âStrangeâ proofs of existence theorems
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This question isn't related to any specific research. I've been thinking a bit about how existence theorems are generally proven, and I've identified three broad categories: constructive proofs, proofs involving contradiction/contrapositive, and proofs involving the axiom of choice.
I'm convinced that there must be some existence theorem that can be proven without any of these techniques (and I'm fairly confident that I've probably encountered some myself in the past haha), but I can't come up with any examples at the moment. Can anyone else come up with one? I'd also like to stipulate the following conditions:
- The proof can't piggyback on another existence theorem whose proof involves one of the above-mentioned devices.
- It has to be a theorem of ZF - no exotic and "high power" axioms allowed!
Now for the interesting question: is there any existence theorem (again in ZF) such that every proof of it meets all the criteria above? Has anyone done any work in this direction? If so, what results do we have around this?
proof-theory
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This question isn't related to any specific research. I've been thinking a bit about how existence theorems are generally proven, and I've identified three broad categories: constructive proofs, proofs involving contradiction/contrapositive, and proofs involving the axiom of choice.
I'm convinced that there must be some existence theorem that can be proven without any of these techniques (and I'm fairly confident that I've probably encountered some myself in the past haha), but I can't come up with any examples at the moment. Can anyone else come up with one? I'd also like to stipulate the following conditions:
- The proof can't piggyback on another existence theorem whose proof involves one of the above-mentioned devices.
- It has to be a theorem of ZF - no exotic and "high power" axioms allowed!
Now for the interesting question: is there any existence theorem (again in ZF) such that every proof of it meets all the criteria above? Has anyone done any work in this direction? If so, what results do we have around this?
proof-theory
3
To make this question precise, you would need to carefully define what you mean by "constructive proof".
â Alex Kruckman
15 hours ago
1
âÂÂ25 has a square root in integers.â When existence is obvious enough to need no elaborate argument, itâÂÂs just not called a theorem...
â Francois Ziegler
14 hours ago
2
@Francois The point is that you exhibit an explicit object (in your example, 5).
â Andrés E. Caicedo
14 hours ago
4
Maybe proofs using the probabilistic method might count. They're not constructive and they don't involve the axiom of choice but it's a bit unclear to me how to evaluate whether they use contradiction / contrapositive (these are really not similar at all, by the way; in a proof by contrapositive every statement you write down along the way is still true, unlike in a proof by contradiction).
â Qiaochu Yuan
10 hours ago
2
@Dirk But typical proofs of uncountability do not seem to be by contradiction: given an enumeration, you explicitly exhibit a real not in the list, for instance. (It seems like splitting hairs in any case.)
â Andrés E. Caicedo
4 hours ago
 |Â
show 13 more comments
up vote
3
down vote
favorite
up vote
3
down vote
favorite
This question isn't related to any specific research. I've been thinking a bit about how existence theorems are generally proven, and I've identified three broad categories: constructive proofs, proofs involving contradiction/contrapositive, and proofs involving the axiom of choice.
I'm convinced that there must be some existence theorem that can be proven without any of these techniques (and I'm fairly confident that I've probably encountered some myself in the past haha), but I can't come up with any examples at the moment. Can anyone else come up with one? I'd also like to stipulate the following conditions:
- The proof can't piggyback on another existence theorem whose proof involves one of the above-mentioned devices.
- It has to be a theorem of ZF - no exotic and "high power" axioms allowed!
Now for the interesting question: is there any existence theorem (again in ZF) such that every proof of it meets all the criteria above? Has anyone done any work in this direction? If so, what results do we have around this?
proof-theory
This question isn't related to any specific research. I've been thinking a bit about how existence theorems are generally proven, and I've identified three broad categories: constructive proofs, proofs involving contradiction/contrapositive, and proofs involving the axiom of choice.
I'm convinced that there must be some existence theorem that can be proven without any of these techniques (and I'm fairly confident that I've probably encountered some myself in the past haha), but I can't come up with any examples at the moment. Can anyone else come up with one? I'd also like to stipulate the following conditions:
- The proof can't piggyback on another existence theorem whose proof involves one of the above-mentioned devices.
- It has to be a theorem of ZF - no exotic and "high power" axioms allowed!
Now for the interesting question: is there any existence theorem (again in ZF) such that every proof of it meets all the criteria above? Has anyone done any work in this direction? If so, what results do we have around this?
proof-theory
proof-theory
asked 15 hours ago
Joseph G
522
522
3
To make this question precise, you would need to carefully define what you mean by "constructive proof".
â Alex Kruckman
15 hours ago
1
âÂÂ25 has a square root in integers.â When existence is obvious enough to need no elaborate argument, itâÂÂs just not called a theorem...
â Francois Ziegler
14 hours ago
2
@Francois The point is that you exhibit an explicit object (in your example, 5).
â Andrés E. Caicedo
14 hours ago
4
Maybe proofs using the probabilistic method might count. They're not constructive and they don't involve the axiom of choice but it's a bit unclear to me how to evaluate whether they use contradiction / contrapositive (these are really not similar at all, by the way; in a proof by contrapositive every statement you write down along the way is still true, unlike in a proof by contradiction).
â Qiaochu Yuan
10 hours ago
2
@Dirk But typical proofs of uncountability do not seem to be by contradiction: given an enumeration, you explicitly exhibit a real not in the list, for instance. (It seems like splitting hairs in any case.)
â Andrés E. Caicedo
4 hours ago
 |Â
show 13 more comments
3
To make this question precise, you would need to carefully define what you mean by "constructive proof".
â Alex Kruckman
15 hours ago
1
âÂÂ25 has a square root in integers.â When existence is obvious enough to need no elaborate argument, itâÂÂs just not called a theorem...
â Francois Ziegler
14 hours ago
2
@Francois The point is that you exhibit an explicit object (in your example, 5).
â Andrés E. Caicedo
14 hours ago
4
Maybe proofs using the probabilistic method might count. They're not constructive and they don't involve the axiom of choice but it's a bit unclear to me how to evaluate whether they use contradiction / contrapositive (these are really not similar at all, by the way; in a proof by contrapositive every statement you write down along the way is still true, unlike in a proof by contradiction).
â Qiaochu Yuan
10 hours ago
2
@Dirk But typical proofs of uncountability do not seem to be by contradiction: given an enumeration, you explicitly exhibit a real not in the list, for instance. (It seems like splitting hairs in any case.)
â Andrés E. Caicedo
4 hours ago
3
3
To make this question precise, you would need to carefully define what you mean by "constructive proof".
â Alex Kruckman
15 hours ago
To make this question precise, you would need to carefully define what you mean by "constructive proof".
â Alex Kruckman
15 hours ago
1
1
âÂÂ25 has a square root in integers.â When existence is obvious enough to need no elaborate argument, itâÂÂs just not called a theorem...
â Francois Ziegler
14 hours ago
âÂÂ25 has a square root in integers.â When existence is obvious enough to need no elaborate argument, itâÂÂs just not called a theorem...
â Francois Ziegler
14 hours ago
2
2
@Francois The point is that you exhibit an explicit object (in your example, 5).
â Andrés E. Caicedo
14 hours ago
@Francois The point is that you exhibit an explicit object (in your example, 5).
â Andrés E. Caicedo
14 hours ago
4
4
Maybe proofs using the probabilistic method might count. They're not constructive and they don't involve the axiom of choice but it's a bit unclear to me how to evaluate whether they use contradiction / contrapositive (these are really not similar at all, by the way; in a proof by contrapositive every statement you write down along the way is still true, unlike in a proof by contradiction).
â Qiaochu Yuan
10 hours ago
Maybe proofs using the probabilistic method might count. They're not constructive and they don't involve the axiom of choice but it's a bit unclear to me how to evaluate whether they use contradiction / contrapositive (these are really not similar at all, by the way; in a proof by contrapositive every statement you write down along the way is still true, unlike in a proof by contradiction).
â Qiaochu Yuan
10 hours ago
2
2
@Dirk But typical proofs of uncountability do not seem to be by contradiction: given an enumeration, you explicitly exhibit a real not in the list, for instance. (It seems like splitting hairs in any case.)
â Andrés E. Caicedo
4 hours ago
@Dirk But typical proofs of uncountability do not seem to be by contradiction: given an enumeration, you explicitly exhibit a real not in the list, for instance. (It seems like splitting hairs in any case.)
â Andrés E. Caicedo
4 hours ago
 |Â
show 13 more comments
5 Answers
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There are probabilistic proofs of existence. Do they fall into one of your three categories?
For example, prove the existence of a real number that is normal in all bases: To do it, we show that "almost all" real numbers (according to Lebesgue measure) have that property. Therefore at least one real number has the property. And the point is: this "almost all" proof is easier than constructing an explicit example.
See some nice examples due to Erdà Âs in the cited Wikipedia page which use only finite probability spaces. If we show that a probability is $ > 0$, then the set is not empty.
I thought of that, but it's a kind of proof by contradiction -- the sum (or integral) over the set is positive, so if the set were empty we'd get 0>0.
â Noam D. Elkies
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
3
down vote
I would call the proof for the existence of the limit $0$ of the Goodstein sequence pretty weird: it uses infinite ordinals, but the sequence itself is within $mathbbN$. In Peano artithmetic, Goodstein's theorem is unprovable.
I view this as an example of "moving to a higher space" in order to prove something. In Goodstein's theorem we move from the naturals to the collection of countable ordinals. Another example is in dynamical systems, when we begin with a compact dynamical system and move to the enveloping semigroup, or when we work with the Stone-Cech compactification of the naturals in combinatorics.
â Carl Mummert
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
While an informal interpretation of the question seems more appropriate, a formal one is possible, too. We then enter the realm of constructive reverse mathematics.
It is (reasonably) clear what it means that a theorem has a constructive proof.
"All proofs of the theorem make use of contradiction" can be formalized as "the theorem implies some form of double-negation elimination over a weak base system (eg BISH)."
Thus, every non-constructive theorem that does not imply a form of DNE would count as an example.
Famous examples here would be weak Konigs Lemma (every infinite binary tree has an infinite path) and the intermediate value theorem.
Looking at eg the proof of the latter via bisection, we see a hybrid between constructive proof and proof by contradiction. We expect bisection to work, and then see that it can only fail if we hit upon a root one of the midpoints.
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
There is a famous proof of the existence of two irrational numbers $a$ and $b$ such that $a^b$. The proof considers two cases: $sqrt2^sqrt2$ is irrational, or it is rational. In either case we can find such $a$, $b$. Then it applies the law of excluded middle to say one of these cases in fact holds. You can see a discussion of the proof here: http://math.andrej.com/2009/12/28/constructive-gem-irrational-to-the-power-of-irrational-that-is-rational/.
You mentioned âÂÂproof by contradictionâ in your question, but to me this application of the law of the excluded middle is conceptually different than proof by contradiction.
(By the way, as discussed in that blog post, this is certainly not a serious application of the law of excluded middle because there are other ways to prove the result in question. But it is a cute proof.)
EDIT: I believe there might be more serious proofs along these lines in number theory, that go something like âÂÂeither the Riemann hypothesis holds, or it doesnâÂÂt. In the first case...; in the second case...â Or the same but with âÂÂSiegel zero existing.â But I donâÂÂt know a particular example off the top of my head.
Whoops, I didnâÂÂt see this was mentioned by Carl Mummert in the comments.
â Sam Hopkins
1 hour ago
I was not sure if this counted as a proof by contradiction to the OP, but I also think it is a different kind of proof, just a proof by cases. Similarly, I think there are some results I can't remember where the proof goes by cases depending on whether the continuum hypothesis holds, but in each case the same result is obtained.
â Carl Mummert
19 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
0
down vote
I think applications of the Yoneda lemma fit your criteria.
We often prove the existence of some isomorphism $f:Arightarrow B$ in a category $mathcalC$ by embedding $mathcalC$ in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ using the Yoneda lemma $y$ and finding an iso $g:y(A)rightarrow y(B)$, then concluding that there exists some unique iso $f:Arightarrow B$ with $y(f)=g$ since $y$ is full and faithful.
Exhibiting an arrow in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ is often easier than in $mathcalC$ since $Sets$ is complete and cocomplete and Cartesian closed, which makes $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ complete and cocomplete and Cartesian closed even if $mathcalC$ isn't.
We can thusly use 'higher order' tools like limits/colimits in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ which we aren't allowed to use in $mathcalC$ to find arrows, then still infer the existence of an arrow in $mathcalC$ if the resulting arrow in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ is between two contravariant representable functors.
1
I really don't see how this is an example. In every possible instance, if one can write down an isomorphism between representables, one can straight away write down the corresponding isomorphism between representing objects.
â Todd Trimbleâ¦
2 mins ago
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5 Answers
5
active
oldest
votes
5 Answers
5
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
up vote
12
down vote
There are probabilistic proofs of existence. Do they fall into one of your three categories?
For example, prove the existence of a real number that is normal in all bases: To do it, we show that "almost all" real numbers (according to Lebesgue measure) have that property. Therefore at least one real number has the property. And the point is: this "almost all" proof is easier than constructing an explicit example.
See some nice examples due to Erdà Âs in the cited Wikipedia page which use only finite probability spaces. If we show that a probability is $ > 0$, then the set is not empty.
I thought of that, but it's a kind of proof by contradiction -- the sum (or integral) over the set is positive, so if the set were empty we'd get 0>0.
â Noam D. Elkies
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
12
down vote
There are probabilistic proofs of existence. Do they fall into one of your three categories?
For example, prove the existence of a real number that is normal in all bases: To do it, we show that "almost all" real numbers (according to Lebesgue measure) have that property. Therefore at least one real number has the property. And the point is: this "almost all" proof is easier than constructing an explicit example.
See some nice examples due to Erdà Âs in the cited Wikipedia page which use only finite probability spaces. If we show that a probability is $ > 0$, then the set is not empty.
I thought of that, but it's a kind of proof by contradiction -- the sum (or integral) over the set is positive, so if the set were empty we'd get 0>0.
â Noam D. Elkies
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
12
down vote
up vote
12
down vote
There are probabilistic proofs of existence. Do they fall into one of your three categories?
For example, prove the existence of a real number that is normal in all bases: To do it, we show that "almost all" real numbers (according to Lebesgue measure) have that property. Therefore at least one real number has the property. And the point is: this "almost all" proof is easier than constructing an explicit example.
See some nice examples due to Erdà Âs in the cited Wikipedia page which use only finite probability spaces. If we show that a probability is $ > 0$, then the set is not empty.
There are probabilistic proofs of existence. Do they fall into one of your three categories?
For example, prove the existence of a real number that is normal in all bases: To do it, we show that "almost all" real numbers (according to Lebesgue measure) have that property. Therefore at least one real number has the property. And the point is: this "almost all" proof is easier than constructing an explicit example.
See some nice examples due to Erdà Âs in the cited Wikipedia page which use only finite probability spaces. If we show that a probability is $ > 0$, then the set is not empty.
edited 3 hours ago
answered 3 hours ago
Gerald Edgar
27.1k269154
27.1k269154
I thought of that, but it's a kind of proof by contradiction -- the sum (or integral) over the set is positive, so if the set were empty we'd get 0>0.
â Noam D. Elkies
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
I thought of that, but it's a kind of proof by contradiction -- the sum (or integral) over the set is positive, so if the set were empty we'd get 0>0.
â Noam D. Elkies
16 mins ago
I thought of that, but it's a kind of proof by contradiction -- the sum (or integral) over the set is positive, so if the set were empty we'd get 0>0.
â Noam D. Elkies
16 mins ago
I thought of that, but it's a kind of proof by contradiction -- the sum (or integral) over the set is positive, so if the set were empty we'd get 0>0.
â Noam D. Elkies
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
3
down vote
I would call the proof for the existence of the limit $0$ of the Goodstein sequence pretty weird: it uses infinite ordinals, but the sequence itself is within $mathbbN$. In Peano artithmetic, Goodstein's theorem is unprovable.
I view this as an example of "moving to a higher space" in order to prove something. In Goodstein's theorem we move from the naturals to the collection of countable ordinals. Another example is in dynamical systems, when we begin with a compact dynamical system and move to the enveloping semigroup, or when we work with the Stone-Cech compactification of the naturals in combinatorics.
â Carl Mummert
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
3
down vote
I would call the proof for the existence of the limit $0$ of the Goodstein sequence pretty weird: it uses infinite ordinals, but the sequence itself is within $mathbbN$. In Peano artithmetic, Goodstein's theorem is unprovable.
I view this as an example of "moving to a higher space" in order to prove something. In Goodstein's theorem we move from the naturals to the collection of countable ordinals. Another example is in dynamical systems, when we begin with a compact dynamical system and move to the enveloping semigroup, or when we work with the Stone-Cech compactification of the naturals in combinatorics.
â Carl Mummert
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
3
down vote
up vote
3
down vote
I would call the proof for the existence of the limit $0$ of the Goodstein sequence pretty weird: it uses infinite ordinals, but the sequence itself is within $mathbbN$. In Peano artithmetic, Goodstein's theorem is unprovable.
I would call the proof for the existence of the limit $0$ of the Goodstein sequence pretty weird: it uses infinite ordinals, but the sequence itself is within $mathbbN$. In Peano artithmetic, Goodstein's theorem is unprovable.
answered 2 hours ago
Dominic van der Zypen
13.2k43172
13.2k43172
I view this as an example of "moving to a higher space" in order to prove something. In Goodstein's theorem we move from the naturals to the collection of countable ordinals. Another example is in dynamical systems, when we begin with a compact dynamical system and move to the enveloping semigroup, or when we work with the Stone-Cech compactification of the naturals in combinatorics.
â Carl Mummert
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
I view this as an example of "moving to a higher space" in order to prove something. In Goodstein's theorem we move from the naturals to the collection of countable ordinals. Another example is in dynamical systems, when we begin with a compact dynamical system and move to the enveloping semigroup, or when we work with the Stone-Cech compactification of the naturals in combinatorics.
â Carl Mummert
16 mins ago
I view this as an example of "moving to a higher space" in order to prove something. In Goodstein's theorem we move from the naturals to the collection of countable ordinals. Another example is in dynamical systems, when we begin with a compact dynamical system and move to the enveloping semigroup, or when we work with the Stone-Cech compactification of the naturals in combinatorics.
â Carl Mummert
16 mins ago
I view this as an example of "moving to a higher space" in order to prove something. In Goodstein's theorem we move from the naturals to the collection of countable ordinals. Another example is in dynamical systems, when we begin with a compact dynamical system and move to the enveloping semigroup, or when we work with the Stone-Cech compactification of the naturals in combinatorics.
â Carl Mummert
16 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
While an informal interpretation of the question seems more appropriate, a formal one is possible, too. We then enter the realm of constructive reverse mathematics.
It is (reasonably) clear what it means that a theorem has a constructive proof.
"All proofs of the theorem make use of contradiction" can be formalized as "the theorem implies some form of double-negation elimination over a weak base system (eg BISH)."
Thus, every non-constructive theorem that does not imply a form of DNE would count as an example.
Famous examples here would be weak Konigs Lemma (every infinite binary tree has an infinite path) and the intermediate value theorem.
Looking at eg the proof of the latter via bisection, we see a hybrid between constructive proof and proof by contradiction. We expect bisection to work, and then see that it can only fail if we hit upon a root one of the midpoints.
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
While an informal interpretation of the question seems more appropriate, a formal one is possible, too. We then enter the realm of constructive reverse mathematics.
It is (reasonably) clear what it means that a theorem has a constructive proof.
"All proofs of the theorem make use of contradiction" can be formalized as "the theorem implies some form of double-negation elimination over a weak base system (eg BISH)."
Thus, every non-constructive theorem that does not imply a form of DNE would count as an example.
Famous examples here would be weak Konigs Lemma (every infinite binary tree has an infinite path) and the intermediate value theorem.
Looking at eg the proof of the latter via bisection, we see a hybrid between constructive proof and proof by contradiction. We expect bisection to work, and then see that it can only fail if we hit upon a root one of the midpoints.
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
up vote
2
down vote
While an informal interpretation of the question seems more appropriate, a formal one is possible, too. We then enter the realm of constructive reverse mathematics.
It is (reasonably) clear what it means that a theorem has a constructive proof.
"All proofs of the theorem make use of contradiction" can be formalized as "the theorem implies some form of double-negation elimination over a weak base system (eg BISH)."
Thus, every non-constructive theorem that does not imply a form of DNE would count as an example.
Famous examples here would be weak Konigs Lemma (every infinite binary tree has an infinite path) and the intermediate value theorem.
Looking at eg the proof of the latter via bisection, we see a hybrid between constructive proof and proof by contradiction. We expect bisection to work, and then see that it can only fail if we hit upon a root one of the midpoints.
While an informal interpretation of the question seems more appropriate, a formal one is possible, too. We then enter the realm of constructive reverse mathematics.
It is (reasonably) clear what it means that a theorem has a constructive proof.
"All proofs of the theorem make use of contradiction" can be formalized as "the theorem implies some form of double-negation elimination over a weak base system (eg BISH)."
Thus, every non-constructive theorem that does not imply a form of DNE would count as an example.
Famous examples here would be weak Konigs Lemma (every infinite binary tree has an infinite path) and the intermediate value theorem.
Looking at eg the proof of the latter via bisection, we see a hybrid between constructive proof and proof by contradiction. We expect bisection to work, and then see that it can only fail if we hit upon a root one of the midpoints.
answered 2 hours ago
Arno
1,2791120
1,2791120
add a comment |Â
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
There is a famous proof of the existence of two irrational numbers $a$ and $b$ such that $a^b$. The proof considers two cases: $sqrt2^sqrt2$ is irrational, or it is rational. In either case we can find such $a$, $b$. Then it applies the law of excluded middle to say one of these cases in fact holds. You can see a discussion of the proof here: http://math.andrej.com/2009/12/28/constructive-gem-irrational-to-the-power-of-irrational-that-is-rational/.
You mentioned âÂÂproof by contradictionâ in your question, but to me this application of the law of the excluded middle is conceptually different than proof by contradiction.
(By the way, as discussed in that blog post, this is certainly not a serious application of the law of excluded middle because there are other ways to prove the result in question. But it is a cute proof.)
EDIT: I believe there might be more serious proofs along these lines in number theory, that go something like âÂÂeither the Riemann hypothesis holds, or it doesnâÂÂt. In the first case...; in the second case...â Or the same but with âÂÂSiegel zero existing.â But I donâÂÂt know a particular example off the top of my head.
Whoops, I didnâÂÂt see this was mentioned by Carl Mummert in the comments.
â Sam Hopkins
1 hour ago
I was not sure if this counted as a proof by contradiction to the OP, but I also think it is a different kind of proof, just a proof by cases. Similarly, I think there are some results I can't remember where the proof goes by cases depending on whether the continuum hypothesis holds, but in each case the same result is obtained.
â Carl Mummert
19 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
There is a famous proof of the existence of two irrational numbers $a$ and $b$ such that $a^b$. The proof considers two cases: $sqrt2^sqrt2$ is irrational, or it is rational. In either case we can find such $a$, $b$. Then it applies the law of excluded middle to say one of these cases in fact holds. You can see a discussion of the proof here: http://math.andrej.com/2009/12/28/constructive-gem-irrational-to-the-power-of-irrational-that-is-rational/.
You mentioned âÂÂproof by contradictionâ in your question, but to me this application of the law of the excluded middle is conceptually different than proof by contradiction.
(By the way, as discussed in that blog post, this is certainly not a serious application of the law of excluded middle because there are other ways to prove the result in question. But it is a cute proof.)
EDIT: I believe there might be more serious proofs along these lines in number theory, that go something like âÂÂeither the Riemann hypothesis holds, or it doesnâÂÂt. In the first case...; in the second case...â Or the same but with âÂÂSiegel zero existing.â But I donâÂÂt know a particular example off the top of my head.
Whoops, I didnâÂÂt see this was mentioned by Carl Mummert in the comments.
â Sam Hopkins
1 hour ago
I was not sure if this counted as a proof by contradiction to the OP, but I also think it is a different kind of proof, just a proof by cases. Similarly, I think there are some results I can't remember where the proof goes by cases depending on whether the continuum hypothesis holds, but in each case the same result is obtained.
â Carl Mummert
19 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
2
down vote
up vote
2
down vote
There is a famous proof of the existence of two irrational numbers $a$ and $b$ such that $a^b$. The proof considers two cases: $sqrt2^sqrt2$ is irrational, or it is rational. In either case we can find such $a$, $b$. Then it applies the law of excluded middle to say one of these cases in fact holds. You can see a discussion of the proof here: http://math.andrej.com/2009/12/28/constructive-gem-irrational-to-the-power-of-irrational-that-is-rational/.
You mentioned âÂÂproof by contradictionâ in your question, but to me this application of the law of the excluded middle is conceptually different than proof by contradiction.
(By the way, as discussed in that blog post, this is certainly not a serious application of the law of excluded middle because there are other ways to prove the result in question. But it is a cute proof.)
EDIT: I believe there might be more serious proofs along these lines in number theory, that go something like âÂÂeither the Riemann hypothesis holds, or it doesnâÂÂt. In the first case...; in the second case...â Or the same but with âÂÂSiegel zero existing.â But I donâÂÂt know a particular example off the top of my head.
There is a famous proof of the existence of two irrational numbers $a$ and $b$ such that $a^b$. The proof considers two cases: $sqrt2^sqrt2$ is irrational, or it is rational. In either case we can find such $a$, $b$. Then it applies the law of excluded middle to say one of these cases in fact holds. You can see a discussion of the proof here: http://math.andrej.com/2009/12/28/constructive-gem-irrational-to-the-power-of-irrational-that-is-rational/.
You mentioned âÂÂproof by contradictionâ in your question, but to me this application of the law of the excluded middle is conceptually different than proof by contradiction.
(By the way, as discussed in that blog post, this is certainly not a serious application of the law of excluded middle because there are other ways to prove the result in question. But it is a cute proof.)
EDIT: I believe there might be more serious proofs along these lines in number theory, that go something like âÂÂeither the Riemann hypothesis holds, or it doesnâÂÂt. In the first case...; in the second case...â Or the same but with âÂÂSiegel zero existing.â But I donâÂÂt know a particular example off the top of my head.
answered 1 hour ago
Sam Hopkins
3,76312346
3,76312346
Whoops, I didnâÂÂt see this was mentioned by Carl Mummert in the comments.
â Sam Hopkins
1 hour ago
I was not sure if this counted as a proof by contradiction to the OP, but I also think it is a different kind of proof, just a proof by cases. Similarly, I think there are some results I can't remember where the proof goes by cases depending on whether the continuum hypothesis holds, but in each case the same result is obtained.
â Carl Mummert
19 mins ago
add a comment |Â
Whoops, I didnâÂÂt see this was mentioned by Carl Mummert in the comments.
â Sam Hopkins
1 hour ago
I was not sure if this counted as a proof by contradiction to the OP, but I also think it is a different kind of proof, just a proof by cases. Similarly, I think there are some results I can't remember where the proof goes by cases depending on whether the continuum hypothesis holds, but in each case the same result is obtained.
â Carl Mummert
19 mins ago
Whoops, I didnâÂÂt see this was mentioned by Carl Mummert in the comments.
â Sam Hopkins
1 hour ago
Whoops, I didnâÂÂt see this was mentioned by Carl Mummert in the comments.
â Sam Hopkins
1 hour ago
I was not sure if this counted as a proof by contradiction to the OP, but I also think it is a different kind of proof, just a proof by cases. Similarly, I think there are some results I can't remember where the proof goes by cases depending on whether the continuum hypothesis holds, but in each case the same result is obtained.
â Carl Mummert
19 mins ago
I was not sure if this counted as a proof by contradiction to the OP, but I also think it is a different kind of proof, just a proof by cases. Similarly, I think there are some results I can't remember where the proof goes by cases depending on whether the continuum hypothesis holds, but in each case the same result is obtained.
â Carl Mummert
19 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
0
down vote
I think applications of the Yoneda lemma fit your criteria.
We often prove the existence of some isomorphism $f:Arightarrow B$ in a category $mathcalC$ by embedding $mathcalC$ in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ using the Yoneda lemma $y$ and finding an iso $g:y(A)rightarrow y(B)$, then concluding that there exists some unique iso $f:Arightarrow B$ with $y(f)=g$ since $y$ is full and faithful.
Exhibiting an arrow in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ is often easier than in $mathcalC$ since $Sets$ is complete and cocomplete and Cartesian closed, which makes $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ complete and cocomplete and Cartesian closed even if $mathcalC$ isn't.
We can thusly use 'higher order' tools like limits/colimits in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ which we aren't allowed to use in $mathcalC$ to find arrows, then still infer the existence of an arrow in $mathcalC$ if the resulting arrow in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ is between two contravariant representable functors.
1
I really don't see how this is an example. In every possible instance, if one can write down an isomorphism between representables, one can straight away write down the corresponding isomorphism between representing objects.
â Todd Trimbleâ¦
2 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
0
down vote
I think applications of the Yoneda lemma fit your criteria.
We often prove the existence of some isomorphism $f:Arightarrow B$ in a category $mathcalC$ by embedding $mathcalC$ in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ using the Yoneda lemma $y$ and finding an iso $g:y(A)rightarrow y(B)$, then concluding that there exists some unique iso $f:Arightarrow B$ with $y(f)=g$ since $y$ is full and faithful.
Exhibiting an arrow in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ is often easier than in $mathcalC$ since $Sets$ is complete and cocomplete and Cartesian closed, which makes $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ complete and cocomplete and Cartesian closed even if $mathcalC$ isn't.
We can thusly use 'higher order' tools like limits/colimits in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ which we aren't allowed to use in $mathcalC$ to find arrows, then still infer the existence of an arrow in $mathcalC$ if the resulting arrow in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ is between two contravariant representable functors.
1
I really don't see how this is an example. In every possible instance, if one can write down an isomorphism between representables, one can straight away write down the corresponding isomorphism between representing objects.
â Todd Trimbleâ¦
2 mins ago
add a comment |Â
up vote
0
down vote
up vote
0
down vote
I think applications of the Yoneda lemma fit your criteria.
We often prove the existence of some isomorphism $f:Arightarrow B$ in a category $mathcalC$ by embedding $mathcalC$ in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ using the Yoneda lemma $y$ and finding an iso $g:y(A)rightarrow y(B)$, then concluding that there exists some unique iso $f:Arightarrow B$ with $y(f)=g$ since $y$ is full and faithful.
Exhibiting an arrow in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ is often easier than in $mathcalC$ since $Sets$ is complete and cocomplete and Cartesian closed, which makes $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ complete and cocomplete and Cartesian closed even if $mathcalC$ isn't.
We can thusly use 'higher order' tools like limits/colimits in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ which we aren't allowed to use in $mathcalC$ to find arrows, then still infer the existence of an arrow in $mathcalC$ if the resulting arrow in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ is between two contravariant representable functors.
I think applications of the Yoneda lemma fit your criteria.
We often prove the existence of some isomorphism $f:Arightarrow B$ in a category $mathcalC$ by embedding $mathcalC$ in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ using the Yoneda lemma $y$ and finding an iso $g:y(A)rightarrow y(B)$, then concluding that there exists some unique iso $f:Arightarrow B$ with $y(f)=g$ since $y$ is full and faithful.
Exhibiting an arrow in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ is often easier than in $mathcalC$ since $Sets$ is complete and cocomplete and Cartesian closed, which makes $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ complete and cocomplete and Cartesian closed even if $mathcalC$ isn't.
We can thusly use 'higher order' tools like limits/colimits in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ which we aren't allowed to use in $mathcalC$ to find arrows, then still infer the existence of an arrow in $mathcalC$ if the resulting arrow in $Sets^mathcalC^OP$ is between two contravariant representable functors.
answered 27 mins ago
Alec Rhea
7681414
7681414
1
I really don't see how this is an example. In every possible instance, if one can write down an isomorphism between representables, one can straight away write down the corresponding isomorphism between representing objects.
â Todd Trimbleâ¦
2 mins ago
add a comment |Â
1
I really don't see how this is an example. In every possible instance, if one can write down an isomorphism between representables, one can straight away write down the corresponding isomorphism between representing objects.
â Todd Trimbleâ¦
2 mins ago
1
1
I really don't see how this is an example. In every possible instance, if one can write down an isomorphism between representables, one can straight away write down the corresponding isomorphism between representing objects.
â Todd Trimbleâ¦
2 mins ago
I really don't see how this is an example. In every possible instance, if one can write down an isomorphism between representables, one can straight away write down the corresponding isomorphism between representing objects.
â Todd Trimbleâ¦
2 mins ago
add a comment |Â
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3
To make this question precise, you would need to carefully define what you mean by "constructive proof".
â Alex Kruckman
15 hours ago
1
âÂÂ25 has a square root in integers.â When existence is obvious enough to need no elaborate argument, itâÂÂs just not called a theorem...
â Francois Ziegler
14 hours ago
2
@Francois The point is that you exhibit an explicit object (in your example, 5).
â Andrés E. Caicedo
14 hours ago
4
Maybe proofs using the probabilistic method might count. They're not constructive and they don't involve the axiom of choice but it's a bit unclear to me how to evaluate whether they use contradiction / contrapositive (these are really not similar at all, by the way; in a proof by contrapositive every statement you write down along the way is still true, unlike in a proof by contradiction).
â Qiaochu Yuan
10 hours ago
2
@Dirk But typical proofs of uncountability do not seem to be by contradiction: given an enumeration, you explicitly exhibit a real not in the list, for instance. (It seems like splitting hairs in any case.)
â Andrés E. Caicedo
4 hours ago