the completeness theorem. Given a consistent theory $Gamma$, Henkin (after perhaps modifying $Gamma$ in a technical way) looks at the structure $mathcalT(Gamma)$ assigned to $Gamma$ as follows:
Elements of $mathcalT(Gamma)$ are equivalence classes of terms in the language of $Gamma$, with the equivalence relation being "$Gamma$-provable equality."
The language of $Gamma$ is then interpreted on this set of equivalence classes by saying that relations hold precisely when they provably hold: e.g. if $U$ is a unary relation symbol in the language of $Gamma$ and $t$ is a term in the language of $Gamma$, then $U$ holds of the equivalence class of $t$ in $mathcalT(Gamma)$ iff $Gamma$ proves $U(t)$.
So the objects of $mathcalT(Gamma)$ are "really" just names for objects. Note that this is all taking place inside classical logic: the intensional perspective is useful even within extensional mathematics.
Conversely, one could always argue that "intensionality is extensionality in disguise" - whenever we move from an "extensional world of objects" to an "intensional world of objects-via-definitions," what we've really done is move to an "extensional world of definitions" - our new objects are definitions, and they're treated extensionally! This is of similar spirit to how many-valued logic can be situated inside first-order logic, or how classical logic can be embedded into intuitionistic logic, or ... Basically each perspective is so broad that it can simulate the other. This is a good thing for each (in my opinion).
- Another example of this phenomenon is the idea of "provable totality" in proof theory. Roughly speaking, a function is provably total relative to a given theory if it has some definition which the theory proves defines a total function: that is, the theory should prove $forall xexists !yvarphi(x,y)$. The actual notions of provable totality considered arise by restricting attention to definitions of certain forms, e.g. via Turing machines, and understanding what functions a theory proves are total (in a given sense) gives us lots of information about the theory as a whole. This is closely connected with a similar but more technical notion in proof theory: proof-theoretic ordinals.
answered 4 hours ago
Noah Schweber
113k9143267
The distinction you're seeing is a very real one, and is treated seriously in both philosophical and mathematical logic; the prevalance of the extensional approach should be taken as a sign of its strength rather than the weakness/uninterestingness of intensional approaches.
You're getting at precisely the extensionality versus intensionality issue. The extensional perspective (as per the axiom) says that a set is determined entirely by its elements; the intensional view, by contrast, says that there is additional relevant data, and usually this data is taken to be some meaning or process assigned to the set.
It's important to note that this issue persists outside set theory. For a natural language example, "morningstar" and "eveningstar" are extensionally equivalent but are a priori different notions; so we can imagine an "intensional" universe of names sitting above an "extensional" universe of referents. This is a huge motivation in philosophical logic, and in particular modal logic; see e.g. here. It's also a natural aspect of intuitionism, or any philosophy of mathematics which views the mathematical universe as a "product of the mind" (or similar).
To be a bit more specific:
Your particular focus on how hard it is to "know" that two things are equal takes us to a very precise notion on logic, namely provable equality (or more generally "provable ---ness"). This is generally a hugely important idea, even when we're only interested in a semantic and extensional picture of things. I think the place this is most obvious is in Henkin's proof of the completeness theorem. Given a consistent theory $Gamma$, Henkin (after perhaps modifying $Gamma$ in a technical way) looks at the structure $mathcalT(Gamma)$ assigned to $Gamma$ as follows:
Elements of $mathcalT(Gamma)$ are equivalence classes of terms in the language of $Gamma$, with the equivalence relation being "$Gamma$-provable equality."
The language of $Gamma$ is then interpreted on this set of equivalence classes by saying that relations hold precisely when they provably hold: e.g. if $U$ is a unary relation symbol in the language of $Gamma$ and $t$ is a term in the language of $Gamma$, then $U$ holds of the equivalence class of $t$ in $mathcalT(Gamma)$ iff $Gamma$ proves $U(t)$.
So the objects of $mathcalT(Gamma)$ are "really" just names for objects. Note that this is all taking place inside classical logic: the intensional perspective is useful even within extensional mathematics.
Conversely, one could always argue that "intensionality is extensionality in disguise" - whenever we move from an "extensional world of objects" to an "intensional world of objects-via-definitions," what we've really done is move to an "extensional world of definitions" - our new objects are definitions, and they're treated extensionally! This is of similar spirit to how many-valued logic can be situated inside first-order logic, or how classical logic can be embedded into intuitionistic logic, or ... Basically each perspective is so broad that it can simulate the other. This is a good thing for each (in my opinion).
- Another example of this phenomenon is the idea of "provable totality" in proof theory. Roughly speaking, a function is provably total relative to a given theory if it has some definition which the theory proves defines a total function: that is, the theory should prove $forall xexists !yvarphi(x,y)$. The actual notions of provable totality considered arise by restricting attention to definitions of certain forms, e.g. via Turing machines, and understanding what functions a theory proves are total (in a given sense) gives us lots of information about the theory as a whole. This is closely connected with a similar but more technical notion in proof theory: proof-theoretic ordinals.
answered 4 hours ago
Noah Schweber
113k9143267
edited 4 hours ago
answered 4 hours ago
Noah Schweber
113k9143267
answered 4 hours ago
Noah Schweber
113k9143267
answered 4 hours ago
Noah Schweber
113k9143267
113k9143267
Oh yeah, I forgot to add in the OP that the equality of two sets may even be independent... which is the strangest case of all. What is "provable totality" in proof theory?
– DPatt
4 hours ago
@DPatt I've added a bit. Does that help?
– Noah Schweber
4 hours ago
add a comment |Â
Oh yeah, I forgot to add in the OP that the equality of two sets may even be independent... which is the strangest case of all. What is "provable totality" in proof theory?
– DPatt
4 hours ago
@DPatt I've added a bit. Does that help?
– Noah Schweber
4 hours ago
Oh yeah, I forgot to add in the OP that the equality of two sets may even be independent... which is the strangest case of all. What is "provable totality" in proof theory?
– DPatt
4 hours ago
Oh yeah, I forgot to add in the OP that the equality of two sets may even be independent... which is the strangest case of all. What is "provable totality" in proof theory?
– DPatt
4 hours ago
@DPatt I've added a bit. Does that help?
– Noah Schweber
4 hours ago
@DPatt I've added a bit. Does that help?
– Noah Schweber
4 hours ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
-1
down vote
It occurred to me the other day that a set can, in some sense, know more than I do. This is because a set does not contain duplicate objects...
Duplicate elements are only an issue in set-builder notation, e.g. $X=0, 1, 1$
Translating this set-builder notation into the language of standard set theory, we would have:
$forall a: [ain X iff a=0 lor a=1 lor a=1]$
Dropping the second disjunction, it would then be trivial to prove that:
$forall a: [ain X iff a=0 lor a=1]$
Translating this back to set-builder notation, we would have:
$X=0, 1$
answered 24 mins ago
Dan Christensen
8,08911732
1
This doesn't have anything to do with the actual question. The OP is asking how the difficulty of telling whether two definitions refer to the same object plays (or doesn't play) a role in set theory, not why sets don't have duplicate elements - "I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it."
– Noah Schweber
14 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
-1
down vote
It occurred to me the other day that a set can, in some sense, know more than I do. This is because a set does not contain duplicate objects...
Duplicate elements are only an issue in set-builder notation, e.g. $X=0, 1, 1$
Translating this set-builder notation into the language of standard set theory, we would have:
$forall a: [ain X iff a=0 lor a=1 lor a=1]$
Dropping the second disjunction, it would then be trivial to prove that:
$forall a: [ain X iff a=0 lor a=1]$
Translating this back to set-builder notation, we would have:
$X=0, 1$
answered 24 mins ago
Dan Christensen
8,08911732
1
This doesn't have anything to do with the actual question. The OP is asking how the difficulty of telling whether two definitions refer to the same object plays (or doesn't play) a role in set theory, not why sets don't have duplicate elements - "I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it."
– Noah Schweber
14 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
-1
down vote
up vote
-1
down vote
It occurred to me the other day that a set can, in some sense, know more than I do. This is because a set does not contain duplicate objects...
Duplicate elements are only an issue in set-builder notation, e.g. $X=0, 1, 1$
Translating this set-builder notation into the language of standard set theory, we would have:
$forall a: [ain X iff a=0 lor a=1 lor a=1]$
Dropping the second disjunction, it would then be trivial to prove that:
$forall a: [ain X iff a=0 lor a=1]$
Translating this back to set-builder notation, we would have:
$X=0, 1$
answered 24 mins ago
Dan Christensen
8,08911732
It occurred to me the other day that a set can, in some sense, know more than I do. This is because a set does not contain duplicate objects...
Duplicate elements are only an issue in set-builder notation, e.g. $X=0, 1, 1$
Translating this set-builder notation into the language of standard set theory, we would have:
$forall a: [ain X iff a=0 lor a=1 lor a=1]$
Dropping the second disjunction, it would then be trivial to prove that:
$forall a: [ain X iff a=0 lor a=1]$
Translating this back to set-builder notation, we would have:
$X=0, 1$
answered 24 mins ago
Dan Christensen
8,08911732
answered 24 mins ago
Dan Christensen
8,08911732
answered 24 mins ago
Dan Christensen
8,08911732
answered 24 mins ago
Dan Christensen
8,08911732
8,08911732
1
This doesn't have anything to do with the actual question. The OP is asking how the difficulty of telling whether two definitions refer to the same object plays (or doesn't play) a role in set theory, not why sets don't have duplicate elements - "I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it."
– Noah Schweber
14 mins ago
add a comment |Â
1
This doesn't have anything to do with the actual question. The OP is asking how the difficulty of telling whether two definitions refer to the same object plays (or doesn't play) a role in set theory, not why sets don't have duplicate elements - "I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it."
– Noah Schweber
14 mins ago
1
1
This doesn't have anything to do with the actual question. The OP is asking how the difficulty of telling whether two definitions refer to the same object plays (or doesn't play) a role in set theory, not why sets don't have duplicate elements - "I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it."
– Noah Schweber
14 mins ago
This doesn't have anything to do with the actual question. The OP is asking how the difficulty of telling whether two definitions refer to the same object plays (or doesn't play) a role in set theory, not why sets don't have duplicate elements - "I'm wondering if anyone has taken issue with the "omniscience" of sets and tried to go about set theory in a different way because of it."
– Noah Schweber
14 mins ago
add a comment |Â
Sign up or log in
StackExchange.ready(function ()
StackExchange.helpers.onClickDraftSave('#login-link');
);
Sign up using Google
Sign up using Facebook
Sign up using Email and Password
Post as a guest
StackExchange.ready(
function ()
StackExchange.openid.initPostLogin('.new-post-login', 'https%3a%2f%2fmath.stackexchange.com%2fquestions%2f2922131%2fset-theoretic-omniscience-and-set-definition%23new-answer', 'question_page');
);
Post as a guest
Sign up or log in
StackExchange.ready(function ()
StackExchange.helpers.onClickDraftSave('#login-link');
);
Sign up using Google
Sign up using Facebook
Sign up using Email and Password
Post as a guest
Sign up or log in
StackExchange.ready(function ()
StackExchange.helpers.onClickDraftSave('#login-link');
);
Sign up using Google
Sign up using Facebook
Sign up using Email and Password
Post as a guest
Sign up or log in
StackExchange.ready(function ()
StackExchange.helpers.onClickDraftSave('#login-link');
);
Sign up using Google
Sign up using Facebook
Sign up using Email and Password
Sign up using Google
Sign up using Facebook
Sign up using Email and Password