Can the autopilot (or stall avoidance system?) of the B737 MAX 8 be overridden by sheer force?
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A New York Times article from today claims that in order to control the airplane the pilot
could have braced his feet on the dashboard and yanked the yoke, or control wheel, back with all his strength.
Thanks to T.J. Crowder's comment I realize there is not only the autopilot but also a (new?) stall avoidance system installed on this new line of B737s.
Is it true that either one can be overridden by a simple application of sufficient force to the yoke? If so:
- What is the respective underlying mechanism for the systems?
- What force would be necessary, respectively?
- Are both systems designed such that they can be overridden simply by applying an unusually strong force, or would that be just a violent and "unofficial" way to control the yoke despite the systems' best efforts?1
I understand that the main flight controls of this recent incarnation of the Boeing 737, the MAX 8, are still hydraulic. Does that play a role in the "override by sheer force" possibility?
1
A design which would allow a pilot to eventually control the plane just by applying excessive and unusual force (as opposed to perform a complicated series of button presses and/or touch screen actions to disable either system) would in my opinion make a lot of sense as a "panic mode".
boeing-737 autopilot accident-investigation hydraulic-system
add a comment |
up vote
3
down vote
favorite
A New York Times article from today claims that in order to control the airplane the pilot
could have braced his feet on the dashboard and yanked the yoke, or control wheel, back with all his strength.
Thanks to T.J. Crowder's comment I realize there is not only the autopilot but also a (new?) stall avoidance system installed on this new line of B737s.
Is it true that either one can be overridden by a simple application of sufficient force to the yoke? If so:
- What is the respective underlying mechanism for the systems?
- What force would be necessary, respectively?
- Are both systems designed such that they can be overridden simply by applying an unusually strong force, or would that be just a violent and "unofficial" way to control the yoke despite the systems' best efforts?1
I understand that the main flight controls of this recent incarnation of the Boeing 737, the MAX 8, are still hydraulic. Does that play a role in the "override by sheer force" possibility?
1
A design which would allow a pilot to eventually control the plane just by applying excessive and unusual force (as opposed to perform a complicated series of button presses and/or touch screen actions to disable either system) would in my opinion make a lot of sense as a "panic mode".
boeing-737 autopilot accident-investigation hydraulic-system
@CGCampbell I don't think there is any speculation involved -- I'm asking about a technical airplane feature. I can of course remove the reference to the crash, but the article would betray it anyway.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
@CGCampbell That said, I did remove the pilot's name -- it was indeed unnecessary. It is certainly painful to read about individuals.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
1
It's not clear from that article that it was the autopilot that the captain would have had to overcome. It's a "system" on the MAX 8 designed to kick in automatically to correct a stall. The speculation is that it got bad data and "corrected." I think we can safely assume that if the plane had been on autopilot and suddenly pitched nose-down, the pilot would have pulled back on the yoke with more than the force required to disengage the autopilot. Based on Boeing's guidance (kill power to tail stabilizers), the "system" isn't the autopilot, but smth else -- and apparently harder to overcome.
– T.J. Crowder
1 hour ago
@T.J.Crowder Oh, that is an interesting point. Thanks.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
I have removed the final overt reference to the current uninvestigated accident and retracted my Vote to Close as well as all comments.
– CGCampbell
14 mins ago
add a comment |
up vote
3
down vote
favorite
up vote
3
down vote
favorite
A New York Times article from today claims that in order to control the airplane the pilot
could have braced his feet on the dashboard and yanked the yoke, or control wheel, back with all his strength.
Thanks to T.J. Crowder's comment I realize there is not only the autopilot but also a (new?) stall avoidance system installed on this new line of B737s.
Is it true that either one can be overridden by a simple application of sufficient force to the yoke? If so:
- What is the respective underlying mechanism for the systems?
- What force would be necessary, respectively?
- Are both systems designed such that they can be overridden simply by applying an unusually strong force, or would that be just a violent and "unofficial" way to control the yoke despite the systems' best efforts?1
I understand that the main flight controls of this recent incarnation of the Boeing 737, the MAX 8, are still hydraulic. Does that play a role in the "override by sheer force" possibility?
1
A design which would allow a pilot to eventually control the plane just by applying excessive and unusual force (as opposed to perform a complicated series of button presses and/or touch screen actions to disable either system) would in my opinion make a lot of sense as a "panic mode".
boeing-737 autopilot accident-investigation hydraulic-system
A New York Times article from today claims that in order to control the airplane the pilot
could have braced his feet on the dashboard and yanked the yoke, or control wheel, back with all his strength.
Thanks to T.J. Crowder's comment I realize there is not only the autopilot but also a (new?) stall avoidance system installed on this new line of B737s.
Is it true that either one can be overridden by a simple application of sufficient force to the yoke? If so:
- What is the respective underlying mechanism for the systems?
- What force would be necessary, respectively?
- Are both systems designed such that they can be overridden simply by applying an unusually strong force, or would that be just a violent and "unofficial" way to control the yoke despite the systems' best efforts?1
I understand that the main flight controls of this recent incarnation of the Boeing 737, the MAX 8, are still hydraulic. Does that play a role in the "override by sheer force" possibility?
1
A design which would allow a pilot to eventually control the plane just by applying excessive and unusual force (as opposed to perform a complicated series of button presses and/or touch screen actions to disable either system) would in my opinion make a lot of sense as a "panic mode".
boeing-737 autopilot accident-investigation hydraulic-system
boeing-737 autopilot accident-investigation hydraulic-system
edited 15 mins ago


CGCampbell
5,58384699
5,58384699
asked 5 hours ago


Peter A. Schneider
1247
1247
@CGCampbell I don't think there is any speculation involved -- I'm asking about a technical airplane feature. I can of course remove the reference to the crash, but the article would betray it anyway.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
@CGCampbell That said, I did remove the pilot's name -- it was indeed unnecessary. It is certainly painful to read about individuals.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
1
It's not clear from that article that it was the autopilot that the captain would have had to overcome. It's a "system" on the MAX 8 designed to kick in automatically to correct a stall. The speculation is that it got bad data and "corrected." I think we can safely assume that if the plane had been on autopilot and suddenly pitched nose-down, the pilot would have pulled back on the yoke with more than the force required to disengage the autopilot. Based on Boeing's guidance (kill power to tail stabilizers), the "system" isn't the autopilot, but smth else -- and apparently harder to overcome.
– T.J. Crowder
1 hour ago
@T.J.Crowder Oh, that is an interesting point. Thanks.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
I have removed the final overt reference to the current uninvestigated accident and retracted my Vote to Close as well as all comments.
– CGCampbell
14 mins ago
add a comment |
@CGCampbell I don't think there is any speculation involved -- I'm asking about a technical airplane feature. I can of course remove the reference to the crash, but the article would betray it anyway.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
@CGCampbell That said, I did remove the pilot's name -- it was indeed unnecessary. It is certainly painful to read about individuals.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
1
It's not clear from that article that it was the autopilot that the captain would have had to overcome. It's a "system" on the MAX 8 designed to kick in automatically to correct a stall. The speculation is that it got bad data and "corrected." I think we can safely assume that if the plane had been on autopilot and suddenly pitched nose-down, the pilot would have pulled back on the yoke with more than the force required to disengage the autopilot. Based on Boeing's guidance (kill power to tail stabilizers), the "system" isn't the autopilot, but smth else -- and apparently harder to overcome.
– T.J. Crowder
1 hour ago
@T.J.Crowder Oh, that is an interesting point. Thanks.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
I have removed the final overt reference to the current uninvestigated accident and retracted my Vote to Close as well as all comments.
– CGCampbell
14 mins ago
@CGCampbell I don't think there is any speculation involved -- I'm asking about a technical airplane feature. I can of course remove the reference to the crash, but the article would betray it anyway.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
@CGCampbell I don't think there is any speculation involved -- I'm asking about a technical airplane feature. I can of course remove the reference to the crash, but the article would betray it anyway.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
@CGCampbell That said, I did remove the pilot's name -- it was indeed unnecessary. It is certainly painful to read about individuals.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
@CGCampbell That said, I did remove the pilot's name -- it was indeed unnecessary. It is certainly painful to read about individuals.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
1
1
It's not clear from that article that it was the autopilot that the captain would have had to overcome. It's a "system" on the MAX 8 designed to kick in automatically to correct a stall. The speculation is that it got bad data and "corrected." I think we can safely assume that if the plane had been on autopilot and suddenly pitched nose-down, the pilot would have pulled back on the yoke with more than the force required to disengage the autopilot. Based on Boeing's guidance (kill power to tail stabilizers), the "system" isn't the autopilot, but smth else -- and apparently harder to overcome.
– T.J. Crowder
1 hour ago
It's not clear from that article that it was the autopilot that the captain would have had to overcome. It's a "system" on the MAX 8 designed to kick in automatically to correct a stall. The speculation is that it got bad data and "corrected." I think we can safely assume that if the plane had been on autopilot and suddenly pitched nose-down, the pilot would have pulled back on the yoke with more than the force required to disengage the autopilot. Based on Boeing's guidance (kill power to tail stabilizers), the "system" isn't the autopilot, but smth else -- and apparently harder to overcome.
– T.J. Crowder
1 hour ago
@T.J.Crowder Oh, that is an interesting point. Thanks.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
@T.J.Crowder Oh, that is an interesting point. Thanks.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
I have removed the final overt reference to the current uninvestigated accident and retracted my Vote to Close as well as all comments.
– CGCampbell
14 mins ago
I have removed the final overt reference to the current uninvestigated accident and retracted my Vote to Close as well as all comments.
– CGCampbell
14 mins ago
add a comment |
3 Answers
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Im not sure of the full story here. But if you pull the controls of a 737 while the autopilot is engaged the autopilot will trip and the pilots will have to fly the plane manually, this requires about 25 lbs of force.
There is also a button on the yoke where you can disengage the AP. So if the AP was controlling the plane and going in to a violent descent the pilots should have been able to cancel it by pulling the yoke or pushing the button on the yoke or the AP panel.
And no, the controls being hydraulic doesn't play a role in the "override by sheer force" possibility.
Edit:
The autopilot servos are limited to 25 lb of force for single channel operation. Separate force sensors measure pilot column input and the autopilot will disconnect if the force applied by the pilot(s) exceeds 21 lbs.
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Douglas Pettersson is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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Why would the override be only triggered on such high stick forces? 25 lbs sounds like a decent amount of force.
– curious_cat
4 hours ago
I'm not sure why they constructed the plane this way. But my guess is that the underlying cause is margin for error without disconnecting the AP. 21-25 lbs of force is not really that much especially not in an emergency, just give the yoke a solid "pull" and it'll be enough. Keep in mind it's force and not pressure
– Douglas Pettersson
4 hours ago
@curious_cat I would assume that it's a safety requirement that disengaging the autopilot requires a conscious act by the pilots. 21 lbs of force are probably high enough to not be exerted accidentally but still low enough to be produced ad hoc. (21 lbs seem to contradict the "feet on the dashboard" bit in the article. OK, maybe one needs a bit of pushing against the dashboard because it's a horizontal force.)
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Thank you for the answer. Can you give us the source of your quote?
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Hi, the data i quoted can be read here: b737.org.uk/incident_ei-ebw.htm
– Douglas Pettersson
2 hours ago
|
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2
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With typical hydraulic controls, the mechanical control cable circuit just operates control valves on the hydraulic actuators. The control valves normally only have fairly light centering springs that take only a few pounds of force to overcome. With no other devices in the control circuit, you could move the control column with your pinky finger.
Control feedback forces come from pitch feel devices in the control circuit that use internal spring packs (bungees) and/or roller cam devices to provide a variable resistive force. But the feel units won't drive the circuit, only provide resistance. Two devices can drive the elevator circuit in theory; the autopilot servo and the stick pusher (which is like an autopilot servo that only operates one way).
Autopilot and stick pusher servos have two clutches, a meshing teeth on/off clutch, and a friction slip override clutch. If the A/P servo runs away for some reason, and you can't trigger a disconnect electrically, it is possible to overpower the slip clutch in the servo, but it is like the stick is in not-quite-solidified concrete the whole time you are trying to move it. But you can move it.
The stick pusher servo is similar, but the stick pusher is designed to drive full nose down and release almost immediately.
In any case, if you had an elevator hard over like that and the electrical disconnects (there are usually several difference switches that can perform the disconnect function), the next action would be to operate the mechanical pitch disconnect to separate the left and right elevator circuits. You end up with one free elevator, which will give some control, at least enough to neutralize the overall input.
One possibility is the shock and surprise of the event, whatever it was, overwhelmed the crew and they didn't follow through on all the memory items for that kind of emergency. At this point, who knows.
Also remember that media stories on these kinds of incidents are almost always wildly inaccurate. Anyone who has worked in any kind of technical specialty and reads media reports related to their specialty knows that they are wrong most of the time.
Thanks for the details. (Btw, I have more confidence in the NYT than in most others. They pay a lot of attention to factual correctness and do publish corrections. If you think the article is factually incorrect don't hesitate to send a correction; they surely appreciate it.)
– Peter A. Schneider
2 hours ago
add a comment |
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-4
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Official reply: Yes of course, it's all the pilot's fault.
Realistically, it's somewhat doubtful the pilot could have done much, if anything. The airplane does have hydraulics, but it is strictly fly-by-wire. Which means nothing more and nothing less than you are at the computer's mercy. There have been reported cases where pilot-vs-computer turned out non-fatal, but these occurred at much greater height, giving personnel more time to react.
You can always yank the control wheel up with moderate force, yes. But that doesn't necessarily mean any part of the airplane will move.
In this particular case, it seems like the computer thought the angle of attack wasn't good (due to a defect sensor). So, pulling up would only have caused the computer to further assume stall-stall-stall, and would have caused it to ignore the input (or lower the nose even further, who knows!).
Air France 296, over 25 years ago, was the first example of such a thing happening (Airbus in that case). We are to believe that a pilot with over 20 years of experience drew a trench almost a kilometer long into the Mulhouse forest, during a non-tricky manueuver in perfect weather conditions and for no obvious reason. The black box, kinda, got lost/delayed for over a week, and evidence was, let's say, doubtful/inconclusive. So the best explanation was it was all the pilot's fault, and that's how the case was closed.
Of course, whenever any such thing happens, there's a non-neglegible financial interest from the side of the airplane manufacturer. Something like "this airplane may randomly kill everyone aboard" is the kind of terribly bad press that you want to avoid at all cost, so obviously you will never get to hear anything but "the pilot could have, the pilot should have". That doesn't mean the pilot could really have done anything, though.
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"Fly-by-wire" does not imply "at the computer's mercy". It just means that some sort of electrical exists between the cockpit crew and the aircraft's control surfaces. My understanding is that, in Airbus's planes, that system is heavily mediated by a computer but, in Boeing's planes, the system essentially just relays the pilot's instructions.
– David Richerby
55 mins ago
2
Also, most of your answer seems to be speculation and conspiracy.
– David Richerby
54 mins ago
add a comment |
3 Answers
3
active
oldest
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3 Answers
3
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
up vote
6
down vote
Im not sure of the full story here. But if you pull the controls of a 737 while the autopilot is engaged the autopilot will trip and the pilots will have to fly the plane manually, this requires about 25 lbs of force.
There is also a button on the yoke where you can disengage the AP. So if the AP was controlling the plane and going in to a violent descent the pilots should have been able to cancel it by pulling the yoke or pushing the button on the yoke or the AP panel.
And no, the controls being hydraulic doesn't play a role in the "override by sheer force" possibility.
Edit:
The autopilot servos are limited to 25 lb of force for single channel operation. Separate force sensors measure pilot column input and the autopilot will disconnect if the force applied by the pilot(s) exceeds 21 lbs.
New contributor
Douglas Pettersson is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
Why would the override be only triggered on such high stick forces? 25 lbs sounds like a decent amount of force.
– curious_cat
4 hours ago
I'm not sure why they constructed the plane this way. But my guess is that the underlying cause is margin for error without disconnecting the AP. 21-25 lbs of force is not really that much especially not in an emergency, just give the yoke a solid "pull" and it'll be enough. Keep in mind it's force and not pressure
– Douglas Pettersson
4 hours ago
@curious_cat I would assume that it's a safety requirement that disengaging the autopilot requires a conscious act by the pilots. 21 lbs of force are probably high enough to not be exerted accidentally but still low enough to be produced ad hoc. (21 lbs seem to contradict the "feet on the dashboard" bit in the article. OK, maybe one needs a bit of pushing against the dashboard because it's a horizontal force.)
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Thank you for the answer. Can you give us the source of your quote?
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Hi, the data i quoted can be read here: b737.org.uk/incident_ei-ebw.htm
– Douglas Pettersson
2 hours ago
|
show 1 more comment
up vote
6
down vote
Im not sure of the full story here. But if you pull the controls of a 737 while the autopilot is engaged the autopilot will trip and the pilots will have to fly the plane manually, this requires about 25 lbs of force.
There is also a button on the yoke where you can disengage the AP. So if the AP was controlling the plane and going in to a violent descent the pilots should have been able to cancel it by pulling the yoke or pushing the button on the yoke or the AP panel.
And no, the controls being hydraulic doesn't play a role in the "override by sheer force" possibility.
Edit:
The autopilot servos are limited to 25 lb of force for single channel operation. Separate force sensors measure pilot column input and the autopilot will disconnect if the force applied by the pilot(s) exceeds 21 lbs.
New contributor
Douglas Pettersson is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
Why would the override be only triggered on such high stick forces? 25 lbs sounds like a decent amount of force.
– curious_cat
4 hours ago
I'm not sure why they constructed the plane this way. But my guess is that the underlying cause is margin for error without disconnecting the AP. 21-25 lbs of force is not really that much especially not in an emergency, just give the yoke a solid "pull" and it'll be enough. Keep in mind it's force and not pressure
– Douglas Pettersson
4 hours ago
@curious_cat I would assume that it's a safety requirement that disengaging the autopilot requires a conscious act by the pilots. 21 lbs of force are probably high enough to not be exerted accidentally but still low enough to be produced ad hoc. (21 lbs seem to contradict the "feet on the dashboard" bit in the article. OK, maybe one needs a bit of pushing against the dashboard because it's a horizontal force.)
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Thank you for the answer. Can you give us the source of your quote?
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Hi, the data i quoted can be read here: b737.org.uk/incident_ei-ebw.htm
– Douglas Pettersson
2 hours ago
|
show 1 more comment
up vote
6
down vote
up vote
6
down vote
Im not sure of the full story here. But if you pull the controls of a 737 while the autopilot is engaged the autopilot will trip and the pilots will have to fly the plane manually, this requires about 25 lbs of force.
There is also a button on the yoke where you can disengage the AP. So if the AP was controlling the plane and going in to a violent descent the pilots should have been able to cancel it by pulling the yoke or pushing the button on the yoke or the AP panel.
And no, the controls being hydraulic doesn't play a role in the "override by sheer force" possibility.
Edit:
The autopilot servos are limited to 25 lb of force for single channel operation. Separate force sensors measure pilot column input and the autopilot will disconnect if the force applied by the pilot(s) exceeds 21 lbs.
New contributor
Douglas Pettersson is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
Im not sure of the full story here. But if you pull the controls of a 737 while the autopilot is engaged the autopilot will trip and the pilots will have to fly the plane manually, this requires about 25 lbs of force.
There is also a button on the yoke where you can disengage the AP. So if the AP was controlling the plane and going in to a violent descent the pilots should have been able to cancel it by pulling the yoke or pushing the button on the yoke or the AP panel.
And no, the controls being hydraulic doesn't play a role in the "override by sheer force" possibility.
Edit:
The autopilot servos are limited to 25 lb of force for single channel operation. Separate force sensors measure pilot column input and the autopilot will disconnect if the force applied by the pilot(s) exceeds 21 lbs.
New contributor
Douglas Pettersson is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
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Douglas Pettersson is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
answered 4 hours ago


Douglas Pettersson
1713
1713
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Douglas Pettersson is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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Douglas Pettersson is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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Douglas Pettersson is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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Why would the override be only triggered on such high stick forces? 25 lbs sounds like a decent amount of force.
– curious_cat
4 hours ago
I'm not sure why they constructed the plane this way. But my guess is that the underlying cause is margin for error without disconnecting the AP. 21-25 lbs of force is not really that much especially not in an emergency, just give the yoke a solid "pull" and it'll be enough. Keep in mind it's force and not pressure
– Douglas Pettersson
4 hours ago
@curious_cat I would assume that it's a safety requirement that disengaging the autopilot requires a conscious act by the pilots. 21 lbs of force are probably high enough to not be exerted accidentally but still low enough to be produced ad hoc. (21 lbs seem to contradict the "feet on the dashboard" bit in the article. OK, maybe one needs a bit of pushing against the dashboard because it's a horizontal force.)
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Thank you for the answer. Can you give us the source of your quote?
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Hi, the data i quoted can be read here: b737.org.uk/incident_ei-ebw.htm
– Douglas Pettersson
2 hours ago
|
show 1 more comment
Why would the override be only triggered on such high stick forces? 25 lbs sounds like a decent amount of force.
– curious_cat
4 hours ago
I'm not sure why they constructed the plane this way. But my guess is that the underlying cause is margin for error without disconnecting the AP. 21-25 lbs of force is not really that much especially not in an emergency, just give the yoke a solid "pull" and it'll be enough. Keep in mind it's force and not pressure
– Douglas Pettersson
4 hours ago
@curious_cat I would assume that it's a safety requirement that disengaging the autopilot requires a conscious act by the pilots. 21 lbs of force are probably high enough to not be exerted accidentally but still low enough to be produced ad hoc. (21 lbs seem to contradict the "feet on the dashboard" bit in the article. OK, maybe one needs a bit of pushing against the dashboard because it's a horizontal force.)
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Thank you for the answer. Can you give us the source of your quote?
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Hi, the data i quoted can be read here: b737.org.uk/incident_ei-ebw.htm
– Douglas Pettersson
2 hours ago
Why would the override be only triggered on such high stick forces? 25 lbs sounds like a decent amount of force.
– curious_cat
4 hours ago
Why would the override be only triggered on such high stick forces? 25 lbs sounds like a decent amount of force.
– curious_cat
4 hours ago
I'm not sure why they constructed the plane this way. But my guess is that the underlying cause is margin for error without disconnecting the AP. 21-25 lbs of force is not really that much especially not in an emergency, just give the yoke a solid "pull" and it'll be enough. Keep in mind it's force and not pressure
– Douglas Pettersson
4 hours ago
I'm not sure why they constructed the plane this way. But my guess is that the underlying cause is margin for error without disconnecting the AP. 21-25 lbs of force is not really that much especially not in an emergency, just give the yoke a solid "pull" and it'll be enough. Keep in mind it's force and not pressure
– Douglas Pettersson
4 hours ago
@curious_cat I would assume that it's a safety requirement that disengaging the autopilot requires a conscious act by the pilots. 21 lbs of force are probably high enough to not be exerted accidentally but still low enough to be produced ad hoc. (21 lbs seem to contradict the "feet on the dashboard" bit in the article. OK, maybe one needs a bit of pushing against the dashboard because it's a horizontal force.)
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
@curious_cat I would assume that it's a safety requirement that disengaging the autopilot requires a conscious act by the pilots. 21 lbs of force are probably high enough to not be exerted accidentally but still low enough to be produced ad hoc. (21 lbs seem to contradict the "feet on the dashboard" bit in the article. OK, maybe one needs a bit of pushing against the dashboard because it's a horizontal force.)
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Thank you for the answer. Can you give us the source of your quote?
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Thank you for the answer. Can you give us the source of your quote?
– Peter A. Schneider
3 hours ago
Hi, the data i quoted can be read here: b737.org.uk/incident_ei-ebw.htm
– Douglas Pettersson
2 hours ago
Hi, the data i quoted can be read here: b737.org.uk/incident_ei-ebw.htm
– Douglas Pettersson
2 hours ago
|
show 1 more comment
up vote
2
down vote
With typical hydraulic controls, the mechanical control cable circuit just operates control valves on the hydraulic actuators. The control valves normally only have fairly light centering springs that take only a few pounds of force to overcome. With no other devices in the control circuit, you could move the control column with your pinky finger.
Control feedback forces come from pitch feel devices in the control circuit that use internal spring packs (bungees) and/or roller cam devices to provide a variable resistive force. But the feel units won't drive the circuit, only provide resistance. Two devices can drive the elevator circuit in theory; the autopilot servo and the stick pusher (which is like an autopilot servo that only operates one way).
Autopilot and stick pusher servos have two clutches, a meshing teeth on/off clutch, and a friction slip override clutch. If the A/P servo runs away for some reason, and you can't trigger a disconnect electrically, it is possible to overpower the slip clutch in the servo, but it is like the stick is in not-quite-solidified concrete the whole time you are trying to move it. But you can move it.
The stick pusher servo is similar, but the stick pusher is designed to drive full nose down and release almost immediately.
In any case, if you had an elevator hard over like that and the electrical disconnects (there are usually several difference switches that can perform the disconnect function), the next action would be to operate the mechanical pitch disconnect to separate the left and right elevator circuits. You end up with one free elevator, which will give some control, at least enough to neutralize the overall input.
One possibility is the shock and surprise of the event, whatever it was, overwhelmed the crew and they didn't follow through on all the memory items for that kind of emergency. At this point, who knows.
Also remember that media stories on these kinds of incidents are almost always wildly inaccurate. Anyone who has worked in any kind of technical specialty and reads media reports related to their specialty knows that they are wrong most of the time.
Thanks for the details. (Btw, I have more confidence in the NYT than in most others. They pay a lot of attention to factual correctness and do publish corrections. If you think the article is factually incorrect don't hesitate to send a correction; they surely appreciate it.)
– Peter A. Schneider
2 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
2
down vote
With typical hydraulic controls, the mechanical control cable circuit just operates control valves on the hydraulic actuators. The control valves normally only have fairly light centering springs that take only a few pounds of force to overcome. With no other devices in the control circuit, you could move the control column with your pinky finger.
Control feedback forces come from pitch feel devices in the control circuit that use internal spring packs (bungees) and/or roller cam devices to provide a variable resistive force. But the feel units won't drive the circuit, only provide resistance. Two devices can drive the elevator circuit in theory; the autopilot servo and the stick pusher (which is like an autopilot servo that only operates one way).
Autopilot and stick pusher servos have two clutches, a meshing teeth on/off clutch, and a friction slip override clutch. If the A/P servo runs away for some reason, and you can't trigger a disconnect electrically, it is possible to overpower the slip clutch in the servo, but it is like the stick is in not-quite-solidified concrete the whole time you are trying to move it. But you can move it.
The stick pusher servo is similar, but the stick pusher is designed to drive full nose down and release almost immediately.
In any case, if you had an elevator hard over like that and the electrical disconnects (there are usually several difference switches that can perform the disconnect function), the next action would be to operate the mechanical pitch disconnect to separate the left and right elevator circuits. You end up with one free elevator, which will give some control, at least enough to neutralize the overall input.
One possibility is the shock and surprise of the event, whatever it was, overwhelmed the crew and they didn't follow through on all the memory items for that kind of emergency. At this point, who knows.
Also remember that media stories on these kinds of incidents are almost always wildly inaccurate. Anyone who has worked in any kind of technical specialty and reads media reports related to their specialty knows that they are wrong most of the time.
Thanks for the details. (Btw, I have more confidence in the NYT than in most others. They pay a lot of attention to factual correctness and do publish corrections. If you think the article is factually incorrect don't hesitate to send a correction; they surely appreciate it.)
– Peter A. Schneider
2 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
2
down vote
up vote
2
down vote
With typical hydraulic controls, the mechanical control cable circuit just operates control valves on the hydraulic actuators. The control valves normally only have fairly light centering springs that take only a few pounds of force to overcome. With no other devices in the control circuit, you could move the control column with your pinky finger.
Control feedback forces come from pitch feel devices in the control circuit that use internal spring packs (bungees) and/or roller cam devices to provide a variable resistive force. But the feel units won't drive the circuit, only provide resistance. Two devices can drive the elevator circuit in theory; the autopilot servo and the stick pusher (which is like an autopilot servo that only operates one way).
Autopilot and stick pusher servos have two clutches, a meshing teeth on/off clutch, and a friction slip override clutch. If the A/P servo runs away for some reason, and you can't trigger a disconnect electrically, it is possible to overpower the slip clutch in the servo, but it is like the stick is in not-quite-solidified concrete the whole time you are trying to move it. But you can move it.
The stick pusher servo is similar, but the stick pusher is designed to drive full nose down and release almost immediately.
In any case, if you had an elevator hard over like that and the electrical disconnects (there are usually several difference switches that can perform the disconnect function), the next action would be to operate the mechanical pitch disconnect to separate the left and right elevator circuits. You end up with one free elevator, which will give some control, at least enough to neutralize the overall input.
One possibility is the shock and surprise of the event, whatever it was, overwhelmed the crew and they didn't follow through on all the memory items for that kind of emergency. At this point, who knows.
Also remember that media stories on these kinds of incidents are almost always wildly inaccurate. Anyone who has worked in any kind of technical specialty and reads media reports related to their specialty knows that they are wrong most of the time.
With typical hydraulic controls, the mechanical control cable circuit just operates control valves on the hydraulic actuators. The control valves normally only have fairly light centering springs that take only a few pounds of force to overcome. With no other devices in the control circuit, you could move the control column with your pinky finger.
Control feedback forces come from pitch feel devices in the control circuit that use internal spring packs (bungees) and/or roller cam devices to provide a variable resistive force. But the feel units won't drive the circuit, only provide resistance. Two devices can drive the elevator circuit in theory; the autopilot servo and the stick pusher (which is like an autopilot servo that only operates one way).
Autopilot and stick pusher servos have two clutches, a meshing teeth on/off clutch, and a friction slip override clutch. If the A/P servo runs away for some reason, and you can't trigger a disconnect electrically, it is possible to overpower the slip clutch in the servo, but it is like the stick is in not-quite-solidified concrete the whole time you are trying to move it. But you can move it.
The stick pusher servo is similar, but the stick pusher is designed to drive full nose down and release almost immediately.
In any case, if you had an elevator hard over like that and the electrical disconnects (there are usually several difference switches that can perform the disconnect function), the next action would be to operate the mechanical pitch disconnect to separate the left and right elevator circuits. You end up with one free elevator, which will give some control, at least enough to neutralize the overall input.
One possibility is the shock and surprise of the event, whatever it was, overwhelmed the crew and they didn't follow through on all the memory items for that kind of emergency. At this point, who knows.
Also remember that media stories on these kinds of incidents are almost always wildly inaccurate. Anyone who has worked in any kind of technical specialty and reads media reports related to their specialty knows that they are wrong most of the time.
answered 3 hours ago


John K
10.8k1132
10.8k1132
Thanks for the details. (Btw, I have more confidence in the NYT than in most others. They pay a lot of attention to factual correctness and do publish corrections. If you think the article is factually incorrect don't hesitate to send a correction; they surely appreciate it.)
– Peter A. Schneider
2 hours ago
add a comment |
Thanks for the details. (Btw, I have more confidence in the NYT than in most others. They pay a lot of attention to factual correctness and do publish corrections. If you think the article is factually incorrect don't hesitate to send a correction; they surely appreciate it.)
– Peter A. Schneider
2 hours ago
Thanks for the details. (Btw, I have more confidence in the NYT than in most others. They pay a lot of attention to factual correctness and do publish corrections. If you think the article is factually incorrect don't hesitate to send a correction; they surely appreciate it.)
– Peter A. Schneider
2 hours ago
Thanks for the details. (Btw, I have more confidence in the NYT than in most others. They pay a lot of attention to factual correctness and do publish corrections. If you think the article is factually incorrect don't hesitate to send a correction; they surely appreciate it.)
– Peter A. Schneider
2 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
-4
down vote
Official reply: Yes of course, it's all the pilot's fault.
Realistically, it's somewhat doubtful the pilot could have done much, if anything. The airplane does have hydraulics, but it is strictly fly-by-wire. Which means nothing more and nothing less than you are at the computer's mercy. There have been reported cases where pilot-vs-computer turned out non-fatal, but these occurred at much greater height, giving personnel more time to react.
You can always yank the control wheel up with moderate force, yes. But that doesn't necessarily mean any part of the airplane will move.
In this particular case, it seems like the computer thought the angle of attack wasn't good (due to a defect sensor). So, pulling up would only have caused the computer to further assume stall-stall-stall, and would have caused it to ignore the input (or lower the nose even further, who knows!).
Air France 296, over 25 years ago, was the first example of such a thing happening (Airbus in that case). We are to believe that a pilot with over 20 years of experience drew a trench almost a kilometer long into the Mulhouse forest, during a non-tricky manueuver in perfect weather conditions and for no obvious reason. The black box, kinda, got lost/delayed for over a week, and evidence was, let's say, doubtful/inconclusive. So the best explanation was it was all the pilot's fault, and that's how the case was closed.
Of course, whenever any such thing happens, there's a non-neglegible financial interest from the side of the airplane manufacturer. Something like "this airplane may randomly kill everyone aboard" is the kind of terribly bad press that you want to avoid at all cost, so obviously you will never get to hear anything but "the pilot could have, the pilot should have". That doesn't mean the pilot could really have done anything, though.
New contributor
Damon is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
"Fly-by-wire" does not imply "at the computer's mercy". It just means that some sort of electrical exists between the cockpit crew and the aircraft's control surfaces. My understanding is that, in Airbus's planes, that system is heavily mediated by a computer but, in Boeing's planes, the system essentially just relays the pilot's instructions.
– David Richerby
55 mins ago
2
Also, most of your answer seems to be speculation and conspiracy.
– David Richerby
54 mins ago
add a comment |
up vote
-4
down vote
Official reply: Yes of course, it's all the pilot's fault.
Realistically, it's somewhat doubtful the pilot could have done much, if anything. The airplane does have hydraulics, but it is strictly fly-by-wire. Which means nothing more and nothing less than you are at the computer's mercy. There have been reported cases where pilot-vs-computer turned out non-fatal, but these occurred at much greater height, giving personnel more time to react.
You can always yank the control wheel up with moderate force, yes. But that doesn't necessarily mean any part of the airplane will move.
In this particular case, it seems like the computer thought the angle of attack wasn't good (due to a defect sensor). So, pulling up would only have caused the computer to further assume stall-stall-stall, and would have caused it to ignore the input (or lower the nose even further, who knows!).
Air France 296, over 25 years ago, was the first example of such a thing happening (Airbus in that case). We are to believe that a pilot with over 20 years of experience drew a trench almost a kilometer long into the Mulhouse forest, during a non-tricky manueuver in perfect weather conditions and for no obvious reason. The black box, kinda, got lost/delayed for over a week, and evidence was, let's say, doubtful/inconclusive. So the best explanation was it was all the pilot's fault, and that's how the case was closed.
Of course, whenever any such thing happens, there's a non-neglegible financial interest from the side of the airplane manufacturer. Something like "this airplane may randomly kill everyone aboard" is the kind of terribly bad press that you want to avoid at all cost, so obviously you will never get to hear anything but "the pilot could have, the pilot should have". That doesn't mean the pilot could really have done anything, though.
New contributor
Damon is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
"Fly-by-wire" does not imply "at the computer's mercy". It just means that some sort of electrical exists between the cockpit crew and the aircraft's control surfaces. My understanding is that, in Airbus's planes, that system is heavily mediated by a computer but, in Boeing's planes, the system essentially just relays the pilot's instructions.
– David Richerby
55 mins ago
2
Also, most of your answer seems to be speculation and conspiracy.
– David Richerby
54 mins ago
add a comment |
up vote
-4
down vote
up vote
-4
down vote
Official reply: Yes of course, it's all the pilot's fault.
Realistically, it's somewhat doubtful the pilot could have done much, if anything. The airplane does have hydraulics, but it is strictly fly-by-wire. Which means nothing more and nothing less than you are at the computer's mercy. There have been reported cases where pilot-vs-computer turned out non-fatal, but these occurred at much greater height, giving personnel more time to react.
You can always yank the control wheel up with moderate force, yes. But that doesn't necessarily mean any part of the airplane will move.
In this particular case, it seems like the computer thought the angle of attack wasn't good (due to a defect sensor). So, pulling up would only have caused the computer to further assume stall-stall-stall, and would have caused it to ignore the input (or lower the nose even further, who knows!).
Air France 296, over 25 years ago, was the first example of such a thing happening (Airbus in that case). We are to believe that a pilot with over 20 years of experience drew a trench almost a kilometer long into the Mulhouse forest, during a non-tricky manueuver in perfect weather conditions and for no obvious reason. The black box, kinda, got lost/delayed for over a week, and evidence was, let's say, doubtful/inconclusive. So the best explanation was it was all the pilot's fault, and that's how the case was closed.
Of course, whenever any such thing happens, there's a non-neglegible financial interest from the side of the airplane manufacturer. Something like "this airplane may randomly kill everyone aboard" is the kind of terribly bad press that you want to avoid at all cost, so obviously you will never get to hear anything but "the pilot could have, the pilot should have". That doesn't mean the pilot could really have done anything, though.
New contributor
Damon is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
Official reply: Yes of course, it's all the pilot's fault.
Realistically, it's somewhat doubtful the pilot could have done much, if anything. The airplane does have hydraulics, but it is strictly fly-by-wire. Which means nothing more and nothing less than you are at the computer's mercy. There have been reported cases where pilot-vs-computer turned out non-fatal, but these occurred at much greater height, giving personnel more time to react.
You can always yank the control wheel up with moderate force, yes. But that doesn't necessarily mean any part of the airplane will move.
In this particular case, it seems like the computer thought the angle of attack wasn't good (due to a defect sensor). So, pulling up would only have caused the computer to further assume stall-stall-stall, and would have caused it to ignore the input (or lower the nose even further, who knows!).
Air France 296, over 25 years ago, was the first example of such a thing happening (Airbus in that case). We are to believe that a pilot with over 20 years of experience drew a trench almost a kilometer long into the Mulhouse forest, during a non-tricky manueuver in perfect weather conditions and for no obvious reason. The black box, kinda, got lost/delayed for over a week, and evidence was, let's say, doubtful/inconclusive. So the best explanation was it was all the pilot's fault, and that's how the case was closed.
Of course, whenever any such thing happens, there's a non-neglegible financial interest from the side of the airplane manufacturer. Something like "this airplane may randomly kill everyone aboard" is the kind of terribly bad press that you want to avoid at all cost, so obviously you will never get to hear anything but "the pilot could have, the pilot should have". That doesn't mean the pilot could really have done anything, though.
New contributor
Damon is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
New contributor
Damon is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
answered 1 hour ago
Damon
93
93
New contributor
Damon is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
New contributor
Damon is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
Damon is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
"Fly-by-wire" does not imply "at the computer's mercy". It just means that some sort of electrical exists between the cockpit crew and the aircraft's control surfaces. My understanding is that, in Airbus's planes, that system is heavily mediated by a computer but, in Boeing's planes, the system essentially just relays the pilot's instructions.
– David Richerby
55 mins ago
2
Also, most of your answer seems to be speculation and conspiracy.
– David Richerby
54 mins ago
add a comment |
"Fly-by-wire" does not imply "at the computer's mercy". It just means that some sort of electrical exists between the cockpit crew and the aircraft's control surfaces. My understanding is that, in Airbus's planes, that system is heavily mediated by a computer but, in Boeing's planes, the system essentially just relays the pilot's instructions.
– David Richerby
55 mins ago
2
Also, most of your answer seems to be speculation and conspiracy.
– David Richerby
54 mins ago
"Fly-by-wire" does not imply "at the computer's mercy". It just means that some sort of electrical exists between the cockpit crew and the aircraft's control surfaces. My understanding is that, in Airbus's planes, that system is heavily mediated by a computer but, in Boeing's planes, the system essentially just relays the pilot's instructions.
– David Richerby
55 mins ago
"Fly-by-wire" does not imply "at the computer's mercy". It just means that some sort of electrical exists between the cockpit crew and the aircraft's control surfaces. My understanding is that, in Airbus's planes, that system is heavily mediated by a computer but, in Boeing's planes, the system essentially just relays the pilot's instructions.
– David Richerby
55 mins ago
2
2
Also, most of your answer seems to be speculation and conspiracy.
– David Richerby
54 mins ago
Also, most of your answer seems to be speculation and conspiracy.
– David Richerby
54 mins ago
add a comment |
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@CGCampbell I don't think there is any speculation involved -- I'm asking about a technical airplane feature. I can of course remove the reference to the crash, but the article would betray it anyway.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
@CGCampbell That said, I did remove the pilot's name -- it was indeed unnecessary. It is certainly painful to read about individuals.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
1
It's not clear from that article that it was the autopilot that the captain would have had to overcome. It's a "system" on the MAX 8 designed to kick in automatically to correct a stall. The speculation is that it got bad data and "corrected." I think we can safely assume that if the plane had been on autopilot and suddenly pitched nose-down, the pilot would have pulled back on the yoke with more than the force required to disengage the autopilot. Based on Boeing's guidance (kill power to tail stabilizers), the "system" isn't the autopilot, but smth else -- and apparently harder to overcome.
– T.J. Crowder
1 hour ago
@T.J.Crowder Oh, that is an interesting point. Thanks.
– Peter A. Schneider
1 hour ago
I have removed the final overt reference to the current uninvestigated accident and retracted my Vote to Close as well as all comments.
– CGCampbell
14 mins ago