Has the US Supreme court ever altered it's own precedent on the same topic twice?

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I know there have been a number of instances where the supreme court has basically 'changed its mind' and has ruled in a case in a manner counter to a previous surpreme court ruling, most obvious being Brown v. Board of Education.



Many of these cases are clearly examples of society moving on, for instance overruling decisions that a modern US person would likely have viewed as racist, sexist, or otherwise clearly 'wrong' by modern sensibilities; though that by no means applies to all of them.



I'm wondering though if there has ever been a case of a the court changing it's mind twice. That is to say that it originally ruled in favor of some concept X, later ruled against X, and still later overturned the second ruling by again ruling in favor of X?



What keeps this situation from being more common? I know that supreme court justices tend to be loath to overturn previous rulings, but not only has it happened, but given the highly polarized nature of American politics and the tendency of political parties to do everything they can to overturn any decisions made by the opposite party when they gain a majority I'm a little surprised that Justices aren't more prone to the same, regardless of the general stigma against changing old precedents.










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  • 1




    I think it might help to clarify what counts as the "same topic." For example, does it count if the Supreme Court struck down minimum wage laws, then upheld them, then struck it down in one application, then overturned that decision? Does it still count even though the decisions were made on different constitutional grounds?
    – Avi
    2 hours ago














up vote
2
down vote

favorite












I know there have been a number of instances where the supreme court has basically 'changed its mind' and has ruled in a case in a manner counter to a previous surpreme court ruling, most obvious being Brown v. Board of Education.



Many of these cases are clearly examples of society moving on, for instance overruling decisions that a modern US person would likely have viewed as racist, sexist, or otherwise clearly 'wrong' by modern sensibilities; though that by no means applies to all of them.



I'm wondering though if there has ever been a case of a the court changing it's mind twice. That is to say that it originally ruled in favor of some concept X, later ruled against X, and still later overturned the second ruling by again ruling in favor of X?



What keeps this situation from being more common? I know that supreme court justices tend to be loath to overturn previous rulings, but not only has it happened, but given the highly polarized nature of American politics and the tendency of political parties to do everything they can to overturn any decisions made by the opposite party when they gain a majority I'm a little surprised that Justices aren't more prone to the same, regardless of the general stigma against changing old precedents.










share|improve this question



















  • 1




    I think it might help to clarify what counts as the "same topic." For example, does it count if the Supreme Court struck down minimum wage laws, then upheld them, then struck it down in one application, then overturned that decision? Does it still count even though the decisions were made on different constitutional grounds?
    – Avi
    2 hours ago












up vote
2
down vote

favorite









up vote
2
down vote

favorite











I know there have been a number of instances where the supreme court has basically 'changed its mind' and has ruled in a case in a manner counter to a previous surpreme court ruling, most obvious being Brown v. Board of Education.



Many of these cases are clearly examples of society moving on, for instance overruling decisions that a modern US person would likely have viewed as racist, sexist, or otherwise clearly 'wrong' by modern sensibilities; though that by no means applies to all of them.



I'm wondering though if there has ever been a case of a the court changing it's mind twice. That is to say that it originally ruled in favor of some concept X, later ruled against X, and still later overturned the second ruling by again ruling in favor of X?



What keeps this situation from being more common? I know that supreme court justices tend to be loath to overturn previous rulings, but not only has it happened, but given the highly polarized nature of American politics and the tendency of political parties to do everything they can to overturn any decisions made by the opposite party when they gain a majority I'm a little surprised that Justices aren't more prone to the same, regardless of the general stigma against changing old precedents.










share|improve this question















I know there have been a number of instances where the supreme court has basically 'changed its mind' and has ruled in a case in a manner counter to a previous surpreme court ruling, most obvious being Brown v. Board of Education.



Many of these cases are clearly examples of society moving on, for instance overruling decisions that a modern US person would likely have viewed as racist, sexist, or otherwise clearly 'wrong' by modern sensibilities; though that by no means applies to all of them.



I'm wondering though if there has ever been a case of a the court changing it's mind twice. That is to say that it originally ruled in favor of some concept X, later ruled against X, and still later overturned the second ruling by again ruling in favor of X?



What keeps this situation from being more common? I know that supreme court justices tend to be loath to overturn previous rulings, but not only has it happened, but given the highly polarized nature of American politics and the tendency of political parties to do everything they can to overturn any decisions made by the opposite party when they gain a majority I'm a little surprised that Justices aren't more prone to the same, regardless of the general stigma against changing old precedents.







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edited 1 hour ago









PoloHoleSet

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asked 2 hours ago









dsollen

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1,5713822







  • 1




    I think it might help to clarify what counts as the "same topic." For example, does it count if the Supreme Court struck down minimum wage laws, then upheld them, then struck it down in one application, then overturned that decision? Does it still count even though the decisions were made on different constitutional grounds?
    – Avi
    2 hours ago












  • 1




    I think it might help to clarify what counts as the "same topic." For example, does it count if the Supreme Court struck down minimum wage laws, then upheld them, then struck it down in one application, then overturned that decision? Does it still count even though the decisions were made on different constitutional grounds?
    – Avi
    2 hours ago







1




1




I think it might help to clarify what counts as the "same topic." For example, does it count if the Supreme Court struck down minimum wage laws, then upheld them, then struck it down in one application, then overturned that decision? Does it still count even though the decisions were made on different constitutional grounds?
– Avi
2 hours ago




I think it might help to clarify what counts as the "same topic." For example, does it count if the Supreme Court struck down minimum wage laws, then upheld them, then struck it down in one application, then overturned that decision? Does it still count even though the decisions were made on different constitutional grounds?
– Avi
2 hours ago










2 Answers
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3
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United States Free Speech Laws originally was the "Bad Tendancy Test" to determine unprotected speech (i.e. restrictions on Free Speech) until Schenk v. United States, which amended the jurisprudence to the "Clear and Present Danger Test" which required that the speech be clear on the action and the action must be dangerous. This was further amended in Brandenberg v. Ohio, which revised the test again to it's current "Imminent Lawless Action test" which requires that some definite time component be attached to an advocacy for an illegal action (basically, I can say "Stealing should be allowed" which holds no lawless action, as I am advocating for the crime to be legalized.).



Additionally, other changes have come down the works to refine previous discrepancies (there are some legal scholars that question if Fighting Words doctrine is even a thing as there has been no case that has upheld it since the original Chaplipsky v. New Hampshire decision, which introduced it. Since then, it has been significantly narrowed in scope by Street v. New York, Cohen v. California, R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, and Snyder v. Phelps).






share|improve this answer



























    up vote
    2
    down vote













    One of the most recent examples involves sales tax jurisdiction.



    In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court changed prior law to prohibit sales taxation imposed on sellers of goods who have no offices for the conduct of business in the taxing state who deliver their goods via common carriers (e.g. U.S. mail, UPS, Federal Express, etc.).



    Quill Corp. hardened the rule of the case National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), in which the Supreme Court ruled that a mail order reseller was not required to collect sales tax unless it had some physical contact with the state. The Court in National Bellas Hess recounted some key cases in place before it was decided:




    In applying these principles the Court has upheld the power of a State
    to impose liability upon an out-of-state seller to collect a local use
    tax in a variety of circumstances. Where the sales were arranged by
    local agents in the taxing State, we have upheld such power. Felt &
    Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher
    , 306 U.S. 62 , 59 S.Ct. 376; General
    Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n
    , 322 U.S. 335 , 64 S.Ct. 1028. We have
    reached the same result where the mail order seller maintained local
    retail stores. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 , 61 S.Ct.
    58; Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 , 61 S.Ct. 593.10 In
    those situations the out-of-state seller was plainly accorded the
    protection and services of the taxing State. The case in this Court
    which represents the furthest constitutional reach to date of a
    State's power to deputize an out-of-state retailer as its collection
    agent for a use tax is Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 , 80
    S.Ct. 619, 4 L.Ed.2d 660. There we held that Florida could
    constitutionally impose upon a Georgia seller the duty of collecting a
    state use tax upon the sale of goods shipped to customers in Florida.
    In that case the seller had '10 wholesalers, jobbers, or 'salesmen'
    conducting continuous local solicitation in Florida and forwarding the
    resulting orders [386 U.S. 753, 758] from that State to Atlanta for
    shipment of the ordered goods.' 362 U.S., at 211 , 80 S.Ct., at 621.




    It looked very likely prior to National Bellas Hess, that intentionally shipping goods to and advertising in a state would have subjected it to sales tax liability (something called "purposeful availment"), by analogy to other personal jurisdiction cases. In other areas of law the trend of the cases allowed a state to assert jurisdiction over someone outside the sate for any act directed intentionally towards a state, which a sale of goods for delivery in a state would include. This principal was eventually articulated directly in the personal jurisdiction context. See, e.g. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286 (1980), and there had been every indication prior to National Bellas Hess that that was where it was going with the sales tax cases as well.



    In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. (U.S. 2018), the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Quill and reverted the law to its pre-Quill state.






    share|improve this answer






















    • That is two rulings, was there rulings, but there would need to be 3 to meet the situation I described. Had the supreme court made a ruling about taxes prior to 1992 that the latest case was reverting back to?
      – dsollen
      33 mins ago






    • 1




      @dollen Yes. There were rulings prior to 1992 by the U.S. regarding the scope of a state's taxing jurisdiction, but, because they involve a variety of cases, rather than one seminal case, it is not quite as easy to summarize.
      – ohwilleke
      28 mins ago










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    2 Answers
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    United States Free Speech Laws originally was the "Bad Tendancy Test" to determine unprotected speech (i.e. restrictions on Free Speech) until Schenk v. United States, which amended the jurisprudence to the "Clear and Present Danger Test" which required that the speech be clear on the action and the action must be dangerous. This was further amended in Brandenberg v. Ohio, which revised the test again to it's current "Imminent Lawless Action test" which requires that some definite time component be attached to an advocacy for an illegal action (basically, I can say "Stealing should be allowed" which holds no lawless action, as I am advocating for the crime to be legalized.).



    Additionally, other changes have come down the works to refine previous discrepancies (there are some legal scholars that question if Fighting Words doctrine is even a thing as there has been no case that has upheld it since the original Chaplipsky v. New Hampshire decision, which introduced it. Since then, it has been significantly narrowed in scope by Street v. New York, Cohen v. California, R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, and Snyder v. Phelps).






    share|improve this answer
























      up vote
      3
      down vote













      United States Free Speech Laws originally was the "Bad Tendancy Test" to determine unprotected speech (i.e. restrictions on Free Speech) until Schenk v. United States, which amended the jurisprudence to the "Clear and Present Danger Test" which required that the speech be clear on the action and the action must be dangerous. This was further amended in Brandenberg v. Ohio, which revised the test again to it's current "Imminent Lawless Action test" which requires that some definite time component be attached to an advocacy for an illegal action (basically, I can say "Stealing should be allowed" which holds no lawless action, as I am advocating for the crime to be legalized.).



      Additionally, other changes have come down the works to refine previous discrepancies (there are some legal scholars that question if Fighting Words doctrine is even a thing as there has been no case that has upheld it since the original Chaplipsky v. New Hampshire decision, which introduced it. Since then, it has been significantly narrowed in scope by Street v. New York, Cohen v. California, R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, and Snyder v. Phelps).






      share|improve this answer






















        up vote
        3
        down vote










        up vote
        3
        down vote









        United States Free Speech Laws originally was the "Bad Tendancy Test" to determine unprotected speech (i.e. restrictions on Free Speech) until Schenk v. United States, which amended the jurisprudence to the "Clear and Present Danger Test" which required that the speech be clear on the action and the action must be dangerous. This was further amended in Brandenberg v. Ohio, which revised the test again to it's current "Imminent Lawless Action test" which requires that some definite time component be attached to an advocacy for an illegal action (basically, I can say "Stealing should be allowed" which holds no lawless action, as I am advocating for the crime to be legalized.).



        Additionally, other changes have come down the works to refine previous discrepancies (there are some legal scholars that question if Fighting Words doctrine is even a thing as there has been no case that has upheld it since the original Chaplipsky v. New Hampshire decision, which introduced it. Since then, it has been significantly narrowed in scope by Street v. New York, Cohen v. California, R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, and Snyder v. Phelps).






        share|improve this answer












        United States Free Speech Laws originally was the "Bad Tendancy Test" to determine unprotected speech (i.e. restrictions on Free Speech) until Schenk v. United States, which amended the jurisprudence to the "Clear and Present Danger Test" which required that the speech be clear on the action and the action must be dangerous. This was further amended in Brandenberg v. Ohio, which revised the test again to it's current "Imminent Lawless Action test" which requires that some definite time component be attached to an advocacy for an illegal action (basically, I can say "Stealing should be allowed" which holds no lawless action, as I am advocating for the crime to be legalized.).



        Additionally, other changes have come down the works to refine previous discrepancies (there are some legal scholars that question if Fighting Words doctrine is even a thing as there has been no case that has upheld it since the original Chaplipsky v. New Hampshire decision, which introduced it. Since then, it has been significantly narrowed in scope by Street v. New York, Cohen v. California, R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, and Snyder v. Phelps).







        share|improve this answer












        share|improve this answer



        share|improve this answer










        answered 1 hour ago









        hszmv

        3,827417




        3,827417




















            up vote
            2
            down vote













            One of the most recent examples involves sales tax jurisdiction.



            In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court changed prior law to prohibit sales taxation imposed on sellers of goods who have no offices for the conduct of business in the taxing state who deliver their goods via common carriers (e.g. U.S. mail, UPS, Federal Express, etc.).



            Quill Corp. hardened the rule of the case National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), in which the Supreme Court ruled that a mail order reseller was not required to collect sales tax unless it had some physical contact with the state. The Court in National Bellas Hess recounted some key cases in place before it was decided:




            In applying these principles the Court has upheld the power of a State
            to impose liability upon an out-of-state seller to collect a local use
            tax in a variety of circumstances. Where the sales were arranged by
            local agents in the taxing State, we have upheld such power. Felt &
            Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher
            , 306 U.S. 62 , 59 S.Ct. 376; General
            Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n
            , 322 U.S. 335 , 64 S.Ct. 1028. We have
            reached the same result where the mail order seller maintained local
            retail stores. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 , 61 S.Ct.
            58; Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 , 61 S.Ct. 593.10 In
            those situations the out-of-state seller was plainly accorded the
            protection and services of the taxing State. The case in this Court
            which represents the furthest constitutional reach to date of a
            State's power to deputize an out-of-state retailer as its collection
            agent for a use tax is Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 , 80
            S.Ct. 619, 4 L.Ed.2d 660. There we held that Florida could
            constitutionally impose upon a Georgia seller the duty of collecting a
            state use tax upon the sale of goods shipped to customers in Florida.
            In that case the seller had '10 wholesalers, jobbers, or 'salesmen'
            conducting continuous local solicitation in Florida and forwarding the
            resulting orders [386 U.S. 753, 758] from that State to Atlanta for
            shipment of the ordered goods.' 362 U.S., at 211 , 80 S.Ct., at 621.




            It looked very likely prior to National Bellas Hess, that intentionally shipping goods to and advertising in a state would have subjected it to sales tax liability (something called "purposeful availment"), by analogy to other personal jurisdiction cases. In other areas of law the trend of the cases allowed a state to assert jurisdiction over someone outside the sate for any act directed intentionally towards a state, which a sale of goods for delivery in a state would include. This principal was eventually articulated directly in the personal jurisdiction context. See, e.g. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286 (1980), and there had been every indication prior to National Bellas Hess that that was where it was going with the sales tax cases as well.



            In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. (U.S. 2018), the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Quill and reverted the law to its pre-Quill state.






            share|improve this answer






















            • That is two rulings, was there rulings, but there would need to be 3 to meet the situation I described. Had the supreme court made a ruling about taxes prior to 1992 that the latest case was reverting back to?
              – dsollen
              33 mins ago






            • 1




              @dollen Yes. There were rulings prior to 1992 by the U.S. regarding the scope of a state's taxing jurisdiction, but, because they involve a variety of cases, rather than one seminal case, it is not quite as easy to summarize.
              – ohwilleke
              28 mins ago














            up vote
            2
            down vote













            One of the most recent examples involves sales tax jurisdiction.



            In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court changed prior law to prohibit sales taxation imposed on sellers of goods who have no offices for the conduct of business in the taxing state who deliver their goods via common carriers (e.g. U.S. mail, UPS, Federal Express, etc.).



            Quill Corp. hardened the rule of the case National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), in which the Supreme Court ruled that a mail order reseller was not required to collect sales tax unless it had some physical contact with the state. The Court in National Bellas Hess recounted some key cases in place before it was decided:




            In applying these principles the Court has upheld the power of a State
            to impose liability upon an out-of-state seller to collect a local use
            tax in a variety of circumstances. Where the sales were arranged by
            local agents in the taxing State, we have upheld such power. Felt &
            Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher
            , 306 U.S. 62 , 59 S.Ct. 376; General
            Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n
            , 322 U.S. 335 , 64 S.Ct. 1028. We have
            reached the same result where the mail order seller maintained local
            retail stores. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 , 61 S.Ct.
            58; Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 , 61 S.Ct. 593.10 In
            those situations the out-of-state seller was plainly accorded the
            protection and services of the taxing State. The case in this Court
            which represents the furthest constitutional reach to date of a
            State's power to deputize an out-of-state retailer as its collection
            agent for a use tax is Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 , 80
            S.Ct. 619, 4 L.Ed.2d 660. There we held that Florida could
            constitutionally impose upon a Georgia seller the duty of collecting a
            state use tax upon the sale of goods shipped to customers in Florida.
            In that case the seller had '10 wholesalers, jobbers, or 'salesmen'
            conducting continuous local solicitation in Florida and forwarding the
            resulting orders [386 U.S. 753, 758] from that State to Atlanta for
            shipment of the ordered goods.' 362 U.S., at 211 , 80 S.Ct., at 621.




            It looked very likely prior to National Bellas Hess, that intentionally shipping goods to and advertising in a state would have subjected it to sales tax liability (something called "purposeful availment"), by analogy to other personal jurisdiction cases. In other areas of law the trend of the cases allowed a state to assert jurisdiction over someone outside the sate for any act directed intentionally towards a state, which a sale of goods for delivery in a state would include. This principal was eventually articulated directly in the personal jurisdiction context. See, e.g. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286 (1980), and there had been every indication prior to National Bellas Hess that that was where it was going with the sales tax cases as well.



            In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. (U.S. 2018), the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Quill and reverted the law to its pre-Quill state.






            share|improve this answer






















            • That is two rulings, was there rulings, but there would need to be 3 to meet the situation I described. Had the supreme court made a ruling about taxes prior to 1992 that the latest case was reverting back to?
              – dsollen
              33 mins ago






            • 1




              @dollen Yes. There were rulings prior to 1992 by the U.S. regarding the scope of a state's taxing jurisdiction, but, because they involve a variety of cases, rather than one seminal case, it is not quite as easy to summarize.
              – ohwilleke
              28 mins ago












            up vote
            2
            down vote










            up vote
            2
            down vote









            One of the most recent examples involves sales tax jurisdiction.



            In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court changed prior law to prohibit sales taxation imposed on sellers of goods who have no offices for the conduct of business in the taxing state who deliver their goods via common carriers (e.g. U.S. mail, UPS, Federal Express, etc.).



            Quill Corp. hardened the rule of the case National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), in which the Supreme Court ruled that a mail order reseller was not required to collect sales tax unless it had some physical contact with the state. The Court in National Bellas Hess recounted some key cases in place before it was decided:




            In applying these principles the Court has upheld the power of a State
            to impose liability upon an out-of-state seller to collect a local use
            tax in a variety of circumstances. Where the sales were arranged by
            local agents in the taxing State, we have upheld such power. Felt &
            Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher
            , 306 U.S. 62 , 59 S.Ct. 376; General
            Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n
            , 322 U.S. 335 , 64 S.Ct. 1028. We have
            reached the same result where the mail order seller maintained local
            retail stores. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 , 61 S.Ct.
            58; Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 , 61 S.Ct. 593.10 In
            those situations the out-of-state seller was plainly accorded the
            protection and services of the taxing State. The case in this Court
            which represents the furthest constitutional reach to date of a
            State's power to deputize an out-of-state retailer as its collection
            agent for a use tax is Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 , 80
            S.Ct. 619, 4 L.Ed.2d 660. There we held that Florida could
            constitutionally impose upon a Georgia seller the duty of collecting a
            state use tax upon the sale of goods shipped to customers in Florida.
            In that case the seller had '10 wholesalers, jobbers, or 'salesmen'
            conducting continuous local solicitation in Florida and forwarding the
            resulting orders [386 U.S. 753, 758] from that State to Atlanta for
            shipment of the ordered goods.' 362 U.S., at 211 , 80 S.Ct., at 621.




            It looked very likely prior to National Bellas Hess, that intentionally shipping goods to and advertising in a state would have subjected it to sales tax liability (something called "purposeful availment"), by analogy to other personal jurisdiction cases. In other areas of law the trend of the cases allowed a state to assert jurisdiction over someone outside the sate for any act directed intentionally towards a state, which a sale of goods for delivery in a state would include. This principal was eventually articulated directly in the personal jurisdiction context. See, e.g. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286 (1980), and there had been every indication prior to National Bellas Hess that that was where it was going with the sales tax cases as well.



            In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. (U.S. 2018), the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Quill and reverted the law to its pre-Quill state.






            share|improve this answer














            One of the most recent examples involves sales tax jurisdiction.



            In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court changed prior law to prohibit sales taxation imposed on sellers of goods who have no offices for the conduct of business in the taxing state who deliver their goods via common carriers (e.g. U.S. mail, UPS, Federal Express, etc.).



            Quill Corp. hardened the rule of the case National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), in which the Supreme Court ruled that a mail order reseller was not required to collect sales tax unless it had some physical contact with the state. The Court in National Bellas Hess recounted some key cases in place before it was decided:




            In applying these principles the Court has upheld the power of a State
            to impose liability upon an out-of-state seller to collect a local use
            tax in a variety of circumstances. Where the sales were arranged by
            local agents in the taxing State, we have upheld such power. Felt &
            Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher
            , 306 U.S. 62 , 59 S.Ct. 376; General
            Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n
            , 322 U.S. 335 , 64 S.Ct. 1028. We have
            reached the same result where the mail order seller maintained local
            retail stores. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 , 61 S.Ct.
            58; Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 , 61 S.Ct. 593.10 In
            those situations the out-of-state seller was plainly accorded the
            protection and services of the taxing State. The case in this Court
            which represents the furthest constitutional reach to date of a
            State's power to deputize an out-of-state retailer as its collection
            agent for a use tax is Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 , 80
            S.Ct. 619, 4 L.Ed.2d 660. There we held that Florida could
            constitutionally impose upon a Georgia seller the duty of collecting a
            state use tax upon the sale of goods shipped to customers in Florida.
            In that case the seller had '10 wholesalers, jobbers, or 'salesmen'
            conducting continuous local solicitation in Florida and forwarding the
            resulting orders [386 U.S. 753, 758] from that State to Atlanta for
            shipment of the ordered goods.' 362 U.S., at 211 , 80 S.Ct., at 621.




            It looked very likely prior to National Bellas Hess, that intentionally shipping goods to and advertising in a state would have subjected it to sales tax liability (something called "purposeful availment"), by analogy to other personal jurisdiction cases. In other areas of law the trend of the cases allowed a state to assert jurisdiction over someone outside the sate for any act directed intentionally towards a state, which a sale of goods for delivery in a state would include. This principal was eventually articulated directly in the personal jurisdiction context. See, e.g. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286 (1980), and there had been every indication prior to National Bellas Hess that that was where it was going with the sales tax cases as well.



            In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. (U.S. 2018), the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Quill and reverted the law to its pre-Quill state.







            share|improve this answer














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            edited 6 mins ago

























            answered 36 mins ago









            ohwilleke

            19.5k34784




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            • That is two rulings, was there rulings, but there would need to be 3 to meet the situation I described. Had the supreme court made a ruling about taxes prior to 1992 that the latest case was reverting back to?
              – dsollen
              33 mins ago






            • 1




              @dollen Yes. There were rulings prior to 1992 by the U.S. regarding the scope of a state's taxing jurisdiction, but, because they involve a variety of cases, rather than one seminal case, it is not quite as easy to summarize.
              – ohwilleke
              28 mins ago
















            • That is two rulings, was there rulings, but there would need to be 3 to meet the situation I described. Had the supreme court made a ruling about taxes prior to 1992 that the latest case was reverting back to?
              – dsollen
              33 mins ago






            • 1




              @dollen Yes. There were rulings prior to 1992 by the U.S. regarding the scope of a state's taxing jurisdiction, but, because they involve a variety of cases, rather than one seminal case, it is not quite as easy to summarize.
              – ohwilleke
              28 mins ago















            That is two rulings, was there rulings, but there would need to be 3 to meet the situation I described. Had the supreme court made a ruling about taxes prior to 1992 that the latest case was reverting back to?
            – dsollen
            33 mins ago




            That is two rulings, was there rulings, but there would need to be 3 to meet the situation I described. Had the supreme court made a ruling about taxes prior to 1992 that the latest case was reverting back to?
            – dsollen
            33 mins ago




            1




            1




            @dollen Yes. There were rulings prior to 1992 by the U.S. regarding the scope of a state's taxing jurisdiction, but, because they involve a variety of cases, rather than one seminal case, it is not quite as easy to summarize.
            – ohwilleke
            28 mins ago




            @dollen Yes. There were rulings prior to 1992 by the U.S. regarding the scope of a state's taxing jurisdiction, but, because they involve a variety of cases, rather than one seminal case, it is not quite as easy to summarize.
            – ohwilleke
            28 mins ago

















             

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