How does autonomy as defined by Kant relate to respect for others?

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I understand what Autonomy means. However, I fail to understand how it maps on to respect for others.










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    I understand what Autonomy means. However, I fail to understand how it maps on to respect for others.










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      I understand what Autonomy means. However, I fail to understand how it maps on to respect for others.










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      I understand what Autonomy means. However, I fail to understand how it maps on to respect for others.







      kant






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          This is described towards the end of the second section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.



          The definition of autonomy is:




          Autonomy of the will is the characteristic of the will by which it is a law
          to itself (4:440)




          The link between autonomy and respect for others is the defining core of the concept of what he calls kingdom of ends:




          [E]very rational being, as an
          end in itself, must be able to view itself as at the same time universally legislating
          with regard to any law whatsoever to which it may
          be subject, because it is' just this fittingness of its maxims for universal
          legislation that marks it out as an end in itself; likewise that this dignity
          (prerogative) it [i.e. a rational being] has above all merely natural beings brings with it that
          it must always take its maxims from the point of view of itself, but also
          at the same time of every other rational being as legislating (which are
          therefore also called persons).
          Now in this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a kingdom of ends is possible, and possible
          through their own legislation of all persons as members. (4:438, bolded mine)




          In other words: As autonomy is about the will being a law to itself and is a property of rational beings as such, any "legislating act", i.e. determining how things should be per autonomy, has to consider the autonomy of every other rational being, i.e. their dignity.



          This means that the concept of the autonomy of the will itself entails the respect for the autonomy of others, i.e. their dignity, because autonomy is something that pertains to the will of every finite rational being:




          [T]he legislation
          that determines all worth [i.e. autonomy of the will of a finite rational being] must itself have a dignity, i.e. unconditional,
          incomparable worth, for which the word respect alone makes a befitting
          expression of the estimation a rational being is to give of it. Autonomy is
          thus the ground of the dignity of a human and of every rational nature. (4:436)




          The reason for why it pertains to every (finite) rational being is beyond the scope of this question, but comes down to the fact that all the analysis of the second section which results in the concept of autonomy started with the concept of the will of a (finite) rational being as such. Thus, autonomy is a concept entailed in the concept of the will of a (finite) rational being and thus trivially pertains to every (finite) rational being. Well, according to Kant's argument, that is.






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            This is described towards the end of the second section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.



            The definition of autonomy is:




            Autonomy of the will is the characteristic of the will by which it is a law
            to itself (4:440)




            The link between autonomy and respect for others is the defining core of the concept of what he calls kingdom of ends:




            [E]very rational being, as an
            end in itself, must be able to view itself as at the same time universally legislating
            with regard to any law whatsoever to which it may
            be subject, because it is' just this fittingness of its maxims for universal
            legislation that marks it out as an end in itself; likewise that this dignity
            (prerogative) it [i.e. a rational being] has above all merely natural beings brings with it that
            it must always take its maxims from the point of view of itself, but also
            at the same time of every other rational being as legislating (which are
            therefore also called persons).
            Now in this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a kingdom of ends is possible, and possible
            through their own legislation of all persons as members. (4:438, bolded mine)




            In other words: As autonomy is about the will being a law to itself and is a property of rational beings as such, any "legislating act", i.e. determining how things should be per autonomy, has to consider the autonomy of every other rational being, i.e. their dignity.



            This means that the concept of the autonomy of the will itself entails the respect for the autonomy of others, i.e. their dignity, because autonomy is something that pertains to the will of every finite rational being:




            [T]he legislation
            that determines all worth [i.e. autonomy of the will of a finite rational being] must itself have a dignity, i.e. unconditional,
            incomparable worth, for which the word respect alone makes a befitting
            expression of the estimation a rational being is to give of it. Autonomy is
            thus the ground of the dignity of a human and of every rational nature. (4:436)




            The reason for why it pertains to every (finite) rational being is beyond the scope of this question, but comes down to the fact that all the analysis of the second section which results in the concept of autonomy started with the concept of the will of a (finite) rational being as such. Thus, autonomy is a concept entailed in the concept of the will of a (finite) rational being and thus trivially pertains to every (finite) rational being. Well, according to Kant's argument, that is.






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              This is described towards the end of the second section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.



              The definition of autonomy is:




              Autonomy of the will is the characteristic of the will by which it is a law
              to itself (4:440)




              The link between autonomy and respect for others is the defining core of the concept of what he calls kingdom of ends:




              [E]very rational being, as an
              end in itself, must be able to view itself as at the same time universally legislating
              with regard to any law whatsoever to which it may
              be subject, because it is' just this fittingness of its maxims for universal
              legislation that marks it out as an end in itself; likewise that this dignity
              (prerogative) it [i.e. a rational being] has above all merely natural beings brings with it that
              it must always take its maxims from the point of view of itself, but also
              at the same time of every other rational being as legislating (which are
              therefore also called persons).
              Now in this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a kingdom of ends is possible, and possible
              through their own legislation of all persons as members. (4:438, bolded mine)




              In other words: As autonomy is about the will being a law to itself and is a property of rational beings as such, any "legislating act", i.e. determining how things should be per autonomy, has to consider the autonomy of every other rational being, i.e. their dignity.



              This means that the concept of the autonomy of the will itself entails the respect for the autonomy of others, i.e. their dignity, because autonomy is something that pertains to the will of every finite rational being:




              [T]he legislation
              that determines all worth [i.e. autonomy of the will of a finite rational being] must itself have a dignity, i.e. unconditional,
              incomparable worth, for which the word respect alone makes a befitting
              expression of the estimation a rational being is to give of it. Autonomy is
              thus the ground of the dignity of a human and of every rational nature. (4:436)




              The reason for why it pertains to every (finite) rational being is beyond the scope of this question, but comes down to the fact that all the analysis of the second section which results in the concept of autonomy started with the concept of the will of a (finite) rational being as such. Thus, autonomy is a concept entailed in the concept of the will of a (finite) rational being and thus trivially pertains to every (finite) rational being. Well, according to Kant's argument, that is.






              share|improve this answer
























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                down vote










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                1
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                This is described towards the end of the second section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.



                The definition of autonomy is:




                Autonomy of the will is the characteristic of the will by which it is a law
                to itself (4:440)




                The link between autonomy and respect for others is the defining core of the concept of what he calls kingdom of ends:




                [E]very rational being, as an
                end in itself, must be able to view itself as at the same time universally legislating
                with regard to any law whatsoever to which it may
                be subject, because it is' just this fittingness of its maxims for universal
                legislation that marks it out as an end in itself; likewise that this dignity
                (prerogative) it [i.e. a rational being] has above all merely natural beings brings with it that
                it must always take its maxims from the point of view of itself, but also
                at the same time of every other rational being as legislating (which are
                therefore also called persons).
                Now in this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a kingdom of ends is possible, and possible
                through their own legislation of all persons as members. (4:438, bolded mine)




                In other words: As autonomy is about the will being a law to itself and is a property of rational beings as such, any "legislating act", i.e. determining how things should be per autonomy, has to consider the autonomy of every other rational being, i.e. their dignity.



                This means that the concept of the autonomy of the will itself entails the respect for the autonomy of others, i.e. their dignity, because autonomy is something that pertains to the will of every finite rational being:




                [T]he legislation
                that determines all worth [i.e. autonomy of the will of a finite rational being] must itself have a dignity, i.e. unconditional,
                incomparable worth, for which the word respect alone makes a befitting
                expression of the estimation a rational being is to give of it. Autonomy is
                thus the ground of the dignity of a human and of every rational nature. (4:436)




                The reason for why it pertains to every (finite) rational being is beyond the scope of this question, but comes down to the fact that all the analysis of the second section which results in the concept of autonomy started with the concept of the will of a (finite) rational being as such. Thus, autonomy is a concept entailed in the concept of the will of a (finite) rational being and thus trivially pertains to every (finite) rational being. Well, according to Kant's argument, that is.






                share|improve this answer














                This is described towards the end of the second section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.



                The definition of autonomy is:




                Autonomy of the will is the characteristic of the will by which it is a law
                to itself (4:440)




                The link between autonomy and respect for others is the defining core of the concept of what he calls kingdom of ends:




                [E]very rational being, as an
                end in itself, must be able to view itself as at the same time universally legislating
                with regard to any law whatsoever to which it may
                be subject, because it is' just this fittingness of its maxims for universal
                legislation that marks it out as an end in itself; likewise that this dignity
                (prerogative) it [i.e. a rational being] has above all merely natural beings brings with it that
                it must always take its maxims from the point of view of itself, but also
                at the same time of every other rational being as legislating (which are
                therefore also called persons).
                Now in this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a kingdom of ends is possible, and possible
                through their own legislation of all persons as members. (4:438, bolded mine)




                In other words: As autonomy is about the will being a law to itself and is a property of rational beings as such, any "legislating act", i.e. determining how things should be per autonomy, has to consider the autonomy of every other rational being, i.e. their dignity.



                This means that the concept of the autonomy of the will itself entails the respect for the autonomy of others, i.e. their dignity, because autonomy is something that pertains to the will of every finite rational being:




                [T]he legislation
                that determines all worth [i.e. autonomy of the will of a finite rational being] must itself have a dignity, i.e. unconditional,
                incomparable worth, for which the word respect alone makes a befitting
                expression of the estimation a rational being is to give of it. Autonomy is
                thus the ground of the dignity of a human and of every rational nature. (4:436)




                The reason for why it pertains to every (finite) rational being is beyond the scope of this question, but comes down to the fact that all the analysis of the second section which results in the concept of autonomy started with the concept of the will of a (finite) rational being as such. Thus, autonomy is a concept entailed in the concept of the will of a (finite) rational being and thus trivially pertains to every (finite) rational being. Well, according to Kant's argument, that is.







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                edited 13 mins ago

























                answered 33 mins ago









                Philip Klöcking♦

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