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How can substance dualism survive the arguments from neuroscience?
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On the Wikipedia page for Mind-body dualism, one of the arguments against dualism is neuroscience.
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Furthermore, subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected, as can mental imagery.
How can substance dualism survive given these discoveries?
philosophy-of-mind dualism
edited 1 hour ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
asked 2 hours ago
Noah
633
add a comment |Â
up vote
3
down vote
favorite
On the Wikipedia page for Mind-body dualism, one of the arguments against dualism is neuroscience.
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Furthermore, subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected, as can mental imagery.
How can substance dualism survive given these discoveries?
philosophy-of-mind dualism
edited 1 hour ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
asked 2 hours ago
Noah
633
add a comment |Â
up vote
3
down vote
favorite
up vote
3
down vote
favorite
On the Wikipedia page for Mind-body dualism, one of the arguments against dualism is neuroscience.
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Furthermore, subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected, as can mental imagery.
How can substance dualism survive given these discoveries?
philosophy-of-mind dualism
edited 1 hour ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
asked 2 hours ago
Noah
633
On the Wikipedia page for Mind-body dualism, one of the arguments against dualism is neuroscience.
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Furthermore, subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected, as can mental imagery.
How can substance dualism survive given these discoveries?
philosophy-of-mind dualism
philosophy-of-mind dualism
edited 1 hour ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
asked 2 hours ago
Noah
633
edited 1 hour ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
asked 2 hours ago
Noah
633
edited 1 hour ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
edited 1 hour ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
edited 1 hour ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
4,0393937
asked 2 hours ago
Noah
633
asked 2 hours ago
Noah
633
asked 2 hours ago
Noah
633
633
add a comment |Â
add a comment |Â
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
up vote
1
down vote
accepted
There are other arguments for mind-body dualism on the "Mind-body dualism" Wikipedia page, but the question is about a specific argument against it coming from neuroscience:
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Furthermore, subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected, as can mental imagery. This is strong empirical evidence that cognitive processes have a physical basis in the brain.
Alfred Mele addresses the issue from the perspective of free will in Chapter 3 of Free: why science hasn't disproved free will (page 26-39). Mele and the Wikipedia authors seem to be addressing the same research by Soon, et. al.
Mele describes what the experiment asked the participants to do: (page 27)
The study's participants were asked to make many simple decisions while their brain activity was measured using fMRI. Their options were always to press one or the other of two buttons. Nothing hinged on which one they pressed--no reward, no penalty, nothing at all.
Mele notes that the accuracy of the study was 60 percent with 50 percent being pure chance. What might be giving the researchers an edge? Mele suggests: (page 28)
What are the scientists measuring or detecting several seconds before a button press? What is that neural activity associated with? My bet is a slight unconscious bias toward a particular button on the next press.
Mele also objects to generalizing from this experiment picking buttons to all decisions that a person may make: (page 27-8)
My concern now is that this kind of picking may not be very similar to choosing or deciding in situations in which a lot of conscious weighing of reasons--pros and cons--goes into the choice or decision. How similar is the arbitrary picking of a button to a decision to ask one's spouse for a divorce--or to change careers or start a small business--after protracted reflection on reasons for and against that decision. If arbitrary picking is not very similar to these other decisions, claiming that what happens in instances of arbitrary picking also happens in instances of complicated, painstaking decision making is a huge stretch.
Let's consider the OP's question: How can substance dualism survive given these discoveries?
One can use Mele's arguments about possible unconscious bias justifying the 60% success rate over 50% random chance as one way to dismiss the experiment as inconclusive. Because of that explanation, the experiment doesn't offer a serious threat to substance dualism or any other alternate understanding of mind-body interaction.
Also one can reject any generalization of these experimental results to important decision making since the experiment did not cover such important decisions.
Reference
Mele, A. R. (2014). Free: why science hasn't disproved free will. Oxford University Press.
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., & Haynes, J. D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature neuroscience, 11(5), 543. https://www.nature.com/articles/nn.2112
Wikipedia, "Mind-body dualism" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism
answered 33 mins ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
Thank you. This is very informative on the subject, and it makes perfect sense!
– Noah
15 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
Disclaimer: none of the ontological positions detailed is my own.
As Peter Reynaert puts it in Reynaert, P. (2015). Neuroscientific Dystopia: Does Naturalism Commit a Category Mistake?. In: Neuroscience and Critique (pp. 70-86). Routledge (this is a synopsis of his):
My claim that naturalism commits a category-mistake has consequences for assessing neuroscience. Neuroscience is a variant of naturalism which reduces aspects of consciousness and human existence to brain processes. The identification of this mistake has both ontological and methodological consequences. The absurdity of naturalism implies that human consciousness and existence are conceptualized with notions and theories that cannot be applied to them, because they do not belong to the ontological region called nature. Second, and because of this, the scientific methods and theories developed for nature cannot be used to elucidate and understand human existence. Contemporary debates about the (un)reality of the free will for instance, whereby arguments against its existence are allegedly borrowed from neuroscientific research, are simply futile, because they illustrate par excellence the absurdity of the naturalist approach.
This does not necessarily commit him to substance dualism, but this is a basic argument the position often is built upon. I would paraphrase and summarise it as follows: We cannot just discard our phenomenal and normative reality by applying explanations and concepts that are methodically and conceptually tailored to explain physical reality, stating an identity across frameworks.
For example, the quote says "decisions", "subjective experiences" and "covert attitudes" can be detected. Following Reynaert, this is simply not true: neuronal activity can be detected (data) and "decisions", "subjective experiences" and "covert attitudes" are then voluntarily and consciously identified (interpreted as being identical) with the physical events detected. Dualists do not have to "explain" anything there, they can simply point out that this interpretation is nonsensical (as Reynaert does at length - it is about this being absurd).
That being said, substance dualism obviously runs into different problems, i.e. mind-body interaction. One possible way to think here is given by Daniel Dennett in Freedom Evolves, p.229:
When you think you're deciding, you're actually just passively watching
a sort of delayed internal videotape (the ominous 300-millisecond delay)
of the real deciding that happened unconsciously in your brain quite a while
before "it occurred to you" to flick.
In other words: You could theorise that there actually is a decision and that this one's "yours" in a meaningful sense, but you perceive it much later on and attribute/interpret it as a conscious decision happening in that moment.
answered 2 hours ago
Philip Klöcking♦
7,78922552
Can you explain how substance dualism could explain the situations given? Or how it could survive each of the specific situations? For example, how would substance dualism account for the fact that decisions can be detected 10 seconds before they are made by scanning the brain activity?
– Noah
1 hour ago
@Noah: Does the edit clarify the point?
– Philip Klöcking♦
1 hour ago
Yes it does thank you. Regarding mind body interaction problem of substance dualism... what’s wrong with interactionist dualism?
– Noah
20 mins ago
@Noah: Because it weakens the very point substance dualism is built upon: Two different substances (substance being self-sufficient traditionally), when able to interact...how can they be delimited from one another? Is it interaction or (partial) identity? Does it work in both directions? If so, how? But all these things have nothing to do with the question at hand, which was about dispelling naturalism, i.e. justifying a position different from it.
– Philip Klöcking♦
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
up vote
1
down vote
accepted
There are other arguments for mind-body dualism on the "Mind-body dualism" Wikipedia page, but the question is about a specific argument against it coming from neuroscience:
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Furthermore, subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected, as can mental imagery. This is strong empirical evidence that cognitive processes have a physical basis in the brain.
Alfred Mele addresses the issue from the perspective of free will in Chapter 3 of Free: why science hasn't disproved free will (page 26-39). Mele and the Wikipedia authors seem to be addressing the same research by Soon, et. al.
Mele describes what the experiment asked the participants to do: (page 27)
The study's participants were asked to make many simple decisions while their brain activity was measured using fMRI. Their options were always to press one or the other of two buttons. Nothing hinged on which one they pressed--no reward, no penalty, nothing at all.
Mele notes that the accuracy of the study was 60 percent with 50 percent being pure chance. What might be giving the researchers an edge? Mele suggests: (page 28)
What are the scientists measuring or detecting several seconds before a button press? What is that neural activity associated with? My bet is a slight unconscious bias toward a particular button on the next press.
Mele also objects to generalizing from this experiment picking buttons to all decisions that a person may make: (page 27-8)
My concern now is that this kind of picking may not be very similar to choosing or deciding in situations in which a lot of conscious weighing of reasons--pros and cons--goes into the choice or decision. How similar is the arbitrary picking of a button to a decision to ask one's spouse for a divorce--or to change careers or start a small business--after protracted reflection on reasons for and against that decision. If arbitrary picking is not very similar to these other decisions, claiming that what happens in instances of arbitrary picking also happens in instances of complicated, painstaking decision making is a huge stretch.
Let's consider the OP's question: How can substance dualism survive given these discoveries?
One can use Mele's arguments about possible unconscious bias justifying the 60% success rate over 50% random chance as one way to dismiss the experiment as inconclusive. Because of that explanation, the experiment doesn't offer a serious threat to substance dualism or any other alternate understanding of mind-body interaction.
Also one can reject any generalization of these experimental results to important decision making since the experiment did not cover such important decisions.
Reference
Mele, A. R. (2014). Free: why science hasn't disproved free will. Oxford University Press.
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., & Haynes, J. D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature neuroscience, 11(5), 543. https://www.nature.com/articles/nn.2112
Wikipedia, "Mind-body dualism" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism
answered 33 mins ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
Thank you. This is very informative on the subject, and it makes perfect sense!
– Noah
15 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
1
down vote
accepted
There are other arguments for mind-body dualism on the "Mind-body dualism" Wikipedia page, but the question is about a specific argument against it coming from neuroscience:
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Furthermore, subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected, as can mental imagery. This is strong empirical evidence that cognitive processes have a physical basis in the brain.
Alfred Mele addresses the issue from the perspective of free will in Chapter 3 of Free: why science hasn't disproved free will (page 26-39). Mele and the Wikipedia authors seem to be addressing the same research by Soon, et. al.
Mele describes what the experiment asked the participants to do: (page 27)
The study's participants were asked to make many simple decisions while their brain activity was measured using fMRI. Their options were always to press one or the other of two buttons. Nothing hinged on which one they pressed--no reward, no penalty, nothing at all.
Mele notes that the accuracy of the study was 60 percent with 50 percent being pure chance. What might be giving the researchers an edge? Mele suggests: (page 28)
What are the scientists measuring or detecting several seconds before a button press? What is that neural activity associated with? My bet is a slight unconscious bias toward a particular button on the next press.
Mele also objects to generalizing from this experiment picking buttons to all decisions that a person may make: (page 27-8)
My concern now is that this kind of picking may not be very similar to choosing or deciding in situations in which a lot of conscious weighing of reasons--pros and cons--goes into the choice or decision. How similar is the arbitrary picking of a button to a decision to ask one's spouse for a divorce--or to change careers or start a small business--after protracted reflection on reasons for and against that decision. If arbitrary picking is not very similar to these other decisions, claiming that what happens in instances of arbitrary picking also happens in instances of complicated, painstaking decision making is a huge stretch.
Let's consider the OP's question: How can substance dualism survive given these discoveries?
One can use Mele's arguments about possible unconscious bias justifying the 60% success rate over 50% random chance as one way to dismiss the experiment as inconclusive. Because of that explanation, the experiment doesn't offer a serious threat to substance dualism or any other alternate understanding of mind-body interaction.
Also one can reject any generalization of these experimental results to important decision making since the experiment did not cover such important decisions.
Reference
Mele, A. R. (2014). Free: why science hasn't disproved free will. Oxford University Press.
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., & Haynes, J. D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature neuroscience, 11(5), 543. https://www.nature.com/articles/nn.2112
Wikipedia, "Mind-body dualism" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism
answered 33 mins ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
Thank you. This is very informative on the subject, and it makes perfect sense!
– Noah
15 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
1
down vote
accepted
up vote
1
down vote
accepted
There are other arguments for mind-body dualism on the "Mind-body dualism" Wikipedia page, but the question is about a specific argument against it coming from neuroscience:
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Furthermore, subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected, as can mental imagery. This is strong empirical evidence that cognitive processes have a physical basis in the brain.
Alfred Mele addresses the issue from the perspective of free will in Chapter 3 of Free: why science hasn't disproved free will (page 26-39). Mele and the Wikipedia authors seem to be addressing the same research by Soon, et. al.
Mele describes what the experiment asked the participants to do: (page 27)
The study's participants were asked to make many simple decisions while their brain activity was measured using fMRI. Their options were always to press one or the other of two buttons. Nothing hinged on which one they pressed--no reward, no penalty, nothing at all.
Mele notes that the accuracy of the study was 60 percent with 50 percent being pure chance. What might be giving the researchers an edge? Mele suggests: (page 28)
What are the scientists measuring or detecting several seconds before a button press? What is that neural activity associated with? My bet is a slight unconscious bias toward a particular button on the next press.
Mele also objects to generalizing from this experiment picking buttons to all decisions that a person may make: (page 27-8)
My concern now is that this kind of picking may not be very similar to choosing or deciding in situations in which a lot of conscious weighing of reasons--pros and cons--goes into the choice or decision. How similar is the arbitrary picking of a button to a decision to ask one's spouse for a divorce--or to change careers or start a small business--after protracted reflection on reasons for and against that decision. If arbitrary picking is not very similar to these other decisions, claiming that what happens in instances of arbitrary picking also happens in instances of complicated, painstaking decision making is a huge stretch.
Let's consider the OP's question: How can substance dualism survive given these discoveries?
One can use Mele's arguments about possible unconscious bias justifying the 60% success rate over 50% random chance as one way to dismiss the experiment as inconclusive. Because of that explanation, the experiment doesn't offer a serious threat to substance dualism or any other alternate understanding of mind-body interaction.
Also one can reject any generalization of these experimental results to important decision making since the experiment did not cover such important decisions.
Reference
Mele, A. R. (2014). Free: why science hasn't disproved free will. Oxford University Press.
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., & Haynes, J. D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature neuroscience, 11(5), 543. https://www.nature.com/articles/nn.2112
Wikipedia, "Mind-body dualism" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism
answered 33 mins ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
There are other arguments for mind-body dualism on the "Mind-body dualism" Wikipedia page, but the question is about a specific argument against it coming from neuroscience:
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Furthermore, subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected, as can mental imagery. This is strong empirical evidence that cognitive processes have a physical basis in the brain.
Alfred Mele addresses the issue from the perspective of free will in Chapter 3 of Free: why science hasn't disproved free will (page 26-39). Mele and the Wikipedia authors seem to be addressing the same research by Soon, et. al.
Mele describes what the experiment asked the participants to do: (page 27)
The study's participants were asked to make many simple decisions while their brain activity was measured using fMRI. Their options were always to press one or the other of two buttons. Nothing hinged on which one they pressed--no reward, no penalty, nothing at all.
Mele notes that the accuracy of the study was 60 percent with 50 percent being pure chance. What might be giving the researchers an edge? Mele suggests: (page 28)
What are the scientists measuring or detecting several seconds before a button press? What is that neural activity associated with? My bet is a slight unconscious bias toward a particular button on the next press.
Mele also objects to generalizing from this experiment picking buttons to all decisions that a person may make: (page 27-8)
My concern now is that this kind of picking may not be very similar to choosing or deciding in situations in which a lot of conscious weighing of reasons--pros and cons--goes into the choice or decision. How similar is the arbitrary picking of a button to a decision to ask one's spouse for a divorce--or to change careers or start a small business--after protracted reflection on reasons for and against that decision. If arbitrary picking is not very similar to these other decisions, claiming that what happens in instances of arbitrary picking also happens in instances of complicated, painstaking decision making is a huge stretch.
Let's consider the OP's question: How can substance dualism survive given these discoveries?
One can use Mele's arguments about possible unconscious bias justifying the 60% success rate over 50% random chance as one way to dismiss the experiment as inconclusive. Because of that explanation, the experiment doesn't offer a serious threat to substance dualism or any other alternate understanding of mind-body interaction.
Also one can reject any generalization of these experimental results to important decision making since the experiment did not cover such important decisions.
Reference
Mele, A. R. (2014). Free: why science hasn't disproved free will. Oxford University Press.
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., & Haynes, J. D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature neuroscience, 11(5), 543. https://www.nature.com/articles/nn.2112
Wikipedia, "Mind-body dualism" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism
answered 33 mins ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
answered 33 mins ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
answered 33 mins ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
answered 33 mins ago
Frank Hubeny
4,0393937
4,0393937
Thank you. This is very informative on the subject, and it makes perfect sense!
– Noah
15 mins ago
add a comment |Â
Thank you. This is very informative on the subject, and it makes perfect sense!
– Noah
15 mins ago
Thank you. This is very informative on the subject, and it makes perfect sense!
– Noah
15 mins ago
Thank you. This is very informative on the subject, and it makes perfect sense!
– Noah
15 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
Disclaimer: none of the ontological positions detailed is my own.
As Peter Reynaert puts it in Reynaert, P. (2015). Neuroscientific Dystopia: Does Naturalism Commit a Category Mistake?. In: Neuroscience and Critique (pp. 70-86). Routledge (this is a synopsis of his):
My claim that naturalism commits a category-mistake has consequences for assessing neuroscience. Neuroscience is a variant of naturalism which reduces aspects of consciousness and human existence to brain processes. The identification of this mistake has both ontological and methodological consequences. The absurdity of naturalism implies that human consciousness and existence are conceptualized with notions and theories that cannot be applied to them, because they do not belong to the ontological region called nature. Second, and because of this, the scientific methods and theories developed for nature cannot be used to elucidate and understand human existence. Contemporary debates about the (un)reality of the free will for instance, whereby arguments against its existence are allegedly borrowed from neuroscientific research, are simply futile, because they illustrate par excellence the absurdity of the naturalist approach.
This does not necessarily commit him to substance dualism, but this is a basic argument the position often is built upon. I would paraphrase and summarise it as follows: We cannot just discard our phenomenal and normative reality by applying explanations and concepts that are methodically and conceptually tailored to explain physical reality, stating an identity across frameworks.
For example, the quote says "decisions", "subjective experiences" and "covert attitudes" can be detected. Following Reynaert, this is simply not true: neuronal activity can be detected (data) and "decisions", "subjective experiences" and "covert attitudes" are then voluntarily and consciously identified (interpreted as being identical) with the physical events detected. Dualists do not have to "explain" anything there, they can simply point out that this interpretation is nonsensical (as Reynaert does at length - it is about this being absurd).
That being said, substance dualism obviously runs into different problems, i.e. mind-body interaction. One possible way to think here is given by Daniel Dennett in Freedom Evolves, p.229:
When you think you're deciding, you're actually just passively watching
a sort of delayed internal videotape (the ominous 300-millisecond delay)
of the real deciding that happened unconsciously in your brain quite a while
before "it occurred to you" to flick.
In other words: You could theorise that there actually is a decision and that this one's "yours" in a meaningful sense, but you perceive it much later on and attribute/interpret it as a conscious decision happening in that moment.
answered 2 hours ago
Philip Klöcking♦
7,78922552
Can you explain how substance dualism could explain the situations given? Or how it could survive each of the specific situations? For example, how would substance dualism account for the fact that decisions can be detected 10 seconds before they are made by scanning the brain activity?
– Noah
1 hour ago
@Noah: Does the edit clarify the point?
– Philip Klöcking♦
1 hour ago
Yes it does thank you. Regarding mind body interaction problem of substance dualism... what’s wrong with interactionist dualism?
– Noah
20 mins ago
@Noah: Because it weakens the very point substance dualism is built upon: Two different substances (substance being self-sufficient traditionally), when able to interact...how can they be delimited from one another? Is it interaction or (partial) identity? Does it work in both directions? If so, how? But all these things have nothing to do with the question at hand, which was about dispelling naturalism, i.e. justifying a position different from it.
– Philip Klöcking♦
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
Disclaimer: none of the ontological positions detailed is my own.
As Peter Reynaert puts it in Reynaert, P. (2015). Neuroscientific Dystopia: Does Naturalism Commit a Category Mistake?. In: Neuroscience and Critique (pp. 70-86). Routledge (this is a synopsis of his):
My claim that naturalism commits a category-mistake has consequences for assessing neuroscience. Neuroscience is a variant of naturalism which reduces aspects of consciousness and human existence to brain processes. The identification of this mistake has both ontological and methodological consequences. The absurdity of naturalism implies that human consciousness and existence are conceptualized with notions and theories that cannot be applied to them, because they do not belong to the ontological region called nature. Second, and because of this, the scientific methods and theories developed for nature cannot be used to elucidate and understand human existence. Contemporary debates about the (un)reality of the free will for instance, whereby arguments against its existence are allegedly borrowed from neuroscientific research, are simply futile, because they illustrate par excellence the absurdity of the naturalist approach.
This does not necessarily commit him to substance dualism, but this is a basic argument the position often is built upon. I would paraphrase and summarise it as follows: We cannot just discard our phenomenal and normative reality by applying explanations and concepts that are methodically and conceptually tailored to explain physical reality, stating an identity across frameworks.
For example, the quote says "decisions", "subjective experiences" and "covert attitudes" can be detected. Following Reynaert, this is simply not true: neuronal activity can be detected (data) and "decisions", "subjective experiences" and "covert attitudes" are then voluntarily and consciously identified (interpreted as being identical) with the physical events detected. Dualists do not have to "explain" anything there, they can simply point out that this interpretation is nonsensical (as Reynaert does at length - it is about this being absurd).
That being said, substance dualism obviously runs into different problems, i.e. mind-body interaction. One possible way to think here is given by Daniel Dennett in Freedom Evolves, p.229:
When you think you're deciding, you're actually just passively watching
a sort of delayed internal videotape (the ominous 300-millisecond delay)
of the real deciding that happened unconsciously in your brain quite a while
before "it occurred to you" to flick.
In other words: You could theorise that there actually is a decision and that this one's "yours" in a meaningful sense, but you perceive it much later on and attribute/interpret it as a conscious decision happening in that moment.
answered 2 hours ago
Philip Klöcking♦
7,78922552
Can you explain how substance dualism could explain the situations given? Or how it could survive each of the specific situations? For example, how would substance dualism account for the fact that decisions can be detected 10 seconds before they are made by scanning the brain activity?
– Noah
1 hour ago
@Noah: Does the edit clarify the point?
– Philip Klöcking♦
1 hour ago
Yes it does thank you. Regarding mind body interaction problem of substance dualism... what’s wrong with interactionist dualism?
– Noah
20 mins ago
@Noah: Because it weakens the very point substance dualism is built upon: Two different substances (substance being self-sufficient traditionally), when able to interact...how can they be delimited from one another? Is it interaction or (partial) identity? Does it work in both directions? If so, how? But all these things have nothing to do with the question at hand, which was about dispelling naturalism, i.e. justifying a position different from it.
– Philip Klöcking♦
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
up vote
2
down vote
Disclaimer: none of the ontological positions detailed is my own.
As Peter Reynaert puts it in Reynaert, P. (2015). Neuroscientific Dystopia: Does Naturalism Commit a Category Mistake?. In: Neuroscience and Critique (pp. 70-86). Routledge (this is a synopsis of his):
My claim that naturalism commits a category-mistake has consequences for assessing neuroscience. Neuroscience is a variant of naturalism which reduces aspects of consciousness and human existence to brain processes. The identification of this mistake has both ontological and methodological consequences. The absurdity of naturalism implies that human consciousness and existence are conceptualized with notions and theories that cannot be applied to them, because they do not belong to the ontological region called nature. Second, and because of this, the scientific methods and theories developed for nature cannot be used to elucidate and understand human existence. Contemporary debates about the (un)reality of the free will for instance, whereby arguments against its existence are allegedly borrowed from neuroscientific research, are simply futile, because they illustrate par excellence the absurdity of the naturalist approach.
This does not necessarily commit him to substance dualism, but this is a basic argument the position often is built upon. I would paraphrase and summarise it as follows: We cannot just discard our phenomenal and normative reality by applying explanations and concepts that are methodically and conceptually tailored to explain physical reality, stating an identity across frameworks.
For example, the quote says "decisions", "subjective experiences" and "covert attitudes" can be detected. Following Reynaert, this is simply not true: neuronal activity can be detected (data) and "decisions", "subjective experiences" and "covert attitudes" are then voluntarily and consciously identified (interpreted as being identical) with the physical events detected. Dualists do not have to "explain" anything there, they can simply point out that this interpretation is nonsensical (as Reynaert does at length - it is about this being absurd).
That being said, substance dualism obviously runs into different problems, i.e. mind-body interaction. One possible way to think here is given by Daniel Dennett in Freedom Evolves, p.229:
When you think you're deciding, you're actually just passively watching
a sort of delayed internal videotape (the ominous 300-millisecond delay)
of the real deciding that happened unconsciously in your brain quite a while
before "it occurred to you" to flick.
In other words: You could theorise that there actually is a decision and that this one's "yours" in a meaningful sense, but you perceive it much later on and attribute/interpret it as a conscious decision happening in that moment.
answered 2 hours ago
Philip Klöcking♦
7,78922552
Disclaimer: none of the ontological positions detailed is my own.
As Peter Reynaert puts it in Reynaert, P. (2015). Neuroscientific Dystopia: Does Naturalism Commit a Category Mistake?. In: Neuroscience and Critique (pp. 70-86). Routledge (this is a synopsis of his):
My claim that naturalism commits a category-mistake has consequences for assessing neuroscience. Neuroscience is a variant of naturalism which reduces aspects of consciousness and human existence to brain processes. The identification of this mistake has both ontological and methodological consequences. The absurdity of naturalism implies that human consciousness and existence are conceptualized with notions and theories that cannot be applied to them, because they do not belong to the ontological region called nature. Second, and because of this, the scientific methods and theories developed for nature cannot be used to elucidate and understand human existence. Contemporary debates about the (un)reality of the free will for instance, whereby arguments against its existence are allegedly borrowed from neuroscientific research, are simply futile, because they illustrate par excellence the absurdity of the naturalist approach.
This does not necessarily commit him to substance dualism, but this is a basic argument the position often is built upon. I would paraphrase and summarise it as follows: We cannot just discard our phenomenal and normative reality by applying explanations and concepts that are methodically and conceptually tailored to explain physical reality, stating an identity across frameworks.
For example, the quote says "decisions", "subjective experiences" and "covert attitudes" can be detected. Following Reynaert, this is simply not true: neuronal activity can be detected (data) and "decisions", "subjective experiences" and "covert attitudes" are then voluntarily and consciously identified (interpreted as being identical) with the physical events detected. Dualists do not have to "explain" anything there, they can simply point out that this interpretation is nonsensical (as Reynaert does at length - it is about this being absurd).
That being said, substance dualism obviously runs into different problems, i.e. mind-body interaction. One possible way to think here is given by Daniel Dennett in Freedom Evolves, p.229:
When you think you're deciding, you're actually just passively watching
a sort of delayed internal videotape (the ominous 300-millisecond delay)
of the real deciding that happened unconsciously in your brain quite a while
before "it occurred to you" to flick.
In other words: You could theorise that there actually is a decision and that this one's "yours" in a meaningful sense, but you perceive it much later on and attribute/interpret it as a conscious decision happening in that moment.
answered 2 hours ago
Philip Klöcking♦
7,78922552
edited 29 mins ago
answered 2 hours ago
Philip Klöcking♦
7,78922552
answered 2 hours ago
Philip Klöcking♦
7,78922552
answered 2 hours ago
Philip Klöcking♦
7,78922552
7,78922552
Can you explain how substance dualism could explain the situations given? Or how it could survive each of the specific situations? For example, how would substance dualism account for the fact that decisions can be detected 10 seconds before they are made by scanning the brain activity?
– Noah
1 hour ago
@Noah: Does the edit clarify the point?
– Philip Klöcking♦
1 hour ago
Yes it does thank you. Regarding mind body interaction problem of substance dualism... what’s wrong with interactionist dualism?
– Noah
20 mins ago
@Noah: Because it weakens the very point substance dualism is built upon: Two different substances (substance being self-sufficient traditionally), when able to interact...how can they be delimited from one another? Is it interaction or (partial) identity? Does it work in both directions? If so, how? But all these things have nothing to do with the question at hand, which was about dispelling naturalism, i.e. justifying a position different from it.
– Philip Klöcking♦
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
Can you explain how substance dualism could explain the situations given? Or how it could survive each of the specific situations? For example, how would substance dualism account for the fact that decisions can be detected 10 seconds before they are made by scanning the brain activity?
– Noah
1 hour ago
@Noah: Does the edit clarify the point?
– Philip Klöcking♦
1 hour ago
Yes it does thank you. Regarding mind body interaction problem of substance dualism... what’s wrong with interactionist dualism?
– Noah
20 mins ago
@Noah: Because it weakens the very point substance dualism is built upon: Two different substances (substance being self-sufficient traditionally), when able to interact...how can they be delimited from one another? Is it interaction or (partial) identity? Does it work in both directions? If so, how? But all these things have nothing to do with the question at hand, which was about dispelling naturalism, i.e. justifying a position different from it.
– Philip Klöcking♦
16 mins ago
Can you explain how substance dualism could explain the situations given? Or how it could survive each of the specific situations? For example, how would substance dualism account for the fact that decisions can be detected 10 seconds before they are made by scanning the brain activity?
– Noah
1 hour ago
Can you explain how substance dualism could explain the situations given? Or how it could survive each of the specific situations? For example, how would substance dualism account for the fact that decisions can be detected 10 seconds before they are made by scanning the brain activity?
– Noah
1 hour ago
@Noah: Does the edit clarify the point?
– Philip Klöcking♦
1 hour ago
@Noah: Does the edit clarify the point?
– Philip Klöcking♦
1 hour ago
Yes it does thank you. Regarding mind body interaction problem of substance dualism... what’s wrong with interactionist dualism?
– Noah
20 mins ago
Yes it does thank you. Regarding mind body interaction problem of substance dualism... what’s wrong with interactionist dualism?
– Noah
20 mins ago
@Noah: Because it weakens the very point substance dualism is built upon: Two different substances (substance being self-sufficient traditionally), when able to interact...how can they be delimited from one another? Is it interaction or (partial) identity? Does it work in both directions? If so, how? But all these things have nothing to do with the question at hand, which was about dispelling naturalism, i.e. justifying a position different from it.
– Philip Klöcking♦
16 mins ago
@Noah: Because it weakens the very point substance dualism is built upon: Two different substances (substance being self-sufficient traditionally), when able to interact...how can they be delimited from one another? Is it interaction or (partial) identity? Does it work in both directions? If so, how? But all these things have nothing to do with the question at hand, which was about dispelling naturalism, i.e. justifying a position different from it.
– Philip Klöcking♦
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
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